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This thesis argues that the Jordanian 
state policies towards Islamists, 
tribes, women and Palestinian 
Jordanians affect democratization 
and the democratic culture in Jordan 
as much as it affect the political and 
social identifications of those groups. 
Yet, those policies are altered by 
colonialization, domestic conflicts, 
military occupation and economic 
organization. The findings of this 
study provide bases for further 
researches on democratization and 
the democratic culture in Arab 
countries.
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis employs sociological and political approaches to examine 
democratization and de-democratization processes and their relation to 
democratic culture in Jordan. In addition, it applies a survey approach to 
scrutinize students’ attitudes towards different dimensions of democracy. By 
linking the micro-level of data analysis with macro-level of historical and socio-
political analyses, the study provides solid arguments to extend its finding to the 
Jordanian society at large. 
The study demonstrates how larger processes in Jordan, namely, 
colonialization, domestic conflicts, military occupation and economic 
organization affected state policies and democratization. Democratization means 
the extent to which the state increases or decreases the integration of trust 
networks, categorical equality and autonomous power groups in public politics. 
To this end, this thesis analyzes the relationship between Jordanian state policies, 
Islamists, tribes, gender and Palestinian Jordanians. 
The analysis provides evidences on how democratization and de-
democratization processes shape the political culture and in return how the 
political culture affects those processes. In addition, it maintains that the 
Jordanian state actions and reactions toward national and international 
dynamics affect the nature of Islamism, tribalism, gender equality and 
Palestinian Jordanian identification. Moreover, the analysis finds a strong impact 
of democratization processes on each other. These contributions, as the study 
aspires, provide solid bases for further researches on democratization processes 
and the political culture in Arab and other countries. 
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Väitöskirja 
 
ABSTRAKTI 
Tässä väitöskirjassa tarkastellaan demokratisoitumiseen ja demokratian 
heikentymiseen liittyviä prosesseja sekä niiden suhdetta Jordanian 
demokraattiseen kulttuuriin sosiologisten ja poliittisten lähestymistapojen 
avulla. Työssä tarkastellaan lisäksi kyselytutkimuksen avulla opiskelijoiden 
asenteita demokratian eri ulottuvuuksia kohtaan. Yhdistämällä mikrotason data-
analyysin ja makrotason historiallisen ja sosiopoliittisen analyysin tutkimus 
antaa vankat perustelut sille, että tulosten voidaan katsoa pätevän Jordanian 
koko yhteiskuntaan. 
Tutkimus havainnollistaa, miten laajat prosessit kuten kolonisaatio, sisäiset 
konfliktit, sotilasmiehitys ja taloudellinen järjestelmä ovat vaikuttaneet 
Jordanian poliittisiin toimiin ja demokratisoitumiseen. Demokratisoituminen 
tarkoittaa sitä, missä määrin valtio lisää tai vähentää luottamusverkostojen, 
kategorisen tasa-arvon ja itsenäistä toimivaltaa käyttävien ryhmien osallisuutta 
julkisessa politiikassa. Näin ollen tässä väitöskirjassa analysoidaan Jordanian 
poliittisten toimien, islamistien, heimojen, sukupuolten ja Jordanian 
palestiinalaisten välisiä suhteita. 
Analyysi antaa näyttöjä siitä, kuinka demokratisoitumiseen ja demokratian 
heikentymiseen liittyvät prosessit muovaavat poliittista kulttuuria ja kuinka 
poliittinen kulttuuri puolestaan vaikuttaa näihin prosesseihin. Tutkimuksessa 
argumentoidaan, että Jordanian valtion toimet ja reaktiot kansalliseen ja 
kansainväliseen dynamiikkaan vaikuttavat islamismiin, heimojärjestelmään, 
sukupuolitasa-arvoon ja Jordanian palestiinalaisten identiteettiin. Lisäksi 
analyysissa havaittiin, että demokratisoitumisprosessit vaikuttavat vahvasti 
myös toisiinsa. Näiden tutkimustulosten avulla halutaan luoda vankka perusta 
demokratisoitumisprosesseja sekä arabimaiden ja muiden maiden poliittista 
kulttuuria koskevalle jatkotutkimukselle. 
Avainsanat: demokratia, Jordania, opiskelijat, demokraattinen kulttuuri, 
islamistit, sukupuoli, Jordanian palestiinalaiset, heimot 
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Preface 
Whenever I gain knowledge 
I acquire knowledge about my ignorance 
Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi [150-204 AH] 
  
When I started working on my doctoral research I thought, mistakenly, that I 
have a good knowledge about the history and the society of my country, Jordan. 
Later, it appeared to me that I had, and maybe still have, many unexamined 
opinions about the Jordanian regime and its relations to different social groups. 
The work on this thesis confirmed only a few of my previous opinions, instead 
modifying and correcting many of them. In addition, I found myself learning a 
great deal about the history of Jordan, the relation between different social 
groups and the complexities of power relations. Among many topics, the 
research challenged my understanding of the relations between state, Islamists 
and tribes; clarified the social institutionalization of gender inequality in Jordan; 
explained the relation between Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians; and 
elaborated the political and social status of tribes in Jordan. Moreover, the 
research demonstrated the different attitudes towards these issues among 
Jordanians and the social, political and economic factors behind these attitudes. 
Yet attempting to understand history and societies can be a minefield. In so 
doing the researcher seeks, as much as she or he can, to discover and uncover 
hidden items, examine known ones, scrutinize claimed relations between the 
items and imagine, if needed, new relations. As a result, she or he might be able 
to provide a sufficient or better understanding of the subject of her or his study. 
In this process many items remain hidden. The imagination, which aims to 
provide an understanding of the hidden items through the known ones, might 
be challenged by further examination of the items. This research, at best, does 
not claim to provide any reality beyond the reality of the scientific method that 
is explained here. 
As much as I learned about Jordan, working on this thesis provided me with 
completely different and more profound understandings of democracy and 
democratization. The voyage to conquer the sea of democracy had been quite 
tough for a junior sailor like me. Shortly after leaving the harbor, I found myself 
overwhelmed with many theories and meanings of democracy. One of the 
challenges was to organize these disparate theories and the approaches of 
democracy into larger frames and select the one best suited to this study. At the 
beginning, the study aimed at examining democracy in Jordan. Yet, this attempt 
appeared to be problematic since Jordan is not a democratic state in many 
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dimensions. Studying democracy at an institutional level, legislative level or as it 
is actually practiced through institutions and legislation is fruitful when 
democracy is taken seriously within them. This is not the case in Jordan. 
Thereafter, the research turned to focus on studying attitudes towards 
democracy. This focus required responding to two questions: first, whose 
attitudes the study will examine, and second, towards which dimensions of 
democracy the attitudes will be examined. In response to the first question, the 
study chose for practical and logistical reasons to examine the attitudes of 
university students in Jordan. Examining attitudes towards democracy at the 
national level was infeasible for two reasons: the undemocratic regime and the 
financial impediments for such study. Even researching the segment that was 
chosen for this study posed many difficulties and challenges based on the same 
reasons. As for the second question, the study examined students’ attitudes 
towards democratic concepts, democratic institutions and democratic practices. After 
examining the students’ attitudes and analyzing them based on various factors, 
two serious questions came out: how can the research understand these attitudes 
in their relation to different factors? More important, why do some factors 
appear to dominate the students’ attitudes more than others? The attempt to 
understand these attitudes led the research to examine carefully democratization 
processes in Jordan. Examining democratization processes gave profound 
understanding for the students’ attitudes towards democracy and insights as to 
the factors which dominate these attitudes. Hereby, democratization processes 
in Jordan and their relation to students’ attitudes form the core and the largest 
part of this research. 
Based on the preceding notes and concerns, the chapters of the thesis are 
distributed as following: The introduction presents the back ground of the study. 
The first chapter discusses the theoretical background of this work. This includes 
discussing possible methods to approach democracy; clarifying the meaning of 
democracy as a process; presenting different views about this understanding; 
and considering which understanding is more beneficial for this thesis and 
elucidating how it can be applied in the Jordanian context. The second chapter 
clarifies the subject and the methods of the study. It also provides a general 
description of the data, the methodology and the collection scope. The third 
chapter comes to provide a general description of students’ attitudes towards 
democratic concepts, institutions and practices. In addition, the chapter analyses 
students’ attitudes on the bases of different factors, for example, religiosity, 
gender, country of origin, tribalism, standard living and father education or 
work. Chapters four through seven discuss the relation between state and, 
respectively, four social groups: Islamists, women, Palestinian Jordanians and 
tribes. In addition, the chapters discuss how the state relation to one social group 
influences the relation to other groups. In so doing, the research tries to clarify 
the inter relation between democratization processes. In these chapters, the 
 
  17 
 
research discusses also the impacts of these relations play on students’ attitudes 
towards democracy. The study ends with conclusions and final remarks. 
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1 Introduction 
Studies on democracy and democratization in the Arab world have significant 
importance and value in political, social, economic and academic spheres. This 
importance came from the unique geographical, political, cultural and economic 
position of Arab countries. For instance Arab countries connect the West the Far 
East and Africa with each other, are the heart of the Islamic culture, produce 32 
percent of world oil and have 43 percent of world oil reserves (Fattouh & El-
Katiri, 2012, 10). 
In December 2010, the Arab spring began with high expectations and hopes. 
It drew a bright picture for democracy in a region that, according to many 
scholars (Karatnycky, 2000; Sivan, 1997, 107-108; Tessler, 2002, 230; Stepan & 
Robertson, 2003), has been largely and exceptionally unaffected by democratic 
waves. The Freedom House criteria of ‘Civil Liberties’ and ‘Political Rights’ were 
used by those scholars to support the unique position of the Arab, or Islamic 
world, in relation to democracy. The comparative study by Iliya Harik (2006) 
examined the measurement criteria set by the Freedom House and argued that 
“the exceptionalism thesis propagated by the Freedom House project is the 
product of serious discrepancies in the measurement application” (Harik, 2006, 
664). 
During these days (September, 2013), the bright picture of the Arab spring 
does not seem promising. Huntington (1984), Lewis (2003) and Sivan (1997) 
largely, or partially, accuse Islamic culture for the lack of democracy in Muslim 
or Arab countries. Other scholars (Hunter & Malik, 2005, 328; Tessler, 2000, 233; 
Harik, 2001) refute these claims. They argue that Islam bears different 
interpretations; some contradict democracy while others bolster it. Stepan and 
Robertson (2003) argue that it is not Islamic, but Arab culture which impedes 
democratization in Arab countries. Boix (2006) and Harik (2006) criticize such a 
suggestion by, indicating that it neither clarifies, nor specifies how Arab culture 
is so at odds with democratic principles. In addition, some surveys show that 
certain Arab countries value democracy by margins similar to other democratic 
countries (Boix, 2006; Tessler, 2000). 
Kamrava (1998) acknowledges that Islam has many interpretations and that 
any culture is subject to continual change. However, he concludes that “the 
social, cultural, and political manifestations of Islam in the Middle East, 
especially in the contemporary era, have turned it into a decidedly 
antidemocratic phenomenon” (Kamrava, 1998, 229). Kamrava, however, puts a 
lot of weight on Islam’s role in shaping Muslim political culture. In addition, his 
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arguments suffer from extensive unscientific generalizations and claims (Battah, 
2000). Tessler (2000) examines four Arab countries through analyzing results 
from the World Survey, and demonstrates that Islam has little influence in 
shaping attitudes towards democracy in these cultures. However, Tessler does 
not discuss the specific factors which affect political attitudes in the examined 
countries. In his study of Islamic political culture, democracy and human rights, 
Price (1999, 178) concludes that Islamic political culture contradicts democracy 
and civil liberties “only when the analyst ignores everything else.” He argues 
that regimes in Muslim countries determine the form of political Islam (Price, 
1999, 179). Kabatilo (2013) argues that attitudes towards political Islam in Jordan 
are more driven by gender, social injustice or economic conditions and other 
social factors than religion. 
Chaney (2012) rejects the influence of Arab or Islamic culture on the 
development of democracy, arguing that the legacy of some Arab and Muslim 
countries’ historical institutional frameworks is behind the lack of democracy in 
these countries. Chaney’s argument is similar to other assertions which blame 
long historical processes for the lack of democracy in Arab and/or Muslim 
worlds. Outside this context, Barrington Moore (1966) argued that long-term 
structural trends are critical in democratic transformation. In his analysis of the 
relationship between economy and democracy, Boix (2006) suggests that the 
nature of the economy and the politics surrounding natural resources, rather 
than long-term cultural, institutional or economic structures, is the key factor 
behind democratization. He argues that countries where rulers depend on land, 
mines or other assets that cannot be transferred abroad, these countries will not 
democratize, while those whose rulers depend on industrial and financial assets 
are more apt to democratize. Tareq and Jacqueline Ismael (1997) conducted a 
historical and social analysis of the rise and fall of civil society in Islamic 
civilization. Their analysis supports the Boix argument, which suggested that 
recent changes, rather than long-term structures, affect democracy or democratic 
institutions. This implies that it is not long-term structures, but recent changes 
and current circumstances which influence political culture, transitioning it to a 
democratic stance. Verba (1965, 133) demonstrated the possibilities of 
transforming fundamental attitudes from antidemocratic to democratic in WWII 
Germany. In the same manner, Catterberg (1991, 3) argues that “the act of 
weakening or replacing authoritarian structures with democratic institutions by 
itself can encourage significant changes in the population's political beliefs.” In 
this theory, democratic culture is perceived as resulting from democratization 
rather than a precondition for it. 
In another dimension, studies on democracy and democratization in the Arab 
world assess democracy by focusing on legislation, democratic institutions 
and/or democratic practices; namely elections (Ghadbian, 2002; Harik, 2001). 
Charles Tilly (2007, 7-8) argues that these approaches are insufficient to 
determine if a country is democratic, the level of democracy, or if it is becoming 
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more (or less) democratic. Consequently, Tilly argues that democracy should be 
perceived, approached and analyzed as continuous processes through which 
people’s demands come into being through state policies. Following a pragmatic 
approach to democracy, Cunningham (2001) says that instead of asking whether 
a country is democratic or not, researchers should ask to what extent, and in 
what way, a country, an institution or a group is democratic. Harik’s (2001) 
research included an analysis of democracy, tribes and Islam in Arab countries, 
providing important arguments on how tribal customs and the common 
understanding of the fundamental principles of shari‘a among Muslim scholars 
are democratic. Similarly, a study by Antoun (2000) on conflict resolution, and 
civil society among tribes in Jordan, elaborates the democratic features of the 
mechanisms that tribes apply to the processes of conflict resolution. Such 
arguments suggest that a study about democracy and democratic culture in non-
Western countries needs to look more carefully not only at the mechanisms or 
constitutional foundations of democracy, but also at the very foundation of its 
meaning. For example, a study would need to look at the “power of people,” 
and how this prevails in political and social spheres. 
There has been substantial studying of democracy in the Arab and Islamic 
world, with less on other factors, including how Islamic conceptions, tribal and 
ethnic identifications, economies, and gender influence attitudes towards 
democracy among ordinary Arabs (Tessler, 2000). So, instead of focusing on 
long-term historical structures to understand the political culture in the Arab 
world, there is a necessity for research focusing on the impact of Arab regimes 
and their policies on the popular political culture of Arabs. Moreover, more 
research is needed to approach democracy as continuous processes, underlining 
how its core meaning has prevailed in Arab popular culture (Antoun, 2000; 
Harik 2001). 
In response to the previous discussions and their ascertained needs, more 
research is needed in three areas of the Arab world: first, examining how the 
essence of democracy exists in popular culture; second, focusing on the 
underlying meanings of attitudes towards democracy among ordinary Arabs, 
rather than only measuring aggregates of attitudes; and third, investigating the 
relation between these attitudes and Arab state policies. Studies will offer new 
insights into the democratic features of Arab culture, highlight new areas behind 
the formation of its popular political culture, providing better comprehension of 
future democracy in the Arab world. 
This study examines democracy and democratization in Jordanian popular 
culture, the nature and determinants of Jordanian attitudes towards democracy, 
and the impact of the Jordanian regime’s policies on popular political culture. 
The main question of this study is: What is the relation between Jordanian state 
policies and Jordanian popular attitudes towards democracy? This study 
examines two sub-questions: What is the relation between state policies and 
increasing or decreasing democratization? And what are the popular attitudes 
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towards democracy and the social factors behind them? The answer to the first 
sub-question means examining state policies in a social dimension where the 
state negotiates power relations with tribal, Islamic, gender, and geographical 
(Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians) identifications. The answer to the 
second sub-question means examining popular conceptualization of democracy 
and popular attitudes towards democratic concepts, democratic practices and 
democratic institutions. 
Further analysis is critical to understand the relations between Arab regimes’ 
policies and popular attitudes towards democracy and democratic culture. The 
significance of Jordan originates from many areas: the prominence of the 
Jordanian case, where an endeavor for democracy started almost three decades 
before the establishment of Jordan as an independent state in 1946. Additionally, 
it emanates from the vibrant role that the regime and the British colonial power 
played in creating Jordan as an independent polity and in forming its national 
identity (Massad, 2001). It is also derived from the position of Jordan as a 
Western ally and as an active and important component in the political sphere 
and in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
In order to proceed with analyzing state relation to popular attitudes towards 
democracy and the democratic culture it is imperative to discuss carefully 
different approaches to understand democracy and democratization, the 
methods and the scope of the study. This is the task of the two coming chapters. 
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 22   
 
 
 
2 Approaching Democracy 
and Democratization: 
A Theoretical Framework 
2.1 WHAT IS DEMOCRACY? 
 
Democracy is the power 1  of the people; yet this simple definition holds 
ambiguous, different and contradictory meanings. These meanings appear in 
questions related to theories of democracy. For instance, how can people express 
their power? Is it by direct voting, consensus, electing representatives, etc.? 
Whose power should be considered? Is it the power of adults, power groups, 
criminals, men, women, citizens or something else? Apparently, there is not one 
singular answer to such questions. Scholars adopt different answers depending 
on: how they approach the theory of democracy and/or the context of democracy 
in different eras and places. Georg Sørensen argues (2008, 4) that the debate 
about democracy “has a built-in dynamic: It develops and grows to incorporate 
new aspects and dimensions when the societal context, or the analyst’s 
perception of it, changes”. However, this does not mean that democracy does 
not have a meaning or that it is similar to absolute monarchy, theocracy, 
despotism or any other ruling ideology or method. Having many or 
contradictory understandings for a concept should not mean that they are all 
right or possible. In addition, it should not mean that the concept has no value 
either. Otherwise, the very foundation of knowledge collapses. Considering 
these concerns, the study departs from a basic starting point in which any theory 
or understanding of democracy should not contradict with the basic meaning of 
democracy; i.e. the power of the people. 
Based on the basic meaning of democracy, it is possible to differentiate 
between modes of theories related to democracy. These are democratic theories 
and theories of democracy. Such a differentiation is important in order to 
understand which theories are themselves democratic and which theories are 
about democracy but not necessarily democratic. The first set of theories 
                                                     
1 The term democracy is usually defined as the rule of the people. Yet, democracy was coined from 
Greek δῆμος (dêmos) ‘people’ and κράτος (kratos) ‘power’. 
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considers the essential meaning of democracy as the most important goal. The 
latter set considers other goals as more important goals or limit possible models 
of democracy to how democracy functions in so-called democratic societies. In 
his book A Preface to Democratic Theory, Robert Dahl (1956, 63) suggests “at 
least two possible methods one might employ to construct a theory of 
democracy”. The first method is that of maximization. In this method one needs 
to specify 1) a set of goals to be maximized and 2) the processes to maximize 
them (Dahl, 1956, 63), for example, freedom of expression, participation, 
deliberation, and non-tyrannical state. The second method is the descriptive 
method. In this method one should examine first, distinguishing characteristics 
that so-called democratic nation states and social organizations have in common 
“and, second, the necessary and sufficient conditions for social organizations 
possessing these characteristics” (Dahl, 1956, 63).  In a similar manner, Frank 
Cunningham (2001, 9, 106, 123 & 150) suggests that democratic theories come 
from two traditions; first, the Aristotelian tradition where goals or ideologies 
precede and/or define democracy and second, the Schumpeterian tradition 
where democracy is defined as it functions in so called democratic societies. Yet, 
neither Dahl nor Cunningham seems to distinguish between theories of 
democracy and democratic theories. In the approach of this study which applies 
such a distinction, it is possible to recognize two different sets of goals that 
ought to be maximized. The first set comes from the meaning of democracy, i.e. 
the power of the people. Goals here could include, for instance, political 
participation, deliberation and tolerance. The second set comes from other 
ideologies, for example, liberalism, socialism, Islamism, etc. These goals could 
include, for instance, promoting individualism, social equality, the rule of the 
majority and solidarity. Hereby, only the theories which consider maximizing 
the first set of goals are democratic theories. Other theories which aim at serving 
other ideologies or describing democracy in so-called democratic societies are 
theories of democracy. Based on the preceding discussion, the study outlines the 
main features of democracy in a democratic theory. 
 
 
2.1.1 Features of democracy 
Democracy is an ideology 
Democracy is an ideology more than just a set of tools. It has a goal or an ideal 
which should be maximized and through which values, institutions and 
practices can be evaluated as either democratic or undemocratic. In this era, 
some institutions and practices are part of people’s understanding of democracy, 
for example, parliaments, elections, devolution of power, etc. However, if these 
institutions and practices do not serve or maximize the goal of democracy, then 
they are not democratic practices and institutions. For instance, Charles Tilly 
(2007, 94) notes that associations such as trade unions, for instance, do not 
necessarily hold the key of democratic participation. Authoritarian regimes often 
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establish civil institutions and practices which appear as democratic in order to 
add more legitimacy to their regimes. Yet, these institutions and practices are 
not democratic since they do not aim at increasing the power of the people but 
rather the power of the regime. In many cases, these institutions and practices 
hinder democracy by eliminating or competing with anti-authoritarian 
institutions and practices. 
Different to authoritarian regimes, there are scholars who regard democracy 
as a tool that serves their own ideologies rather than an ideology in its own right. 
These ideologies aim at maximizing goals which often contradict the essential 
meaning of democracy. The works of Yusef Alqardawi (1997) and John Stuart 
Mill (1862) are good examples of such scholars. By utilizing democracy, the 
former aims at nurturing Islamism and the latter aims at nurturing liberalism. 
Hence, they both give priority to their ideologies over democracy. In other 
words, they do not see a contradiction between their ideologies and democracy 
because democracy is a tool rather than an ideology. This understanding of 
democracy might result in emptying democratic institutions and practices from 
their democratic role. For instance, in Alqardawi’s (1997, 142) and Mill’s (1862, 
241) understanding of elections, the former argues that the rule of the majority is 
to be considered in an educated society with Islamic values  while the later 
argues that the vote of an educated voter should weight more than that of an 
uneducated voter. In his discussion about democracy and liberalism, Sørensen 
(2008, 7) concludes that “the liberal democratic tradition is primarily concerned 
with restricting political authority over citizens. Liberty is individual freedom in 
the realm of civil society. Democracy can be a means of achieving this end but [it] 
is not the end itself”. In the approach of this study, democracy is the end itself. 
More importantly, democracy does not aim at restricting political authority over 
citizens but rather at transforming citizens to political authority. 
 
Democracy is progressive 
Another feature of democracy which is based on its essential meaning is that 
democracy is progressive more than conservative. Ilyia Harik (2001, 25-26), who 
mainly discusses democracy by using a descriptive method, argues that 
democracy is more conservative than progressive. By that he means that 
democracy tends to preserve the values and traditions of power groups. He 
argues that power groups who establish the norms of ruling seek through these 
norms to protect their values and traditions. Moreover, in democracies decision-
making and then implementation can take a long time. By delaying the 
conduction and implementation of decisions democracy becomes less 
progressive. In an authoritarian regime the decision can be taken and applied 
faster as long as it is the will of the ruler. In Cunningham’s (2001, 144-145) 
pragmatic view, democracy is progressive rather than conservative as it is a 
continuous process of problem solving, which aims at expanding people’s 
preferences. Since democracy has an ideal goal - increasing the power of all 
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people - then there must be continuous work and progress to reach that goal. 
Hence Cunningham’s (2001) understanding of democracy fits with the essential 
meaning of democracy to a greater degree than Harik’s (2001) understanding. 
 
Democracy is about quantity and quality 
The previous discussion leads to another feature of democracy. Aristotle (1999 
[c.320 BC], 87) and de Tocqueville (2002 [1835–40], 282) understand democracy 
as the rule of the majority. Robert Dahl (1956, 128) discusses the rule of 
minorities as an alternative to the rule of majority. Harik (2001, 129-138) and 
theorists of classic or radical pluralism democracy2 recognize to a large extent 
that democracy is the rule of power groups. These views support a 
representative form of democracy. James Madison, according to Dahl (1956), 
distinguishes between pure democracy and a republic. In the former, citizens 
assemble and administrate the government in person. In the latter, citizens elect 
representatives and the delegation of the government is granted to a small 
number of citizens (Dahl, 1956, 155-157). In line with Madison’s distinction, John 
Dewey (1927, 143), Crawford Macpherson (1973, 51), Carole Pateman (1970, 110-
111) and others support different forms of democracy where people’s 
participation should be expanded and encouraged. The essential meaning of 
democracy is compatible with the latter opinions rather than the former ones. 
A major criticism of considering democracy as the power of all people rather 
than most or some of them would be that this consideration is an ideal that 
cannot be reached. Hereby, the rule of the majority, power groups or minorities 
needs to be considered as realistic alternative approaches. This argument is 
legitimate, however even if the ideal cannot be reached, it is still possible to 
create different political cultures, practices and institutions such as deliberation, 
proportional representation electoral systems, effective civil institutions, etc. 
Moreover, arguing that democracy is the rule of the majority or power groups 
can legitimize and justify undemocratic practices or different levels of 
oppression of different social groups in the name of democracy. These groups 
can be small minorities or large weak groups. Moreover, progressive theories of 
democracy, which aim at making the society a better place, have ideals that are 
impossible to accomplish. Descriptive theories, which aim at describing 
democratic societies rather than changing them, do not provide enough 
knowledge of how to develop or improve democracy. 
Following on from the previous discussion, we can see that increasing the 
number of people who rule does not necessarily mean more democracy. 
Cunningham (2001, 146) assumes that a state, for instance, becomes more 
democratic “when more of the people who make it up come to have effective 
control over what happens to and in it through joint actions they take to this 
end”. In his criticism of such views, Dahl (1956, 90) raises the following 
                                                     
2 For the views of classic and radical plural democracy see (Cunningham 2001, 73,184). 
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questions “What if the minority prefers its alternative much more passionately 
than the majority prefers a contrary alternative? Does the majority principle still 
make sense?” Accordingly, it is hard to say that one decision is more democratic 
than the other just because the number of people who accepted it is more. 
 
Democracy is of unlimited scope 
Following Dewey (1927), Cunningham (2001, 143, 146) suggests that democracy 
is appropriate to all modes of human associations as “political relations of 
publics and government leaders […] do not exhaust democracy”. However, 
Dewey (1927, 143) goes one step further and argues that in order for democracy 
“to be realized it must [emphasis added] affect all the modes of human 
association, the family, the school, industry, religion". This view is wider than 
that of Schumpeter (1942, 269) which limits the democratic method to an 
“institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for 
the people’s vote”3. Apparently, the essential meaning of democracy is most 
compatible with Dewey’s (1927) view. However, it is important to recognize that 
human associations are related to democracy or to democratic theory only in 
their relation to state and public policies. A religious sect, for example, does not 
have to follow the democratic ideal in its internal system. 
In the Arab context, Harik (2001, 140) argues, rightly, that Muslim scholars 
established many rules which gives flexibility to shari'a to encounter new 
situations by establishing new laws or amending previous ones. Harik (2001, 390) 
also pays attention to family values in Arab societies and the important role of 
tribes in sustaining communities and solving conflicts and problems 4 . By 
focusing on shari'a rules, quoting many recognized Muslim scholars and 
referring to the role of extended families in Arab societies, Harik (2001) argues 
that democracy as a mean to assuage the brutality of power and to solve 
conflicts among different groups have strong bases in Arabs' traditions. In 
Harik’s (2001) understanding, democracy can be found in traditional institutions 
as much as in modern ones5. 
 
 
                                                     
3 Influenced by the Schumpeterian realistic approach, yet approaching democracy from an economic 
view, Anthony Downs (1957), a catallactic theorist of democracy, works with more conservative 
view of democracy than Schumpeter. In Downs’ view, people have the ability to vote for candidates. 
However, it is rational for every citizen to minimize his investment in political information (Downs, 
1957, 138,148) and consequently in political action. 
4 For the role of tribes in solving social problems in Jordan see Antoun (2000). 
5 A serious problem in Harik’s (2001) thesis is that he gives a crucial role to power groups and argues 
that the more power groups have power the more they have the right to rule according to their 
preferences. Power is not limited here to the number of people who support a group, but to the 
means, which enable the group to convince people, e.g. discussion, pressure or even lying (Harik, 
2001, 129-138). 
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Democracy is about justice rather than equality or freedom 
A common disagreement among theorists of democracy is the relation between 
democracy, freedom and equality (Cunningham 2001, 29-31). The question here 
is whether freedom should go ahead of equality or whether equality should go 
ahead freedom 6 . Neither understanding fits with the essential meaning of 
democracy. Democracy is about freedom as much as it is about equality. 
Considering that all people should have power to rule (equality) entails that 
they are free to rule according to their preferences (freedom). This is opposite to 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s (2010 [1762], 8, I.vii) understanding of democracy 
where he argues that “anyone who refuses to obey the general will is to be 
compelled to do so by the whole body”. 
Harik (2001, 14, 68-70) strongly and convincingly criticizes  the influence of 
abstract ideologies on democracy by arguing that freedom and equality, as 
democratic concepts, are socially defined concepts, rather than abstract 
ontological ones. Each society draws the meaning of these concepts formally 
through legal binding agreements and informally through social codes, 
traditions and cultures. Justice, as the most important concept in Harik’s (2001) 
thesis, is used to argue against or for the borders of other concepts, for example, 
freedom and equality. He considers justice a matter of rights related to the 
prevailed norms of society and a matter of claim against another party. This 
claim is not recognized except by the approval of others that the claim 
represents a rule, which holds normative and sustained value in the society 
(Harik, 2001, 58). The rule can be an established law or a social tradition (Harik, 
2001, 68). The established law is supported by the power of the state and has a 
coercive power. The social tradition is supported by different communal and 
civil institutions, which do not have the same coercive power of the state. From 
this point, Harik (2001) argues that the rights of freedom and equality can be 
perceived as rights only when there is an established law or a recognized social 
tradition, which support the claim of having such rights. Yet different traditions 
might be supported by different groups within a society, for example, a group 
supports abortion while another rejects it. In addition, the same accepted 
tradition might have different values among different groups, for example, some 
groups think that abortion is not accepted because it violates the right of the 
fetus. Other groups believe that it contradicts strongly with their religious beliefs. 
A perfect solution for these contradictions is impossible. Yet, a democratic 
regime tries, through different mechanisms to find a solution, which suits as 
much parties, or people as possible and alleviate the coercive power of decision 
on others. 
The above discussion advocates that democracy needs continuous efforts to 
solve conflicts and organize power relation in order to approach its ideal. This 
                                                     
6 For a profound discussion of the contradictory relation between freedom and equality in liberal 
theory see Mendus (1989)  
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makes democracy a continuing process rather than a quality that a political 
entity either has or lacks. Thus, a study about democracy entails by virtue of its 
meaning examining democratization and de-democratization. 
 
 
2.2 DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
 
When Charles Tilly (2007) wrote his book Democracy, his aim was to discuss the 
processes of democratization rather than democracy. Yet, this is not to say that 
Tilly was unsuccessful in choosing the title of his book but rather to say that he 
understood democracy as a process. Therefore, Tilly (2007, 140) defines 
democracy as “the extent to which the state behaves in conformity to the 
expressed demands of its citizens” and argues that democratization “consists of 
an increase in conformity between state behavior and citizen’s expressed 
demands”. Yet, before taking Tilly’s definition further let us explore the pre-
conditions of democracy. In this context, many scholars such as Diamond (1993), 
Huntington (1991), Dahl (1956) and Ghadbian (2002) do not seem to distinguish 
between the pre-conditions and the conditions of democracy. In a more 
acceptable view, Dankwart Rustow (1970, 346) argues that “the factors that keep 
a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence: 
explanations of democracy must distinguish between function and genesis”. For 
the scope of this study, the discussion focuses on the factors that bring 
democracy into existence and shape attitudes towards democracy rather than 
the factors that keep democracy stable. 
 
2.2.1 The pre-conditions behind democratization 
As many other issues related to democracy, the pre-conditions, which are 
necessary for democracy and democratic transition are highly disputed among 
scholars. Ghadbian (2002) recognizes two sets of arguments for democratic 
transition7 among scholars. The first set of arguments8 is related to economic 
conditions and the second set is related to the political culture (Ghadbian, 2002, 
23-26). The former argument suggests that there is a positive relation between 
democracy and “economic and social background conditions, such as high per 
capita income, widespread literacy, and prevalent urban residence” (Rustow, 
1970, 337). In the same manner Welzel and Inglehart (2009) argues that 
emancipative values9, which are crucial for democratic transition, tend to spread 
with the development of socioeconomic modernization (Welzel and Inglehart, 
                                                     
7 For other arguments related to democratic transition see Karl (1990) and Anderson (1999).  For a 
bibliography account on democratization see Zuern (1999).  
8 The second set of arguments is discussed in the next section. 
9 Emancipative values are those which give priority to gender equality over patriarchy, tolerance 
over conformity, autonomy over authority and participation over security (Welzel and Inglehart, 
2009, 131).  
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2009, 133). This kind of arguments was challenged by Guillermo O’Donnell who, 
according to Sørensen (2008, 30), argues that “authoritarianism, not democracy, 
seems to be the more likely concomitant of the highest levels of modernization”. 
In line with O’Donnell’s arguments, the economical, educational and 
urbanization development in Arab Gulf states in recent years with the absence of 
democracy there provides evidence which refutes the economic argument. 
However, this does not mean that there is no relation between economy and 
democracy. In his analysis of the relationship between economy and democracy, 
Boix (2006) suggests that the nature of the economy and the politics surrounding 
natural resources, rather than long-term cultural, institutional or economic 
structures, is the key factor behind democratization. He argues that where rulers 
depend on industry and finance, as opposed to land and minerals, 
democratization is more likely. Tareq and Jacqueline Ismael (1997) historical and 
social analysis of civil society in Islamic civilization suggests that the rise and fall 
of it is related to the influence of economic policies implemented by rulers and 
the changes in the international economy after the discovery of the new world. 
Charles Tilly (2007, 15) argues that democratization depends strongly on a 
change in state capacity; as this increases, the more likely it is that the state will 
be able to consolidate its regime. The weaker the state capacity gets the more 
likely the state is not able to consolidate its regime. Hence, democratic and 
nondemocratic countries with strong economy are more likely to consolidate 
their regime than other countries with weak economy. A nondemocratic regime 
might introduce some democratic reforms in order to encounter instability that 
is caused by a weak economy. This was the case in Jordan in 1989 when the 
Jordanian regime introduced some democratic reforms to encounter the riots 
that were caused by devastating economic crisis (Alda‘jeh, 2005, 93; Mahafza, 
2001, 95). 
 
Democratization and the political culture 
The second set of arguments about democratic transition is related to political 
culture. In their classic work The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba used the 
term “political culture” to refer to “specifically political orientations – attitudes 
toward the political system and its various parts and attitudes toward the role of 
the self in the system” (Almond and Verba, 1989 [1963], 12). Their pioneer work 
opened a new spectrum of studies about the relation between political culture 
and political systems. Their basic argument is that it is possible to identify 
certain orientations in the political culture that sustain stable democracy. This 
argument has been largely accepted among political scientists. Yet, many aspects 
of their work, as Verba later on acknowledged, have been convincingly criticized 
(Verba, 2011, iv). For instance, the political culture they identified as necessary to 
sustain a successful democratic system does not fit with the political culture of 
many democratic countries (Dalton and Welzel, 2014, 5-6). In addition, Almond 
and Verba did not differentiate different kinds of support of democracy. 
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Consequently, they did not recognize how the nature of the support of 
democracy could affect democratization. Based on the World Value Survey and 
other cross-national surveys, Welzel and Inglehart (2009) and Dalton and Welzel 
(2014) argue that democracy has positive connotations for most people in most 
countries. Yet, these preferences are superficial or instrumental. They do not 
motivate the mass of people to struggle for democracy. Moreover, countries 
differ considerably in the extent to which they support the intrinsic meaning of 
democracy (Welzel and Inglehart, 2009, 129, 131; Dalton and Welzel, 2014, 7). 
Hereby, Welzel and Inglehart (2009) argue that in democratic transition one 
needs to detect orientations that encourage people to fight for democracy and 
reject authoritarianism. Emancipative values, as Welzel and Inglehart continue 
to argue, constitute precisely this type of orientation. Those values give priority 
to tolerance over conformity, autonomy over authority, gender equality over 
patriarchy, and participation over security (Welzel and Inglehart, 2009, 140). Yet, 
Welzel and Inglehart do not provide us with a clear argument on how and why 
emancipative values develop in some societies but not in others. Richard Wilson 
suggests, after discussing five approaches to examine political culture, that a 
theory of political culture must “specify the functional role of political culture 
[…] It must [… specify] how and why people make choices that affect political 
life. It must specify the nature of the interaction between the normative level and 
the level of preference formation and show how particular interconnections link 
the two levels and how and why behavior or discourse generated at one level 
has an effect on the other. Finally, it must specify a sociological context in which 
hypotheses can be fruitfully tested” (Wilson, 2000, 273). 
In the Arab and Muslim contexts, Rex Brynen defines three categories, 
sometimes overlapping, under which the literature on political culture and 
democracy in the Middle East falls: essentialists, contextualists and critics 
(Brynen, n.d., 7). Essentialists relate the political culture to long historical culture, 
beliefs, physiologies, or institutional frameworks that are highly resistant to both 
change and variation. Huntington (1984), Lewis (2003), Sivan (1997), Chaney 
(2012), and Moore (1966) are a few examples of this category. Wilson (2000) 
argues that essentialists utilize the social character approach, which ignores the 
importance of subcultures within the society and “the significant convergence in 
values and beliefs among the world’s population” (Wilson, 200, 256-257). For 
instance, Huntington (1984, 207-208) claims that certain cultures and beliefs are 
not hospitable to democracy, for example, Islam and Confucianism. Yet, he does 
not recognize the dynamics and the struggle of different subcultures for 
democracy within those cultures and beliefs. Moreover, such claims depend 
merely on insufficient observations and casual relations. Huntington, for 
instance, jumps from observing a lack of democracy in Muslim countries to 
concluding that it is the responsibility of Islam, without bringing one single 
argument. This is similar to a racist argument where someone might claim that 
the lack of development in Africa is because the majority of people there have 
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black skin. Huntington does not recognize that the lack of democracy in Muslim 
countries can be a result of reasons other than Islam, for example, colonialism, 
international relations or internal conflicts. Indeed, Huntington’s claims 
summarize the culture in the one dimension of religion, instead of recognizing 
the different aspects of the culture. Moreover, such claims perceive cultures, 
beliefs or civilizations as static rather than dynamic. They do not recognize that 
the understanding of belief, for instance, is influenced by different aspects of 
culture as it influences them. If beliefs are static, then how could recognized 
scholars of the same belief have different and contradictory opinions about that 
belief? 
Contextualists perceive cultures as dynamic and recognize the different and 
even contradictory subcultures within the same culture (Brynen, n.d., 8). For 
instance, instead of discussing Arab culture, contextualists discuss Arab 
subcultures and how they interact with each other, forming different political 
orientations and redefining the values and the meanings within them. Michael 
Hudson strongly criticizes essentialists’ generalization, yet, stresses that culture 
affects political orientations and attitudes (Hudson, 1995, 61-62). In his view, the 
political culture cannot be reduced to other factors, such as economics, 
institutions or externalities” (Hudson, 1995, 62). Symbols, values and meanings 
change through interactions between different subcultures and power relations. 
Theorists and scholars who have this view utilize the hermeneutic or 
interpretive approach or the culture theory approach (Hudson, 1995, 69; Wilson, 
2000, 249-255). The two approaches, as Wislon argues, depict the changes and 
the diversity of cultures and help in understanding the politics in different 
polities, but do not provide satisfactory explanations as to why people select 
certain biases within the culture (Wislon, 2000, 251, 254). Moreover, the two 
approaches produce limited knowledge about the aspects of the democratic 
political culture or the features of the political culture, which develop or sustain 
democracy, if any. It is not clear whether a certain political culture is a condition 
or precondition to democracy or not. 
To overcome the above shortages, Hudson suggests, in combination with the 
previous approaches, the use of attitude surveys (Hudson, 1995, 69). Utilizing 
cross-national and comparative surveys helps in defining the values and beliefs 
that should exist in a democratic culture. In addition, such surveys enable the 
researchers to examine whether these values are caused by democracy or if they 
have preceded democracy. In addition, they could illustrate whether the relation 
between the values and democracy is casual or substantial. Welzel and Inglehart, 
for instance, utilized different surveys in different papers to argue that a 
democratic political culture should have emancipative values, which give 
priority to gender equality over patriarchy, tolerance over conformity, autonomy 
over authority and participation over security (Welzel and Inglehart, 2009, 131). 
Yet, Welzel and Inglehart’s sole dependency on statistical analyses does not 
allow them to provide any satisfactory answers of how democratic values and 
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beliefs emerge in some political cultures but not in others. In addition, Welzel 
and Inglehart do not tell us how many emancipative values should be spread in 
a culture in order for it to become democratic. Moreover, what if one 
emancipative value, for instance, gender equality, has low levels of support in a 
society and other emancipative values, such as tolerance and participation, have 
high levels of support; should we consider the political culture democratic or not? 
Hereby, one wonders, do emancipative values precede democracy as a condition 
for its existence, as Welzel and Inglehart (2009, 141) suggest, or do they emerge 
within the process of democratization? The latter choice seems to be less 
problematic. 
Critics doom the essentialists’ simplistic and biased stereotypes that 
overwhelm their work on Arab and Muslim societies (Brynen, n.d., 11). Lisa 
Anderson (1995) acknowledges that values and attitudes play a role in politics. 
Yet, she asserts their role is marginal and one should focus on the underlying 
factors that create and alter those values and attitudes (Anderson, 1995, 89-90). 
As Anderson puts it: 
 
“to understand politics, we need to know about institutional structures, sources of 
government revenues, population growth rates, class relations, regime 
constituencies, government policy biases, and a host of other things  before we can 
assess the appropriate context and real significance of political attitudes” 
(Anderson, 1995, 90). 
 
Indeed, what Anderson (1995) suggests is of great importance. However, no 
propriety should be given to the factors she mentioned over the careful 
examination of political culture. As those factors affect the political culture, 
political attitudes and values could also, in turn, affect the factors that created or 
shaped them. 
There is an opposing view to that of essentialists which does not regard the 
political culture as a pre-condition for democracy at all (Sørensen, 2008; 
Ghadbian, 2002). Yet, this view is as much problematic and does not provide 
answers to critical questions. For instance, how broad democracy could be 
established in a society where the majority does not want democracy or where 
the majority does not agree with female participation in public policies? In such 
contexts democracy faces significant challenges unless the political culture of the 
society changes. Indeed, political culture has an important role in 
democratization. However, political culture is dynamic rather than static. In 
addition, political culture should not be perceived as rooted in history as much 
as it is created through state relations to national, regional and international 
actors and through state policies. Verba (1965, 133) demonstrated the 
possibilities of transforming fundamental attitudes from antidemocratic to 
democratic in WWII Germany. In the same manner, Catterberg (1991, 3) argues 
in her study about political culture in Argentina that “the act of weakening or 
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replacing authoritarian structures with democratic institutions by itself can 
encourage significant changes in the population's political beliefs.” In later 
chapters, the study demonstrates how democratization in Jordan is affected by 
state relations and policies and how the political culture in Jordan has been built 
through them. 
The important relationship between the political culture and democratization 
does not mean that political culture is a pre-condition for democracy but rather, 
as the study argues, it is part of the processes of democratization. In previous 
discussions, the study argued that democracy needs continuous efforts to solve 
conflicts and organize power relations in order to approach its ideal. Developing 
the political culture is part of those continuous efforts and hence it is part of 
democracy. In this understanding there is no country which is one hundred 
percent democratic or one hundred percent undemocratic, rather countries are 
democratic or undemocratic to different degrees. Most countries with a long 
democratic tradition, for instance, only granted women and black people equal 
political status in law within the last century yet were all considered 
‘democratic’ at that time. 
Sørensen (2008, 54) notes that “no single factor can account for the 
contemporary surge toward democracy. Each case involves a complex pattern of 
internal and external elements; in each, various conditions interplay with 
different groups of actors”. Rustow (1970) recognizes a process10 for democratic 
transition instead of a single condition or a set of conditions, which consists of 
one condition and three overlapping phases. The only condition for democracy 
is national unity. By this, Rustow (1970, 350) “simply means that the vast 
majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental 
reservations as to which political community they belong to”. The three 
overlapping phases of democratic transition 
 
“are (1) the preparatory phase, characterized by a political struggle leading to the 
breakdown of the nondemocratic regime; (2) the decision phase, where clear-cut 
elements of a democratic order are established; and (3) the consolidation phase, 
where the new democracy is further developed, and democratic practices 
eventually become an established part of the political culture” (Sørensen 2008, 
54)11. 
 
Based on the national unity condition, Rustow (1970, 350-351) argues that 
democracy is impossible when cleavages within the country lead to questioning 
national unity or when citizens of many countries have “serious aspirations for 
merger as in many Arab states”. Ghadbian (2002) agrees with this. However, he 
notes that Arab nationalism was prominent during the fifties and the seventies 
                                                     
10 In Tilly’s (2007, 23) definition, a process is “combinations and sequences of mechanisms that 
produce some specific outcomes”. 
11 Discussing the third phase is beyond the scope of this study. 
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of the previous decade. Yet, after this period political powers in Arab countries 
focus on local issues and the political boundaries of Arab countries are widely 
accepted (Ghadbian 2002, 31-32). However, Ghadbian (2002) does not recognize 
that Islamic unity replaced largely Arab nationalism more than national unity. 
Contary to Rustow (1970) and Ghadbian (2002), Sørensen (2008, 48) notes that 
“the phases often overlap. In India, for example, the preparatory phase of the 
struggle for democracy began long before national unity and independence were 
achieved”. Rather than considering national unity as a background condition 
that “must precede all the other phases of democratization” (Rustow, 1970, 351)12, 
it is more acceptable to think about national unity as part of the democratization 
processes or as part of the changing political culture13. In the Jordanian context, 
the national unity is of great significance. As chapter six discusses, state policies 
related to Palestinian Jordanians creates serious debates about who is Jordanian 
and preserves retaining the answer ambiguous. By so doing, the state 
consolidates its regime and increases its capacity. 
In the preparatory phase or the struggle phase as it can also be named, 
Rustow (1970) does not provide us with the reasons that create the struggle. 
Tilly’s (2007) model about the relationship between democratization and state 
capacity provides a general answer for this question. As the study noted before 
Tilly (2007) argues that democratization depends strongly on a change in state 
capacity. By state capacity Tilly (2007, 16) means  
 
“the extent to which interventions of state agents in existing non-state resources, 
activities, and interpersonal connections alert existing distributions of those 
resources, activities, and interpersonal connections as well as relations among 
those distributions.” 
 
According to Tilly (2007, 40, 77), four powerful processes alter state capacity: 
military conquest; colonization; domestic confrontations; and revolution (Tilly 
2007, 40, 77). Behind these processes lie larger changes in social life, for example, 
transformation of economic organization, mass communications, population 
mobility and education (Tilly, 2007, 77). Sørensen (2008, 66) suggests that 
 
“weak states are deficient in three basic respects. First, the economy is defective; 
there is a lack of a coherent national economy capable of sustaining a basic level of 
welfare for the population and of providing the resources for running an effective 
state. […] Second […] relations between people in society; they do not make up a 
coherent national community. […] third major problem in weak states concerns 
the state apparatus in a direct sense (i.e., the institutions of government at all 
levels).Weak states lack effective and responsive institutions”. 
                                                     
12 For similar opinion see John Stuart Mill (1862, 310) in Considerations on Representative Government. 
13 The work of Arend Lijphart (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies provides excellent ground for this 
opinion. 
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The preparatory phase should conclude “deliberate decision on the part of 
political leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to 
institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic procedure” (Rustow, 1970, 
355). Sørensen (2008, 49) argues that “the decision phase may be split into 
several subphases”. Moreover, the decision phase results from the interplay of a 
number of forces and overlaps with the previous phase. Hence the outcome of 
the decision varies considerably and predicting it by using a general rule is 
almost impossible. For instance, Tilly (2007, 44) argues that “once a regime has 
entered the volatile zone of democratization and de-democratization, on the 
whole, moves away from democracy occur more rapidly, with less popular 
participation, and under greater elite influence than moves towards democracy”. 
This argument is supported by Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman’s (2005) 
study, in which they found that “the force of civic resistance was a key factor in 
driving 50 of 67 transitions [… and that] there is comparatively little positive 
effect for freedom in “top-down” transitions that were launched and led by 
elites”. Contrary to these findings, Terry Lynn Karl (1990, 8) argues in her study 
of democratization in Latin America that “to date, however, no stable political 
democracy has resulted from regime transitions in which mass actors have 
gained control, even momentarily, over traditional ruling classes”. Such 
contradictions demonstrate the difficulties in finding general paths that could be 
used to predict the outcome of the decision phase. However, this does not mean 
that it is not possible to assess democratization during, before and after 
democratic transition. 
 
2.2.2 Assessing democratization and de-democratization 
In his examination of countries which remain in the gray “between being 
outright authoritarian and being fully democratic”, Sørensen (2008, 44-45) 
recognizes four characteristic features of those countries: partially fair and/or 
free elections; weak states; elite domination; and popular mobilization and 
organization for the struggle of democracy. These characteristics are very helpful 
to identify countries in the gray area but are not sufficient to identify which of 
those countries are more or less democratic. For instance, deficits in elections can 
result from vote-buying, a lack of transparency or the unfair distribution of 
constituencies. If different countries have different deficits in their respective 
elections, how can we assess which elections are more or less democratic? A 
simple answer could be: elections which result in representing more people is 
more democratic. However, these elections might result, at the same time, in 
strong conflict between ethnic groups, failure in forming the government and 
other drastic consequences. Would those elections be the most democratic 
among others? The previous discussion about features of democracy elaborated 
that democracy is not only about quantity but also about quality. 
Assessing democracy, as Tilly (2007) notes, depends on how democracy is 
understood. For instance, Tilly’s (2007, 140) own understanding is that 
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democracy is “the extent to which the state behaves in conformity to the 
expressed demands of its citizens”. In this understanding, which fits well with 
the arguments of this study, elections, voting, political parties, referendums and 
other institutions and practices do not necessarily reflect the level of democracy 
and they are not sufficient to determine whether a country is democratic or not. 
Tilly recognizes four approaches to democracy: constitutional, substantive 
procedural and process-oriented. According to Tilly (2007), these approaches are 
not sufficient to find out if a country is democratic or not, what is the level of 
democracy or whether a country becomes more (or less) democratic. In Tilly’s 
(2007, 7-8 [original emphasis]) words 
 
“A constitutional approach concentrates on laws a regime enacts concerning 
political activity […] however, large discrepancies between announced principles 
and daily practices often make constitutions misleading. Substantive approaches 
focus on the conditions of life and politics a given regime promotes: Does this 
regime promote human welfare, individual freedom, security, equity, social 
equality, public deliberation, and peaceful conflict resolution? [… Yet], how do we 
handle tradeoffs among these estimable principles? If a given regime is 
desperately poor but its citizens enjoy rough equality, should we think of it as 
more democratic than a fairly prosperous but fiercely unequal regime? [...] 
Advocates of procedural definitions single out a narrow range of governmental 
practices to determine whether a regime qualifies as democratic […] despite their 
crisp convenience, they work with an extremely thin conception of the political 
processes involved”. 
 
Tilly’s (2007) concerns do not demolish the value of the first three approaches14, 
but rather they point at their limitations to understand the dynamics of 
democracy and democratization; for example, to examine the causes and effects 
of democratization and how democracy interacts and molds in different contexts. 
For the purposes of this study those limited approaches will be largely avoided. 
A more promising approach is the process-oriented approach, as Tilly (2007) 
calls it, which is suggested by Robert Dahl (2005). 
Dahl (2005) suggests six crucial institutions that need to be strengthened, 
deepened and consolidated for democratization in undemocratic or newly-
democratic countries. As Tilly (2007, 9) notes, Dahl identifies “some minimum 
set of processes that must be continuously in motion for a situation to qualify as 
democratic”.  Dahl (2005, 188-189) argues that the minimum requirements for 
polyarchy15 democracy are:  
 
                                                     
14 The fourth approach is discussed below.  
15 Polyarchy is derived from Greek words meaning “many” and “rule,” thus “rule by the many.” The 
term was introduced by Robert Dahl and his colleague in 1953 (Dahl 2005, 192)  
 
  37 
 
• Elected officials. Control over government decisions about policy is 
constitutionally vested in officials elected by citizens. Thus modern, large-
scale democratic governments are representative. 
• Free, fair and frequent elections. Elected officials are chosen in frequent 
and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively 
uncommon. 
• Freedom of expression. Citizens have a right to express themselves 
without danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, 
including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the 
socioeconomic order, and the prevailing ideology. 
• Access to alternative sources of information. Citizens have a right to 
seek out alternative and independent sources of information from other 
citizens, experts, newspapers, magazines, books, telecommunications, and 
the like. Moreover, alternative sources of information actually exist that 
are not under the control of the government or any other single political 
group attempting to influence public political beliefs and attitudes, and 
these alternative sources are effectively protected by law. 
• Associational autonomy. To achieve their various rights, including 
those required for the effective operation of democratic political 
institutions, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent 
associations or organizations, including independent political parties and 
interest groups. 
• Inclusive citizenship. No adult permanently residing in the country and 
subject to its laws can be denied the rights that are available to others and 
are necessary to the five political institutions just listed16. 
 
Guillermo O'Donnell (1996) argues that according to Dahl’s criteria, a country 
remains democratic if elected politicians are subject to severe constraints, vetoes, 
or exclusion from certain policy domains by other, nonelected actors or when 
their constitutional mandated terms is ended arbitrarily. Hereby, O'Donnell 
(1996, 35) suggests that in polyarchy democracy constitutionally mandated 
terms of elected officials and their authority in certain policy domains should 
not be subject to arbitrary termination and/or severe constraints, vetoes, or 
exclusion by other, nonelected actors. In Jordan the two objections appear 
significant. The King, for instance, dissolves the elected parliament often before 
the end of its mandated term. 
According to Dahl (2005), his democratic institutions are useful to examine 
what nondemocratic countries lack or to consolidate newly democratized 
countries. Yet, he recognizes that the institutions are not sufficient to develop 
democracy or to examine its level in old democracies since they represent the 
                                                     
16 In his book Democracy and its Critics, Dahl (1989) suggests seven institutions rather than six. In his 
later work he replaces inclusive suffrage and the right to run for office with inclusive citizenship. 
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minimum requirements for democracy (Dahl 2005, 197). Tilly (2007) 
acknowledges this limitation and adds that Dahl’s institutions are not sufficient 
to compare regimes with regard to how democratic they are or to follow 
individual regimes through time, observing when and how they become more 
or less democratic. More important, the institutions do not provide an insight 
into causes and effects of democratization and de-democratization (Tilly, 2007, 
10). Indeed, Dahl’s (2005) criteria provide a yes/no checklist, which might be 
helpful to examine democracy at one specific point in time or to produce a 
political report about democracy in different countries. However, it is too static 
to provide a clear insight about the causes and effects of democratization and the 
fluctuation of democracy over time. 
As an alternative approach to democratization, Tilly (2007, 140) argues that 
democratization “consists of an increase in conformity between state behavior 
and citizen’s expressed demands”. Assessing the conformity between state’s 
behavior and citizens expressed demands require examining to what extent  
 
“relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and 
mutually binding consultation [i.e. to what extent a regime is democratic]. 
Democratization means net movement toward broader, more equal, more 
protected and more binding consultations. De-democratization, obviously, then 
means net movement toward narrower, more unequal, less protected, and less 
binding consultation” (Tilly, 13-14).  
 
By ‘broad’, Tilly (2007) means the extent to which people are segmented from or 
included in public politics under the state’s jurisdiction. Equality is the extent to 
which different groups of citizens enjoy equal translation of their demands into 
state behavior; protected is the extent to which people are protected against the 
state’s arbitrary action; and binding consultation is the extent to which state 
agents have clear, enforceable obligations to deliver benefits without needing to 
resort to bribes, cajoling, threatening, or using third-party influence to get 
anything at all (Tilly, 2007, 13-15). 
The features of ‘broad’ and ‘equal’ correspond to - and represent for most - 
an understanding of freedom and equality in democracy. Protected and 
mutually binding consultation features correspond to and represent for most 
discussions about state capacity and power groups. Those features, as the 
previous discussion demonstrates are, not new to democratic theory or theories 
of democracy. What Tilly (2007) brings to the table is that he argues that three 
necessary processes, not conditions, promote those features and their reversals 
demote them. The three processes are related to: trust networks, categorical 
inequality and autonomous power centers (Tilly 2007, 74).  In Tilly’s (2007, 23) 
words 
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”The fundamental processes promoting democratization in all times and places, 
the argument runs, consist of increasing integration of trust networks into public 
politics, increasing insulation of public politics from categorical inequality, and 
decreasing autonomy of major power centers from public politics”. 
 
In the same manner, the fundamental processes promoting de-democratization 
consist of decreasing integration of trust networks into public politics; 
decreasing the insulation of public politics from categorical inequality, and 
increasing autonomy of major power centers from public politics. 
Before discussing the three processes, two points need to be clarified. First 
Tilly (2007) applies his thesis of democracy and democratization merely to state-
citizens relations. Yet, he recognizes that “we can’t make sense of public politics 
by focusing on citizen-state interactions alone, but must examine coalitions, 
rivalries, and confrontations among major political actors outside the state as 
well” (Tilly 2007, 13). Second, Tilly (2007, 78) talks about processes which are in 
motion because of changes in state capacity: “Regularities in democratization 
consist […] of recurrent casual mechanisms that in varying combinations and 
sequences produce changes in categorical inequality, networks of trust and non-
state power”. In this view a state might be heading towards more or less 
democratization without having the intention to do this. 
 
2.2.3 Democratization and de-democratization processes 
 
Trust Networks 
Trust networks as Tilly (2007, 74) defines them are “ramified interpersonal 
connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, 
consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, 
mistakes or failures of other”. De Tocqueville (2002 [1835–40], 213-221) analyses 
and values the vibrant role of non-governmental free associations in American 
democracy; he argues that “in the United States, as soon as a party is become 
preponderant, all public authority passes under its control; its private supporters 
occupy all the places, and have all the force of the administration at their 
disposal” (de Tocqueville, 2002 [1835–40], 217). Hereby, free and independent 
associations become an essential element to guard democracy from the tyranny 
of the winner (de Tocqueville, 2002 [1835–40], 217-218). Yet, in his analysis of the 
role of associations in Europe, de Tocqueville detects carefully the undemocratic 
role that associations could play17. Apparently, his analysis is outdated and 
                                                     
17 For instance, he notes, “the principal aim of these bodies [associations in Europe] is to act, and not 
to debate, to fight rather than to persuade, they are naturally led to adopt a form of organization 
which differs from the ordinary customs of civil bodies, and which assumes the habits and the 
maxims of military life. They centralize the direction of their resources as much as possible, and they 
entrust the power of the whole party to a very small number of leaders” (de Tocqueville, 2002 [1835–
40], 221). 
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cannot be applied to contemporary free associations in United States and Europe. 
However, it could provide good understanding of the contradictory roles that 
free associations could play in increasing or decreasing democratization. 
Skocpol (1997) criticizes de Tocqueville’s analysis of the relation between the 
central government and associations in America. She argues that the central 
government services in America were utilized not only by the winning party but 
also by all parties and associations. These national services allowed different 
parties and associations to mobilize their members, recruit new ones and expand 
their power (Skocpol, 1997, 461-463). “In America’s national history, the 
structure and activities of the federal government, along with translocal and 
competitive forms of popular political mobilization, created an “opportunity 
structure” that nourished, encouraged, and rewarded voluntary associations” 
(Skocpol, 1997, 472). Thus, associations in America were not completely 
independent from the government, but rather they were working within its 
frame. 
The pertaining question here is how distrust could be reduced between 
regimes and independent associations? A level of trust should be present in a 
democratic political culture. To say the least, political actors should trust each 
other in subscribing to the basic rules, which organize political actions and 
competition. Almond and Verba (1963) focused on allegiance participant citizens 
who, in the civic culture, are “oriented positively to the input structures and the 
input process” (Almond and Verba, 1989 [1963], 30). Inglehart and Welzel (2003) 
argue that interpersonal trust is important to develop and sustain democracy 
(Inglehart and Welzel, 2003, 64).  Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki claimed 
that the extension of citizens’ actions against elites degrade representative 
democracy (Dalton and Welzel, 2014, 5). These opinions were challenged by 
Dalton and Welzel (2014) who argued that protestors do not necessarily reject 
democracy, rather they commit themselves to democratic ideas of requite from 
the elites to be responsive to public demands. In addition, trust in political 
parties, electoral processes and political institutions seem to decline in most 
advanced democratic societies. However, the appreciation of democracy remains 
the same (Dalton and Welzel, 2014, 5-6). Indeed an absolute trust between 
political actors is unrealistic and implicitly means the end of opposition. In the 
same manner, an absolute distrust between political actors results in political 
disorder. A level of trust, which preserves order and leaves a space for 
opposition and change, is the only possible solution. However, how could a 
democratic culture preserve this level or trust? Tilly’s simple answer to this is by 
integrating trust networks in public politics (Tilly, 2007). 
Following Mark Warren (1999), Tilly (2007) sees a problematic relation 
between public politics and trust networks. Public politics attempts, for instance, 
to produce collective binding decisions. Yet, collective binding decisions mean 
unequal realization of different trust network interests (Tilly 2007, 93). A 
complete integration of trust networks into public politics would result either in 
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trust networks giving up their preferences and hence, dissolving these networks 
or in thwarting public politics. In responding to this problematic, Tilly (2007, 94) 
suggests a level of distrust or a contingent consent from the side of trust 
networks and a shift “from coercion toward combination of capital and 
commitment” from the side of state. However, if this author understands Tilly 
(2007) rightly, then the problematic that he tried to solve should not exist in his 
thesis in the first place. This is to say that, according to Tilly (2007, 95), 
integrating trust networks into public politics (for most) means motivating trust 
networks members to engage in mutually binding consultation. Members of 
trust networks engage in mutually binding consolations when they commit 
themselves to the state law. However, this practice does not inevitably require 
that trust network members accept the law or at least not object it. In democratic 
and undemocratic states people could be unsatisfied with the law and might 
seek to change it. Yet, they would still obey the law they object. Integrating trust 
networks into public politics - or in other words, integrating trust networks into 
mutually binding consultation - does not necessarily require that trust networks 
give up what they stand for and should not result in their dissolution. 
The distrust or contingent consent that Tilly (2007) suggests is unnecessary 
and possibly even dangerous. It could open the door for tensions between trust 
networks instead of discussion and corporation. In addition, promoting 
conditional obedience to public law and/or order could result in violating the 
law and disturbing the public order. Two large processes affecting trust 
networks underline democratization 1) dissolution of integration of segregated 
trust networks and 2) creation of politically connected trust networks (Tilly, 2007, 
74). The second process is meant for authoritarian regimes, which create their 
own trust networks to expand their power and oppress democracy. 
 
Categorical inequality 
Regarding categorical inequality, Tilly (2007, 75) defines it as the  
 
“organization of social life around boundaries separating whole sets of people 
who differ collectively in their life chances as is commonly the case with categories 
of gender, race, caste, ethnicity, nationality, and religion and is sometimes the case 
of categories of social class.”  
 
The issue here is related mainly to inequality in political rights and the 
insulation of public politics from categorical inequality rather than social or 
material inequalities 18 . However, according to Tilly (2007, 110) crystallizing 
                                                     
18 All regimes, democratic or undemocratic, intervene in the production of inequality in three 
different ways: “by protecting the advantages of their major supporters; by establishing their own 
systems of extraction and allocation of resources; and by redistributing resources among different 
segments of their subject populations” (Tilly, 2007, 117). Thus, the absence of inequality is not an 
 40   
 
 
cannot be applied to contemporary free associations in United States and Europe. 
However, it could provide good understanding of the contradictory roles that 
free associations could play in increasing or decreasing democratization. 
Skocpol (1997) criticizes de Tocqueville’s analysis of the relation between the 
central government and associations in America. She argues that the central 
government services in America were utilized not only by the winning party but 
also by all parties and associations. These national services allowed different 
parties and associations to mobilize their members, recruit new ones and expand 
their power (Skocpol, 1997, 461-463). “In America’s national history, the 
structure and activities of the federal government, along with translocal and 
competitive forms of popular political mobilization, created an “opportunity 
structure” that nourished, encouraged, and rewarded voluntary associations” 
(Skocpol, 1997, 472). Thus, associations in America were not completely 
independent from the government, but rather they were working within its 
frame. 
The pertaining question here is how distrust could be reduced between 
regimes and independent associations? A level of trust should be present in a 
democratic political culture. To say the least, political actors should trust each 
other in subscribing to the basic rules, which organize political actions and 
competition. Almond and Verba (1963) focused on allegiance participant citizens 
who, in the civic culture, are “oriented positively to the input structures and the 
input process” (Almond and Verba, 1989 [1963], 30). Inglehart and Welzel (2003) 
argue that interpersonal trust is important to develop and sustain democracy 
(Inglehart and Welzel, 2003, 64).  Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki claimed 
that the extension of citizens’ actions against elites degrade representative 
democracy (Dalton and Welzel, 2014, 5). These opinions were challenged by 
Dalton and Welzel (2014) who argued that protestors do not necessarily reject 
democracy, rather they commit themselves to democratic ideas of requite from 
the elites to be responsive to public demands. In addition, trust in political 
parties, electoral processes and political institutions seem to decline in most 
advanced democratic societies. However, the appreciation of democracy remains 
the same (Dalton and Welzel, 2014, 5-6). Indeed an absolute trust between 
political actors is unrealistic and implicitly means the end of opposition. In the 
same manner, an absolute distrust between political actors results in political 
disorder. A level of trust, which preserves order and leaves a space for 
opposition and change, is the only possible solution. However, how could a 
democratic culture preserve this level or trust? Tilly’s simple answer to this is by 
integrating trust networks in public politics (Tilly, 2007). 
Following Mark Warren (1999), Tilly (2007) sees a problematic relation 
between public politics and trust networks. Public politics attempts, for instance, 
to produce collective binding decisions. Yet, collective binding decisions mean 
unequal realization of different trust network interests (Tilly 2007, 93). A 
complete integration of trust networks into public politics would result either in 
 
  41 
 
trust networks giving up their preferences and hence, dissolving these networks 
or in thwarting public politics. In responding to this problematic, Tilly (2007, 94) 
suggests a level of distrust or a contingent consent from the side of trust 
networks and a shift “from coercion toward combination of capital and 
commitment” from the side of state. However, if this author understands Tilly 
(2007) rightly, then the problematic that he tried to solve should not exist in his 
thesis in the first place. This is to say that, according to Tilly (2007, 95), 
integrating trust networks into public politics (for most) means motivating trust 
networks members to engage in mutually binding consultation. Members of 
trust networks engage in mutually binding consolations when they commit 
themselves to the state law. However, this practice does not inevitably require 
that trust network members accept the law or at least not object it. In democratic 
and undemocratic states people could be unsatisfied with the law and might 
seek to change it. Yet, they would still obey the law they object. Integrating trust 
networks into public politics - or in other words, integrating trust networks into 
mutually binding consultation - does not necessarily require that trust networks 
give up what they stand for and should not result in their dissolution. 
The distrust or contingent consent that Tilly (2007) suggests is unnecessary 
and possibly even dangerous. It could open the door for tensions between trust 
networks instead of discussion and corporation. In addition, promoting 
conditional obedience to public law and/or order could result in violating the 
law and disturbing the public order. Two large processes affecting trust 
networks underline democratization 1) dissolution of integration of segregated 
trust networks and 2) creation of politically connected trust networks (Tilly, 2007, 
74). The second process is meant for authoritarian regimes, which create their 
own trust networks to expand their power and oppress democracy. 
 
Categorical inequality 
Regarding categorical inequality, Tilly (2007, 75) defines it as the  
 
“organization of social life around boundaries separating whole sets of people 
who differ collectively in their life chances as is commonly the case with categories 
of gender, race, caste, ethnicity, nationality, and religion and is sometimes the case 
of categories of social class.”  
 
The issue here is related mainly to inequality in political rights and the 
insulation of public politics from categorical inequality rather than social or 
material inequalities 18 . However, according to Tilly (2007, 110) crystallizing 
                                                     
18 All regimes, democratic or undemocratic, intervene in the production of inequality in three 
different ways: “by protecting the advantages of their major supporters; by establishing their own 
systems of extraction and allocation of resources; and by redistributing resources among different 
segments of their subject populations” (Tilly, 2007, 117). Thus, the absence of inequality is not an 
 42   
 
 
social or material inequality into common practices and translating this 
inequality to public politics impede democratization. 
Linda Dalloul (2004) distinguishes between historical social movements and 
development organizations, which strive for modernization. According to 
Dalloul (2004, 124), the former strives for creating another society and the latter 
strives for developing the same society. Borrowing from Dalloul (2004), it is 
possible to recognize at least two strategies through which the state might 
increase the insulation, for instance, of gender inequality from public politics. In 
the first strategy, the state develops the social status of women through laws and 
institutions, which affirm different social roles based on gender. For example, 
decreasing the illiteracy of women through education and asserting the women 
role as a housekeeper through the curriculum. In the second strategy, the state 
leads or responds positively to strong social movement, which aims at changing 
the norms of society rather than developing the social status and asserting the 
norms. For example, the state decreases the illiteracy of women and alters the 
way of perceiving gender roles by promoting women as a breadwinner besides 
the man. Both strategies challenge Tilly’s (2007) flat argument about the relation 
between categorical inequality and democratization. This is to say, in both 
strategies the state is increasing the insulation of gender inequality from public 
politics (democratization). However, in the first strategy the state is also 
crystalizing gender roles and translating it to public politics (de-
democratization). In the second strategy the state is challenging severely the 
majority of people and segmenting them from public politics by altering 
profoundly the structure, the norms and the practices of their society (de-
democratization). In both strategies it is problematic to assess if democratization 
is increasing or decreasing and even more problematic to assess the level of 
democratization. Nonetheless, considering that democracy is the power of 
people rather than the power of the majority, an ideology rather than a tool or 
mechanism, and problematic rather than a perfect solution, it is possible to argue 
that the second strategy increases democratization rather than de-
democratization. Hence, democratization increases: first, when the state 
increases the insulation of categorical inequality from public politics by 
changing the structure, norms and practices of the society, or second, when the 
state increases the insulation of categorical inequality from public politics 
without increasing the institutionalization and systematization of social 
inequalities. 
 
Autonomous power groups 
“The third essential alteration behind democratization consists of reducing 
autonomous power clusters within the regime’s operating territory, especially 
                                                                                                                                   
absolute condition for democracy, rather the insulation of public politics from whatever material 
inequality exist accomplish democracy (Tilly, 2007, 117-118). 
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clusters that dispose of their own concentrated coercive means” (Tilly, 2007, 137) 
for example, warlords, military rulers, secret intelligence. Tilly (2007, 139) 
defines three processes that reduce autonomous power clusters: 1) Expanding 
political participation, 2) Equalization of access to non-state political resources 
and opportunities, 3) Inhibition of autonomous and/or arbitrary coercive power 
both within and outside the state. The third process does not include only the 
inhibition of arbitrary coercive power but also the inhibition of autonomous 
power to operate outside the control of public politics. This means that “state 
agents [should] have clear, enforceable obligations to deliver benefits by 
category of recipient without the need of bribe, cajole, threaten, or use third-
party influence to get anything at all” (Tilly, 2007, 15) or the need of patronage 
relation to the agent. 
The three processes that reduce autonomous power clusters implicitly entails 
that the consent of elite to give part of their power is not a precondition for 
democratization as some scholars suggest (Diamond, 1993). Rather, those three 
processes compel the elites to reduce or negotiate their power. In addition, 
reducing the autonomy of power groups through the three processes differs 
from the arguments, which aims at regulating more than reducing the autonomy 
of power groups to operate outside of public politics (Harik, 2001, 129-138). In 
these arguments, power groups come to an arrangement through which they 
manage their relations to each other and to the state. In the former view, the 
processes do not happen by deliberate decision and agreement but rather 
through mechanisms that subject state to public politics and/or facilitate popular 
influence over public politics (Tilly, 2007, 141). Some of these mechanisms could 
follow undemocratic paths, yet they might lead to democratization, for example, 
terminating a civil war by using excessive force. 
This study holds the position that Tilly’s (2007) approach is useful as a 
starting point to understand the processes of democratization and de-
democratization. Yet, his approach must be taken more carefully by examining 
not only the processes as separated but also as related to each other. Though 
Tilly (2007) emphasized on the importance of the relation between the three 
processes to understand democratization, his examination and analyses of the 
different cases through his book neglected largely this relation. Moreover, this 
present study takes Tilly’s (2007) approach one more step and examines not only 
the relation between state policies, trust networks, categorical inequality and 
autonomous power groups  but also how democratization processes are related 
to attitudes towards democratic concepts, institutions and practices. By so doing, 
the study aspires to draw more profound understanding of democratization 
effects. This is done by examining the relation between democratization 
processes and university students’ attitudes towards democracy in Jordan. 
Before starting the ambitious analysis of the three democratization processes in 
Jordan, let us examine what this research entails. 
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2.3 DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESSES IN JORDAN 
 
Based on the preceding discussion, examining democratization processes entails 
examining the relation between state, trust networks, categorical inequality and 
autonomous power groups. In Jordan, examining trust networks entails 
examining the relation between the state and Islamists. Islamists in Jordan are 
the main opposition to state policies at a national level and they form strong 
networks through different kinds of social and political institutions - for 
example, charity organizations, schools, hospitals, political parties, etc. However, 
these institutions function largely under the state’s public politics and their 
strength does not form any significant threat to the stability of the Jordanian 
state. Consequently, it is more convincing to consider Islamists’ institutions as 
trust networks rather than autonomous power groups, which operate outside 
the public political domain. 
Non-Islamist trust networks in Jordan - for example, other political parties 
and civil society institutions - lack strong organizational structures and/or 
significant roles in the public sphere. Hence, these trust networks are excluded 
from this study. State politically-connected trust networks are also excluded 
from the study since their integration in public politics does not hold the key to 
democratic participation. 
Analyzing categorical inequality involves examining gender inequality and 
the status of Palestinian Jordanians. As this study demonstrates in subsequent 
chapters, women are insulated to a large extent from public politics by state 
policies or by the social culture of different groups, for example tribes and 
religious groups. In the same manner, Palestinian Jordanians are also insulated 
to a noticeable level from public politics by state policies and by the integration 
of Jordanian tribes in public institutions. There is no evidence to my knowledge, 
that other inequalities, for example religious, ethnic, social class, etc. form a 
phenomenon that is related to their insulation from public politics. 
Examining autonomous power groups in Jordan entails examining the 
position of tribes in Jordan and their relation to the Jordanian state. Jordanian 
tribes have strong trust networks, yet they have been challenging the state’s 
capacity and functioning outside the state public politics in many ways. Hence it 
is more convenient to think about Jordanian tribes as autonomous power groups 
rather than trust networks. Jihadist Islamists movements who adopt militant 
agendas form autonomous power groups as well. Yet, the small size of these 
movements and the successful policies of the state to encounter and contain their 
threat limit significantly their ability to operate significantly outside public 
politics. Hence, the study excludes them from the analysis. 
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3 The purpose of the study: 
Subjects, methods and 
material 
Democratic reform started in Jordan with the influence of international, regional 
and local factors in 1989. Shortly after the reform, democracy started to 
deteriorate without affecting the legitimacy of the Jordanian regime or brining 
any significant public mobilization against this deterioration. More recently, the 
Arab Spring brought demonstrations to Jordan. Yet, the demonstrations have 
not been as strong as those in other Arab Spring countries. The regime says that 
it introduced crucial and sufficient democratic reforms after the Arab Spring. 
The opposition for its part degrades the regime’s reforms, describing them as 
superficial. In this context, many important questions come out: Is democracy 
increasing or decreasing in Jordan?  How can researchers appraise 
democratization? What is the relation between democratization processes and 
the democratic culture? Studies on democratization in Jordan assess democracy 
by focusing on legislation, democratic institutions and/or democratic practices, 
namely elections (Alda‘jeh, 2005; Ghadbian, 2002; and Mahafza, 2001). As 
mentioned before, Tilly (2007, 7-8) argues that these approaches to 
democratization are not sufficient to determine if a country is democratic or not, 
what the level of democracy is, or whether a country is becoming more (or less) 
democratic19. Equally important there is a clear lack of material which examines 
how the processes of democratization in Jordan affect Jordanians’ attitudes towards 
democracy. Tilly’s (2007) concerns do not demolish the value of the used 
approaches, but rather they point at their limitations to understand the 
dynamics of democracy and democratization, for example, to examine the 
causes and effects of democratization and how democracy interacts and molds 
in different contexts.  
This study contributes to the discussion of democracy in Jordan in two main 
dimensions: first, it assesses democratization by scrutinizing the relations 
between the state, trust networks, categorical inequality and autonomous power 
groups rather than focusing simply on legislation, institutions and practices. 
                                                     
19 The next chapter provides more discussion for Tilly’s views. 
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Second, it examines how these relations affect Jordanians’ attitudes towards 
democracy. 
Assessing democratization in Jordan implies analyzing the processes through 
which the state decreases or increases the integration of Islamist groups trust 
networks into public politics, the insulation of gender inequality from public 
politics, the insulation of ethnic 20  inequality (Palestinian Jordanians and 
Transjordanians) from public politics, and the autonomy of tribes to operate 
outside the control of public politics. 
In order to provide an empirical insight into the effects of democratization 
processes on Jordanians’ attitudes towards democracy, the study analyses the 
impact of the ongoing process of democratization on university students’ 
attitudes towards democracy in four dimensions: democratic concepts, for 
example, freedom of expression, equality and citizenship; democratic institutions, 
for example, parliament and political parties; democratic practices, for example, 
elections and demonstrations; and the attitudes towards the relationship between 
democracy and different actors, for example, state, Islamists and tribes. These 
dimensions are interrelated and in some cases there is no clear cut between them. 
However, recognizing these dimensions as separate is useful for analytical and 
explanatory purposes. Hereby, the study needs to reformulate its main question 
and the two sub-questions and make them more specific. The main question will 
become: what is the impact of the ongoing process of democratization on 
students’ attitudes towards different dimensions of democracy? The two sub-
questions: How does the relation between State, Islamist groups, women, and 
ethnic and tribal identifications affect democratization in Jordan? What are the 
students’ attitudes towards democratic concepts, democratic institutions and 
democratic practices? 
 
 
3.1 METHODS 
 
Conducting research regarding sensitive political and social topics in a semi-
democratic, developing Arab country is a challenge. The methods used in such 
research are limited, as in-depth interviews by a male researcher would likely 
exclude many conservative or religious females because of gender sensitivities. 
Organizing group discussions (‘focus groups’) on political issues might cause 
legal persecution or limit freedom of speech for some. Distributing a national 
questionnaire would require official permits that are difficult to acquire. 
Conducting research which deals with sensitive political and social topics in a 
semi-democratic, developing Arab country is a challenging task. Considering 
such impediments and the nature of the study, the research employs a survey 
                                                     
20 The term ethnic in this context is not accurate; the discrimination is based on the geographical 
place of origin of Jordanians namely Jordanians of Palestinian origin and Jordanians of 
Transjordanian origin. The problematic of defining Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians in 
discussed in (Layne, 1994, 18-321).  
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approach (questionnaire) to examine students’ attitudes towards different 
dimensions of democracy. In addition, the research relies on historical and socio-
political analyses of the data within the literature related to the relation between 
the state, Islamist groups, women and geographical and tribal identifications. 
The subject of the literature selected for examination depended mainly on the 
analyses of the questionnaire data. The analyses, as the study demonstrates in 
chapter three, single out four major factors which have significantly stronger 
relations to students’ answers than do other possible factors. These factors are 
religiosity, gender, country of origin and tribalism. 
The choice of the university student was driven by two factors: first, they 
represent a sizeable population composed of different social groups and second, 
they are more accessible to the academic researcher than are other social groups. 
Nonetheless, acquiring permissions to distribute the questionnaire in different 
universities presented many obstacles as it is demonstrated later in this chapter. 
By linking the micro-level of data analysis with macro-level of historical and 
socio-political analyses in the forthcoming chapters, the study should be able to 
extend its finding to the Jordanian society at large. In addition, the study aspires 
that the systematic analysis of democratization processes and their relation to 
state policies and the political culture in Jordan will provide solid bases for other 
researches to examine democratization processes and the democratic culture in 
Arab countries. 
The questionnaire consists of five sections (see appendix 1): 1) general 
information 2) democracy 3) political parties 4) civil society 5) citizenship. The 
general information section has questions related to the social and economic 
background of the students namely, gender, age, religiosity, economic condition, 
field of study, education of parents, parents work, year of study, country of 
origin and religion. The other sections of the questionnaire examine students’ 
attitudes towards the four dimensions of democracy: 1) democratic concepts 2) 
democratic institutions 3) democratic practices and 4) the relation between 
democracy and different actors. In the assessment of the data, the fourth 
dimension is established through the analyses of the first three dimensions. The 
analysis used Chi-Square test to examine the significance of the relationship 
between the answers and general information factors. 
The recognition of the four dimensions of democracy was built on the 
assumption that students could have varied attitudes towards them. For 
instance, a negative attitude towards political parties (institutions) does not 
mean the same attitude towards democracy (concepts) itself. Hereby, 
recognizing these dimensions of democracy would provide more 
comprehensive and solid understanding of the students’ attitudes. Yet, the 
questions about the four dimensions do not cover them completely; rather, they 
cover the essential points which are sufficient to facilitate an understanding of 
students’ attitudes towards the four dimensions and to examine their relation to 
democratization processes. 
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3.1.1 University students in Jordan 
There were 237,000 university students (undergraduate, graduate and 
postgraduate) enrolled in ten public, and sixteen private, universities in the 
academic year 2007/2008 (Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, 
2008). The majority of students are females (51.26 percent). Females account for 
59.7 percent of the students in sociology, 70.1 percent of the students in 
humanities and shari‘a, and 83 percent of students in education departments. 
Males account for 70.1 percent of the students in engineering, 74.6 percent in law 
and 64.8 percent in commercial and business administration (see appendix 2). 
University students have organized demonstrations at university campuses 
since the government continues to take coercive measurements to prevent them 
from going elsewhere (Schwedler & Sam, 2010, 287). These demonstrations are 
largely related to governmental economic policies, for example, raising 
university fees and removing subsidies on essential products. They are also 
related to international conflicts such as the Palestinian-Israeli one, and the war 
in Iraq. Nonetheless, these demonstrations are often mixed with demands for 
democratic reform (Ottawy & Hamzawy, 2011, 4; Schwedler & Sam, 2010, 287; 
Satloff, 1986b, 23-24). In 1986, student demonstration at Yarmouk University 
escalated from just a few dozen to nearly three thousand students – 
approximately 20 percent of the students at the university. The demonstrators 
demanded lowering the fees and reinstating the students who had been 
dismissed from university at the beginning of the demonstration (Satloff, 1986b, 
23-24). By challenging the state martial laws, and limitations on freedom of 
assembly and speech at that time, the demands took an overtly political 
dimension. The government responded by allowing seventy five soldiers from 
the General Security Forces to enter the university and crush the students’ 
demonstration (Satloff, 1986b, 23-24). This severe clash between the government 
and the students has not been repeated since then. 
Political activities are not allowed inside the universities (Al-Fdaylat, 2013). 
The state does not allow for the establishing of a national student union. The 
student unions function only within the boundaries of their respected 
universities (Al-Taqrir Al-Sanawi Al-Rab‘ Lilhurriyat Al-Tullabiyah Wa Al- ‘Unf 
Al-Jami‘i, 2012). There are two student national organizations in Jordan, the 
National Campaign for Student Rights ‘Zabahtuna’ (literally ‘you slaughtered 
us’), established in 2008, and the Jordanian Democratic Youth Union, established 
in 2002. Both organizations focus on national economic and political demands 
(National Campaign for student Rights, 2013; Ottawy & Hamzawy, 2011, 11). 
However, as noted by Ottawy & Hamzawy (2011, 11) their activities do not seem 
to have had any significant impact at national level, or to reach students outside 
cities. 
In the mid-1990s, clashes based on tribal identification started to grow among 
university students (Ahmad, 2012). According to many observers (Abu Rumman, 
2013; Faek, 2013; Al-Fdaylat, 2013) the issue became a social phenomenon, which 
required careful attention. In 2011, the National Campaign for Student Rights 
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registered fifty eight fights among university students compared to thirty one in 
2010 (Al-Taqrir Al-Sanawi Al-Rab‘ Lilhurriyat Al-Tullabiyah Wa Al- ‘Unf Al-
Jami‘i, 2012). Chapter seven discusses how this anti-democratic behavior is a bi-
product of state policies. 
 
3.1.2 Data collection 
The questionnaire data was collected in Jordan between January and April 2008 
at four public universities (P), and three private ones (R). 735 questionnaires 
were distributed and 630 returned - a response rate of 85.7 percent. After 
examining the collected questionnaires, I excluded 56 either because they were 
not sufficiently completed, or they had been completed improperly. 
Insufficiently completed questionnaires did not provide information about the 
social and economic background and/or did not provide answers for, at least, 
half of the analyzed questions. An answer was considered improper when it 
followed an unacceptable pattern and provided clear inconsistent answers to 
related questions, for example, answering ‘absolutely’ to all the questions, which 
are related to forms of gender equality (see appendix 2, question 55). A further 
110 questionnaires were excluded because they were completed by non-
Jordanian citizens. It is important to exclude those students since they come 
from different societies, cultures and educational systems; so including them 
could create statistical errors when analyzing the data. The study analyses the 
remaining 464 questionnaires, which constitute a 63 percent response rate. The 
percentages of respondents from public and private universities were 72.7% and 
27.3% respectively (see table 1). The selection of the universities was not 
exclusive; the researcher approached three other public universities: the 
University of Jordan, Yarmouk University and Jordan University for Science and 
Technology. However after reviewing my questionnaire, the rectors of the first 
two universities refused to grant permission to distribute the questionnaire on 
their campuses due to ideological and political sensitivities. No reason was 
mentioned by the third university. However, undeterred, the researcher 
managed to distribute a few questionnaires to University of Jordan students 
outside the campus. 
The attempt to get permission from the three mentioned universities was an 
interesting experience. Officials at Jordan University were constantly asking the 
researcher to come back again after one or two days had passed. Each time they 
had excuses for why they had not looked at the questionnaire. When an official 
noticed the determination of the researcher, he or she sent him to another office, 
where he had to wait for another two days. In total, the researcher visited the 
university thirty times before he was told that his request was declined. At 
Yarmouk University the researcher had to travel by car or bus five times from 
Amman to Irbid before his request was declined. At Jordan University for 
Science and Technology, officials were seemingly more sincere; however after 
giving permission and asking the researcher to bring them the number of copies 
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3.1.1 University students in Jordan 
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he wanted distributed, they withdrew the permission on his second visit, 
without giving any explanation. 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
 University of Jordan (P) 18 3.9 
 Mu’tah(P) 135 29.1 
 Philadelphia(R) 20 4.3 
 Alhusain Ben Talal(P) 179 38.6 
 Altatbiqyyah(R) 65 14.0 
 Petra(R) 2 .4 
 Amman Al’ahlyih(R) 45 9.7 
 Total 464 100.0 
 
 
Mu’tah University and Alhusain Ben Talal University are located respectively in 
M‘an and Karak. The majority of the population in both cities is Transjordanian 
and they have stronger tribal identification than in Amman. The University of 
Jordan, Altatbiqyyah University, Petra University and Amman Al’ahlyih 
University are located in Amman. Philadelphia University is in the north 
between Amman and Jarash. 
A group of doctors and lecturers assisted this research by granting 
permission to distribute the questionnaire in their lectures. They either asked the 
students to fill the questionnaire during the lecture or to bring the questionnaire 
back in the following lecture. The students were free to choose between filling 
the questionnaire and leaving it. The questionnaire was distributed in university 
requirement courses. These courses are attended by students from all disciplines. 
The selection of the classes, though arbitrary was limited to the classes of the 
doctors and lecturers who assisted me. I was also assisted by some students who 
volunteered to distribute the questionnaire among their friends. All necessary 
measures were considered to protect the privacy of the respondents and to 
inform those who wish about the results of the research. The main characteristics 
of my sample include broad characteristics of Jordanian university students. Yet, 
probability sampling was practically impossible; hence the research had to rely 
on non-probability convenience sampling. In addition, by linking the macro 
level of literature with the micro level of the survey in the analysis, the study 
hopes to reduce biased results that the sample could create. 
The atmosphere during which the questionnaire was charged with the echo 
from the second publication of Muhammad cartoons in 2007 (the first one was in 
2005) and the government’s attempts to sell off national institutions and 
buildings to the private sector, and to decrease subsidies on fuel and other 
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products. It is expected that these issues influenced the students’ response to 
some questions. However, the research focuses on the underlying reasons and 
factors governing students’ attitudes, rather than only measuring aggregates of 
attitudes. As a result, these issues do not disturb the analysis and the arguments 
of this research. 
 
3.1.3 General characteristics of the students 
Table 2 represents the students' profiles in terms of gender, country of origin, 
field of study, economic condition, religiosity, year of study, work of parents, 
education of parents, age and religion. After examining the results most of these 
factors were coded into new variables in order to avoid having cells, which 
count less than necessary in the Chi-square test and to examine further possible 
relations between the factors and the answers. The country of origin factor was 
recoded into three variables instead of seven. The economic condition was 
recoded into three variables instead of five. The year of study was recoded into 
three variables instead of nine. Going to mosques was recoded into three 
variables instead of four. Attending religious lessons was recoded into three 
variables instead of four. The education of the parents was recoded into three 
variables instead of seven. The age of students was recoded into three variables 
instead of twelve. 
The percentage of female respondents is higher than male respondents; 57.6% 
and 42.4% respectively. More respondents were of Transjordanian origin 
(Transjordanians) than a Palestinian origin (Palestinian Jordanians). Other 
Jordanians were originally Syrians, Chechens, Circassians and Iraqi. The fathers 
of the students have better education than the mothers and the unemployment 
rate among the latter is significantly higher than among the former. The 
economic condition is determined by the students' perceptions of their living 
conditions, rather than the income of the family. Religiosity is measured in two 
ways: the frequency of going to mosques or churches apart from Friday or 
Sunday prayer, and the frequency of attending religious lessons apart from 
Friday or Sunday prayer. Apparently, this conceptualization of religiosity is 
limited and does not represent the complexity of being religious. Nonetheless, it 
provides the research with an important and clear factor that can be examined. 
In this respect, a religious person in Jordan is not necessarily an Islamist and a 
nonreligious person is not necessarily a secular. For instance, the data shows that 
some students who attend religious lessons and go to mosques do not 
necessarily agree that the state should apply religious moralities, for example, 
banning alcohol. The study could not find any evidence that this attitude exists 
among Islamists in Jordan. Though it is hard to find a clear distinction between a 
definition of an Islamist and a definition of a religious person, it is possible to 
say that an Islamist is a person who is politically active and who places the 
religious rhetoric in the center of his thoughts or arguments. A religious person 
might lack at least one of these conditions. A nonreligious person mostly 
believes strongly in Islam as an ideal and in its important role in social life, 
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however, he or she does not pay much attention to the practice of Islam. In 
addition, Christian students are not sufficiently represented in the sample (7 
Christian students out of 464 students, 1.5%). For statistical purposes, they are 
excluded from the analyses of questions related to religion or the religiosity 
factor. Hereby, the analysis of these questions represents only Muslim students. 
The analyses show that there is a relation between going to mosques and the 
gender of the student. Female students tend to go to mosques less than their 
male counterparts. This relation does not exist when it comes to attending 
religious lessons: female students attend religious lessons as frequently as males. 
Attending religious lessons includes going to a lesson or listening to a lesson in 
the media. 
Before examining and analyzing the three processes of democratization in 
Jordan and their relation to students’ attitudes, the study presents students’ 
attitudes towards democratic concepts, institutions and practices. In addition, 
the next chapter examines the factors which are related to these attitudes; do 
these factors influence each other? If yes, how do they do that? And what are the 
most important factors which have relations to the students’ attitudes? 
 
Variable Categories Percentage 
Gender Male 
Female 
42.4% 
57.6% 
Country of Origin Transjordanian 
Palestinian Jordanian 
Other Jordanian 
62.5% 
32.7% 
4.8% 
Field of Study Applied Science 
Social Science  
Humanities 
Politics and law 
26.2% 
32.4% 
31% 
10.4% 
Economic conditions Less than average 
Average 
More than average 
11.4% 
60.8% 
27.8% 
Religiosity (1)  
Attending religious lessons apart 
from Friday or Sunday prayer 
At least once a week 
At least once a month 
Barely or do not attend 
16.3% 
17.9% 
62.2% 
Religiosity (2) 
Going to mosques or churches apart 
from Friday or Sunday prayer 
Almost daily  
At least once a month  
Barely or do not go  
15.7% 
19.5% 
58.4% 
Year of Study First year 
Second year 
Higher than second year 
36.4% 
29% 
34.6% 
Work of the father Public sector 
Private sector 
14.3% 
17% 
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Private business owner 
Unemployed 
Retired  
26.1% 
8.6% 
34% 
Work of the mother Public sector 
Private sector 
Private business owner 
Unemployed 
Retired 
6.1% 
1.8% 
0.7% 
85.7% 
5.7% 
Education of the father Illiterate or low education 
High school 
College or university 
19.1% 
34.8% 
46.1 
Education of the mother Illiterate or low education 
High school 
College of university 
27.7% 
37.5% 
34.8% 
Age 18 or less 
More than 18 
11.2% 
88.8% 
Religion Muslim 
Christian 
Others 
98.5% 
1.5% 
0.0% 
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4 University Students’ 
Attitudes towards 
Democracy 
This study is about democratization processes in Jordan and their influence on 
university students’ attitudes towards democracy, rather than the students’ 
attitudes themselves. Nonetheless, the study needs to present these attitudes and 
determine their relation to various factors. There are two reasons for starting the 
analysis by presenting the students’ attitudes in relation to different social 
factors; first, the linear process of the thesis started by examining the students’ 
attitudes before examining democratization processes. Following this order 
could provide better understanding of how the research proceeded. Second, 
after analyzing the relations between different social factors and the students’ 
attitudes, it became clearer that some factors have stronger and more coherent 
relations to the attitudes than other factors. Presenting these results at first 
provides better understanding of the importance of analyzing democratization 
processes and examining their relations to the students’ attitudes in the 
following chapters. 
This chapter proceeds by presenting students’ attitudes towards democratic 
concepts, democratic institutions and democratic practices in three sections. 
Each section is followed by a short discussion of the results. In order to avoid 
distraction, the chapter minimizes where possible the use of tables and charts. 
Tables and charts are used in later chapters to provide better understanding of 
the discussions there. Whenever the chapter states that there is a relationship 
between the answers and a given factor, this means that the relation is tested by 
Chi-Square and that the p-value is 0.05 or less. Moreover, every relationship is 
tested by adding other factors, which have a relation to the same question, as a 
layer in the crosstabulation analysis. This is important in order to examine 
whether the relation between the answers and the factor is influenced by any 
other factor or not. 
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4.1 STUDENTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC 
CONCEPTS 
 
4.1.1 The importance of democracy 
The majority of students (64.6%) tend to say that the democratic system is 
excellent or very good, 7.4% say that it is bad or very bad and 28% say it is good. 
In another question about the relation between democracy and security the 
majority of students (74.8%) say that democratic reform will lead to 
strengthening security in society, 8.8% of the students say that security should 
be introduced and democracy should be reduced. None of the factors have 
relation to the students’ answers in both questions. The results of both questions 
show positive attitudes towards democracy among students. 
Two other questions are related to the previous questions. In the first 
question, 66.1% of students tend to agree absolutely, to a large extent or 
somewhat that the Jordanian street opposes the democratic choice because it 
leads to social changes, which may include women’s status and freedom of 
expression in religious and intellectual issues. In another question, the majority 
of the students (64%) agree absolutely, to a large extent or somewhat that the 
democratic culture and awareness in the Jordanian society are weak. There is no 
relation between the answers of the two questions and any factor. The results of 
the last two questions show skeptical or negative attitudes towards the 
understanding or appreciation of democracy among Jordanians. Nonetheless, 
these attitudes do not undermine the value of democracy among students. This 
is an indication that student would support democracy even when they think 
that other Jordanians do not support it or are even against it. 
 
4.1.2 The collective identity 
Students were asked to rank the importance of five issues that a political party 
should consider in its platform. These are economic development, Arab issues, 
Islamic issues, national issues and social development. Islamic issues scored the 
highest with 4.18 points out of 5; followed by national issues 2.96 points; Arab 
issues 2.71 points; economic development 2.59 points and social development 
with 2.55 points. There is no relation between the answer here and any factor. 
Regardless of their social, economic and religious backgrounds, the majority of 
students support Islamic issues at first. However, as the study discusses in the 
next chapter, students do not have a clear understanding of the relation between 
Islam and the state. Moreover, they do not necessarily understand Islam as 
Islamists do. In other words, students do not support Islamists as much as they 
support issues related to Islam. For students, Islam is an ideal, which leads to 
good life. This vague yet strong position of Islam makes it an excellent collective 
identity. On the one hand, the ambiguity of Islam assists preventing any extreme 
understandings of it, which might contradict with democracy. On the other 
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4.1 STUDENTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC 
CONCEPTS 
 
4.1.1 The importance of democracy 
The majority of students (64.6%) tend to say that the democratic system is 
excellent or very good, 7.4% say that it is bad or very bad and 28% say it is good. 
In another question about the relation between democracy and security the 
majority of students (74.8%) say that democratic reform will lead to 
strengthening security in society, 8.8% of the students say that security should 
be introduced and democracy should be reduced. None of the factors have 
relation to the students’ answers in both questions. The results of both questions 
show positive attitudes towards democracy among students. 
Two other questions are related to the previous questions. In the first 
question, 66.1% of students tend to agree absolutely, to a large extent or 
somewhat that the Jordanian street opposes the democratic choice because it 
leads to social changes, which may include women’s status and freedom of 
expression in religious and intellectual issues. In another question, the majority 
of the students (64%) agree absolutely, to a large extent or somewhat that the 
democratic culture and awareness in the Jordanian society are weak. There is no 
relation between the answers of the two questions and any factor. The results of 
the last two questions show skeptical or negative attitudes towards the 
understanding or appreciation of democracy among Jordanians. Nonetheless, 
these attitudes do not undermine the value of democracy among students. This 
is an indication that student would support democracy even when they think 
that other Jordanians do not support it or are even against it. 
 
4.1.2 The collective identity 
Students were asked to rank the importance of five issues that a political party 
should consider in its platform. These are economic development, Arab issues, 
Islamic issues, national issues and social development. Islamic issues scored the 
highest with 4.18 points out of 5; followed by national issues 2.96 points; Arab 
issues 2.71 points; economic development 2.59 points and social development 
with 2.55 points. There is no relation between the answer here and any factor. 
Regardless of their social, economic and religious backgrounds, the majority of 
students support Islamic issues at first. However, as the study discusses in the 
next chapter, students do not have a clear understanding of the relation between 
Islam and the state. Moreover, they do not necessarily understand Islam as 
Islamists do. In other words, students do not support Islamists as much as they 
support issues related to Islam. For students, Islam is an ideal, which leads to 
good life. This vague yet strong position of Islam makes it an excellent collective 
identity. On the one hand, the ambiguity of Islam assists preventing any extreme 
understandings of it, which might contradict with democracy. On the other 
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hand, the shared Islamic identity can bolster alleviating conflicts and finding 
common grounds for negotiations21. 
National Issues, which are ranked second in importance, seem to relate to 
three factors: the country of origin (p = .001), the education level of the father (p 
= .02) and the year of study (p = .034). Further analyses show that the last two 
factors are influenced by the first and they do not have a relation to the answers. 
Palestinian Jordanian students seem to have greater support for national issues 
than Transjordanians. 
Social development, which ranks the fifth important, seems to have relations to 
three factors: gender (p = .005), tribalism (p = .018) and attending religious 
lessons (p = .002). Female students seem to value social development more than 
male students. Tribal students tend to rank the importance of social issues more 
than nontribal students. Further analysis of the religiosity factor shows that it is 
influenced by the gender factor and does not have a relation to the answers. 
 
4.1.3 Freedom 
 
Freedom of political expression 
The majority of students (53.8%) agree absolutely or to a large extent that 
freedom of expression should include criticizing the government publicly, 20.7% 
agree somewhat, 12.5% agree to a small extent and 12.8% do not agree at all. 
These results show a positive attitude among students regarding criticizing the 
government publicly. The answers of the question appear to have relation to 
four factors: gender (p = .049), attending religious lessons (p = .002), year of study 
(p = .026) and tribalism (p = .033). Male students tend to agree more than female 
students on the issue. The more the students attend religious lessons or the more 
years they spend at university, the more they support that freedom of 
expression should include criticizing the government publicly. A close 
examination and analyses of the tribal factor through combining different 
variables and having a close look to the figures show that tribalism does not 
have a significant relation to the answers. In general there is an acceptable 
positive attitude towards freedom of political expression. However, there is 
considerable percentage of students who oppose it. 
 
Flouting the government publicly 
Only 11.1% of students agree absolutely or to a large extent that freedom of 
expression should include flouting the government publicly. The majority 
(72.6%) does not agree at all or agree only to a small extent on the issue. Four 
factors seem to have a relation to the answers: attending religious lessons (p 
= .015), tribalism (p = .003), standard of living (p = .01) and year of study (p = .008). 
Further analysis show that the year of study factor is influenced by the other 
                                                     
21 A thorough discussion of these points in presented in the next chapter. 
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factors and does not have a relation to the answers. Students who attend 
religious lessons at least once a week or tribal students agree clearly more than 
other students that freedom of expression should include flouting the 
government publicly. The higher their standard of living, the more the students 
disagree with the issue. The results here are problematic. This is to say that the 
meaning of ‘flouting’ is quite ambiguous. Hence, this could open the doors to 
oppress many legitimate ways of freedom of political expression. 
  
Criticizing or flouting any ideology 
The majority of students (73.2%) agree absolutely or to a large extent that 
freedom of expression should not include criticizing any ideology including 
religion. Again, there is no relation between the answers and any factor. In 
addition, the majority of students (88.6%) agree absolutely or to a large extent 
that freedom of expression should not include flouting any ideology including 
religion. There is no relation between the answers and any factor. 
 
Freedom of expression and the UDHR 
In relation to Article 1922 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
28.9% of students agree absolutely or to a large extent that freedom of 
expression should include the freedom to hold opinions without interference 
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers23. 26.7% agree somewhat and 44.5% agree only to a small 
extent or do not agree at all. There seems to be a relation between the answers 
and three factors: country of origin (p = .001), the education level of the father (p 
= .05) and the work of the father (p = .008). Yet, further analysis shows that the 
last two factors are influenced by the country of origin factor and that they have 
no relation to the answers. Palestinian Jordanians tend to agree with the Article 
more than Transjordanian students. 
 
State and applying religious rules 
A high percentage of students (40.2%) say that the state must impose religious 
rules and punish those who breach them, 9.8% say that religious rules are 
personal issues and the state should not interfere, while 6.7% say that it is up to 
the government to decide what is suitable and people should obey and 43.3% 
say that the state has the right to interfere with some religious rules and does not 
have the right to interfere with others. The answers seem to have relations to 
four factors: going to mosques (p = .000), attending religious lessons (p = .006), 
standard of living (p = .011) and the education level of the father (p = .012). 
                                                     
22 Article 19 states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (United Nations). 
23 The question does not tell the students that this is an article in the UDHR. 
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factors and does not have a relation to the answers. Students who attend 
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disagree with the issue. The results here are problematic. This is to say that the 
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four factors: going to mosques (p = .000), attending religious lessons (p = .006), 
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22 Article 19 states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (United Nations). 
23 The question does not tell the students that this is an article in the UDHR. 
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Further analysis shows that the major factor which has relation to the students’ 
answers is going to mosques. Other factors have limited relation as next chapter 
discusses in details. 
 
Students and applying religious rules on others 
If someone under the authority of the student tries to consume alcohol in front 
of the student, the majority (58.5%) will try to give him an advice and leave it for 
him to decide, 31.5% will try to prevent the person by all means even if they 
have to use force and 10% will consider it a personal matter and will not 
interfere. The answers seem to have relation to two factors: tribalism (p = .035) 
and the education level of the mother (p = .038). Tribal students tend to say that 
they will try to prevent the person by all means even if they have to use force 
more than other students. Nontribal students tend to consider it a personal issue 
more than other students. Students whom their mothers have college or 
university degree tend to consider it a personal issue more than other students. 
In a question about another religious rule, the majority (50.7%) say that they 
forced or will force someone under their authority, for example, their sister, to 
obey what they consider a religious rule such as wearing the veil, 35% say they 
did not and will not do that and 14.3% say that they do not know. Seven factors 
seem to have relations to the students’ answers: gender (p = .000), country of 
origin (p = .028), going to mosques (p = .000), tribalism (p = .002), standard of 
living (p = .029), the education level of the father (p = .000) and the education 
level of the mother (p = .000). Male students, Transjordanian students, students 
who go to mosques almost daily, tribal students, students living in less than 
average level, and students whom their fathers or mothers do not have a college 
or university degree tend to say more than other students that they forced or 
will force someone under their authority to obey what they consider a religious 
rule such as wearing the veil. None of the factors is influenced here by any other 
factor. 
The differences between the answers of the previous two questions show the 
social impact on the limits of freedom and on the understanding of religion. 
More about this is discussed in the following chapter. 
 
4.1.4 Equality 
 
Equality between citizens 
In a question about equality between citizens, 37.8% of the students agree 
absolutely or to a large extent that the interest of Transjordanian citizens should 
come ahead the interest of other Jordanian citizens, 17.2% agree somewhat and 
45% agree to a small extent or do not agree at all. Two factors seem to have a 
relation to the students’ answer: country of origin (p = .000) and tribalism (p 
= .018). Further analyses show that tribalism is affected by the country of origin 
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factor and does not have relation to the answer. Transjordanian students who 
agree absolutely are significantly more than Palestinian Jordanian students. 
Respectively, the percentages are 34.2% and 8.5%. The majority of Palestinian 
Jordanian students (51.8%) do not agree at all while less than quarter of 
Transjordanian students (24.7%) does not agree at all. The results here are 
discussed in the sixth chapter. 
In another question about equality between citizens, the majority of the 
students (64.4%) agree absolutely or to a large extent that religious minorities 
should be allowed to apply the laws of their religion in issues, which are not 
directly related to public affairs such as marriage and inheritance, 17.4% agree 
somewhat and 18.1% agree to a small extent or do not agree at all. There is no 
relation between the answers here and any factor. The majority understanding 
of religious equality supports applying unequal laws among citizens in order to 
reach an equal recognition of religious practices. This differs significantly from 
the understanding of equality, which does not recognize religious differences 
and subjugates all religions to the same law. In many cases, the law, at least in 
some of its aspects, favors one religious tradition over the others. For instance, 
marriage laws in western countries. The understanding of religious equality 
here is more compatible with the basic meaning of democracy. 
 
Forms of gender equality 
A high percentage of students (80%) agree absolutely and 12.4% agree to a large 
extent that equality between men and women should not contradict with Islamic 
shari‘a. There is no relation between the students’ answers and any factor. 
Almost half of the students (49.5%) agree absolutely that equality between 
men and women should not contradict with the customs and traditions of the 
society, 25.3% agree to a large extent, 13.6% agree somewhat and 11.6% agree to 
a small extent or do not agree at all. There is no relation between the answers 
here and any factor. 
Only 14.4% of the students agree absolutely or to a large extent that equality 
between men and women should be similar to gender equality in western 
countries, 16.7% agree somewhat and 20.4% agree to a small extent and 48.5 
percent do not agree at all. There is no relation between the answers here and 
any factor. 
In the last question about the form of equality between men and women, 
55.8% of the students agree that the responsibility of men should be different 
from the responsibility of women in society, 25.6% agree somewhat and 18.6% 
agree to a small extent or do not agree at all. There seem to be a relation between 
the answers and two factors: gender (p = .009) and tribalism (p = .04). Further 
analysis shows that tribalism is affected by the gender factor and does not have a 
relation to the students’ answers. Among male students, 62.8% agree absolutely 
or to a large extent that the responsibilities of men and women should be 
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different from each other compared to 51.1% percent among female students. 
Yet, the majority of female students agree with male students on the issue. 
 
Gender equality and elections 
If there are two equally qualified candidates one of which is a man and the other 
is a woman, 43.7% of the students say that it is better to elect the man, 21% say 
that the man should be elected, 9.1% say that the woman should be elected, 6.2% 
say that it is better to elect the woman and 20% say something else24. There 
seems to be a relation between the answers and one factor only: gender (p = .000). 
Female students agree less than male students that the man should be elected if 
the candidates are equally-qualified; respectively 12.3% and 32.3%. However, 
both genders prefer largely to elect the man, 46.4% of male students say that it is 
better to elect the man and 41.9% of female students say that it is better to elect 
the man. 
 
The rule of the majority 
The majority’s right to impose its opinion on others is examined in four 
questions. In the first question, 33.5% of students agree absolutely or to a large 
extent that the majority has the right to impose its opinion in any issue that 
achieves their interests or supports their ideologies without any restrictions. 
25.9% agree somewhat and 40.6% agree to a small extent or do not agree at all. 
There seems to be a relation between the answers and the tribal factor (p = .018). 
Other factors do not have any relation to the answers. The more tribal the 
students are, the more they agree with the issue. 
In the second question, 61.2% agree absolutely or to a large extent that the 
majority has the right to impose their opinion on others in any issue that does 
not breach human rights, 23.5% agree somewhat and 15.3% agree to a small 
extent or do not agree at all. There is a relation between the answer and the work 
of the students’ fathers (p = .009). Students with fathers who are private business 
owners tend to agree with the issue less than other students. 
In the third question, 74.4% of the students agree absolutely or to a large 
extent that the majority has the right to impose their opinion on others in any 
issue that is compatible with the Islamic law and the general opinion of Muslim 
Scholars, 18.8% agree somewhat and 6.8% agree to a small extent or do not agree 
at all. There seem to be a relation between the answers and two factors: gender 
(p = .017) and the country or origin (p = .028). Further analysis shows that the 
country of origin factor is affected by the gender factor and does not have a 
relation to the answers. Female students tend to agree with the issue more than 
male students. 
In the fourth question, 53.3% of the students agree absolutely or to a large 
extent that the majority has the right to impose their opinion on others in any 
                                                     
24 A detailed account of the students’ choices is discussed in chapter five. 
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issue that is compatible with the customs and the traditions of the majority 
culture, 28.8% agree somewhat and 17.9% agree to a small extent or do not agree 
at all. There is no relation between the answers and any factor. 
The answers of the previous four questions show that students’ attitudes do 
not support ultimately the rule of the majority. Islamic shari‘a is the strongest 
guardian against the tyranny of the majority. Human rights have a strong 
position as well. The weakest position, yet still strong, is traditions and customs. 
 Now that the study has finished presenting student’s attitudes towards 
different democratic concepts, it is time to discuss two important issues; first, 
what are the most important factors which have relations to the answers? and 
second, what are the general points that can be raised about students’ attitudes 
towards democratic concepts? 
 
4.1.5 Social factors and democratic concepts 
The preceding analysis shows that the students’ answers regarding democratic 
concepts are related to ten factors: gender; tribalism; attending religious lessons; 
going to mosques; country of origin; standard of living; year of study; the 
education level of the father; the education level of the mother; and the working 
sector of the father. However, there are greater relations to some factors than 
others. For example, gender is related to six questions while the working sector 
of the father is related to just one question. Table 3 shows the factors that are 
related to students’ attitudes towards democratic concepts and the number of 
questions linked to each factor25. Gender has the highest number of relations to 
the students’ answers followed by tribalism, religiosity and country of origin. 
 
 
Factors Number of Questions 
Gender  6 
Tribalism 5 
Religiosity Going to mosques 
Attending religious lessons 
2 
3 
Country of origin 4 
Standard of living 3 
The education level of the mother 2 
The education level of the father 2 
Year of study 1 
The working sector of the father 1 
 
                                                     
25 Only the questions which have significant relation according to the Chi-Square test are counted. 
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24 A detailed account of the students’ choices is discussed in chapter five. 
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issue that is compatible with the customs and the traditions of the majority 
culture, 28.8% agree somewhat and 17.9% agree to a small extent or do not agree 
at all. There is no relation between the answers and any factor. 
The answers of the previous four questions show that students’ attitudes do 
not support ultimately the rule of the majority. Islamic shari‘a is the strongest 
guardian against the tyranny of the majority. Human rights have a strong 
position as well. The weakest position, yet still strong, is traditions and customs. 
 Now that the study has finished presenting student’s attitudes towards 
different democratic concepts, it is time to discuss two important issues; first, 
what are the most important factors which have relations to the answers? and 
second, what are the general points that can be raised about students’ attitudes 
towards democratic concepts? 
 
4.1.5 Social factors and democratic concepts 
The preceding analysis shows that the students’ answers regarding democratic 
concepts are related to ten factors: gender; tribalism; attending religious lessons; 
going to mosques; country of origin; standard of living; year of study; the 
education level of the father; the education level of the mother; and the working 
sector of the father. However, there are greater relations to some factors than 
others. For example, gender is related to six questions while the working sector 
of the father is related to just one question. Table 3 shows the factors that are 
related to students’ attitudes towards democratic concepts and the number of 
questions linked to each factor25. Gender has the highest number of relations to 
the students’ answers followed by tribalism, religiosity and country of origin. 
 
 
Factors Number of Questions 
Gender  6 
Tribalism 5 
Religiosity Going to mosques 
Attending religious lessons 
2 
3 
Country of origin 4 
Standard of living 3 
The education level of the mother 2 
The education level of the father 2 
Year of study 1 
The working sector of the father 1 
 
                                                     
25 Only the questions which have significant relation according to the Chi-Square test are counted. 
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4.1.6 Students’ attitudes and democratic concepts 
Above, it was shown that university students in Jordan have positive attitudes 
towards the value of democracy. In addition, they have a strong collective 
Islamic identity, which exceeds clearly other identities. This identity does not 
necessarily contradict with the national identity as Rustow (1970) argues. On the 
contrary, it could sustain alleviating national conflicts between different groups, 
for example, Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians or between different 
tribes. This idea is discussed further in the next chapter. 
 In relation to freedom, students have strong positive attitudes towards 
political freedom of expression which is essential for democracy. However, 
students have strongly negative attitudes towards other freedoms of expression. 
As much as these negative attitudes could be utilized to minimize the political 
freedom of expression, the positive attitudes can be utilized to maximize other 
freedoms. Because of the strong attitudes of both sides, it would be hard for one 
attitude to completely triumph over the others. Indeed, as Harik (2001) argues, 
the borders of freedom are socially-defined matters. Yet, these borders change 
because of the interaction of different discourses. In the coming chapters the 
study demonstrates the factors, which are related to these attitudes and how 
they are defined through the relation between state and democratization 
processes. 
Religion affects to a large extent students’ attitudes towards different kinds of 
freedoms. These freedoms are at the state-citizen relation level and in a personal 
or social level. However, the religious factor is not the only one which is related 
to the answers as other factors have relations as well. At the state-citizen 
religious level, for example, the state and applying religious moralities, the 
religious factor appears to be stronger than others. However, other factors affect 
strongly the religious factor as the next chapter demonstrates. At the personal or 
social level of religious freedoms, other factors, for example, tribalism, appear to 
have stronger relations than the religious factor. 
 Equality as a democratic concept seems to have some challenges in the 
student’s democratic culture. This appears in two issues: first, equality between 
citizens from different countries of origin, and second, gender equality. These 
challenges are not cultural as much as they are created through complex social, 
political and economic relations between the state and different groups as 
subsequent chapters clarify. Yet, equality has positive attitudes when it comes to 
empowering minorities or protecting them against the majority. 
A few important points about students’ attitudes towards the rule of the 
majority can be drawn from the results. First, the rule of the majority as the only 
method to settle disagreements without recognizing religious opinions, human 
rights and cultural circumstances is not accepted among the majority of students. 
Second, the different restrictions over majority rule demonstrate that a decision 
by the majority needs not only to count votes but also to negotiate the decision 
across many dimensions. Third, the different restrictions on the rule of the 
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majority provide protection from utilizing one dimension against others. For 
instance, an Islamist winning party trying to impose its ideology by utilizing 
Islamic shari‘a and claiming to speak by the name of the majority would not be 
able to neglect established traditions and human rights. 
 
 
4.2 STUDENTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
More than half of the students (51.8%) agree absolutely or to a large extent that 
effective democratic institutions in Jordan such as political parties, labor and 
profession unions are weak, 31.3% agree somewhat and 17% agree to a small 
extent or do not agree at all. There is a relation between the answers and one 
factor: tribalism (p = .036). Tribal students tend to agree more than other students 
that active democratic institutions in Jordan such as political parties, labor and 
profession unions are weak. 
In another question, 16.7% agree absolutely or to a large extent that they are 
satisfied with the performance of the Jordanian parliament, 38.1% are somewhat 
satisfied and 45.2% are satisfied to a small extent or not satisfied at all. There 
seem to be a relation between the answers and two factors: gender (p = .010) and 
tribalism (p = .038). Male students tend to be more satisfied than female students 
and more unsatisfied at the same time – that is, there is stronger polarization 
among the opinions of male students than females. Tribal students tend to be 
more satisfied and more unsatisfied about the parliament performance than 
other students. 
 
4.2.1 Political parties 
The majority of students say that the presence of different and diverse political 
parties in a democratic society is necessary or desirable (23.2% and 36.6% 
respectively). Yet, a considerable percentage of students say that it is ineffective 
(16%), undesirable (17.5%) or wrong (6.6%). There seem to be a relationship 
between the answers and two factors: gender (p = .000) and going to mosques (p 
= .021). Further analysis shows that going to mosques is affected by the gender 
factor and does not have a relation to the answers. Female students tend to have 
negative attitudes towards the importance of political parties significantly more 
than male students; 31.5% of females say that having political parties in a 
democratic society is undesirable or wrong, compared to 14% of male students. 
 
Participating in political parties 
The majority of the students (95.4%) did not participate in a political party and 
4.6% participated in a political party. There is no relation between the answers 
here and any factor. The majority of students (72.6%) will not join a political 
party in the future and 27.4% might join a political party in the future. The 
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party in the future and 27.4% might join a political party in the future. The 
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percentage here is considerably different than the one in the previous question. 
There seem to be a relation between the answers and three factors: attending 
religious lessons (p = .002), going to mosques (p = .005) and the education level of 
the father (p = .029). Further analysis shows that the education level of the father 
is influenced by the religiosity factors and does not have a relation to the 
answers. The more the students attend religious lessons or go to mosques the 
more they say that they might join a political party. 
 
Obstacles behind joining a political party 
The fear of being chased by the secrete agency prevents absolutely or to a large 
extent 62.5% of students from joining a political party, prevents 9.8% somewhat 
and prevents 27.7% to a small extent or does not prevent them at all. There is no 
relation between the students’ answers and any factor. 
The weakness of political parties in Jordan prevents absolutely or to a large 
extent 55.8% of students from joining a political party, prevents 23.5% somewhat 
and prevents 20.6% to a small extent or does not prevent them at all. There 
seems to be a relation between the answer and three factors: country of origin (p 
= .024), tribalism (p = .001) and year of study (p = .001). Transjordanians and 
tribal students tend to consider this reason as an obstacle more than Palestinian 
Jordanians. Further analysis shows that Tribalism has a relation to the answers 
only among Transjordanians. In addition, among students who have been at 
university for longer time only non-tribal Transjordanians seem to find the 
weakness of political parties an obstacle. 
When Islamists control a political party, 22.3% of students agree absolutely or 
to a large extent that this prevents them from joining the political party, 23.3% 
agree somewhat and 54.4% agree to a small extent or do not agree at all. There 
seems to be a relation between the answers and two factors: gender (p = .017) 
and country of origin (p = .004). Male students tend to be less averse to joining an 
Islamist political party than female students. Transjordanians tend to be more 
averse about joining an Islamist political party than Palestinian Jordanians. 
In relation to tribes, 34.5% of students agree absolutely or to a large extent not 
to join a political party, which is controlled by tribes, 20.2% agree somewhat and 
45.3% agree to a small extent or do not agree at all. There seems to be a relation 
to two factors: country of origin (p = .024) and tribalism (p = .004). Further 
analyses show that the tribal factor is affected by the country of origin factor and 
does not have a relation to the answers. Palestinian Jordanian students tend to 
refrain from joining a political party, which is controlled more by tribes than by 
Transjordanian students. 
40.6% of students agree absolutely or to a large extent not to join a political 
party which opposes the government, 29.1% agree somewhat and 30.2% agree to 
a small extent or do not agree at all. There seem to be a relation between the 
answers and two factors: country of origin (p = .046) and tribalism (p = .049). 
Further analysis shows that the tribal factor is affected by the country of origin 
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factor and does not have a relation to the answers. Transjordanian students tend 
to refrain from joining a political party which opposes the government more 
than Palestinian Jordanian students. 
More than half of the students (50.3%) agree absolutely or to a large extent 
that they do not join a political party because they believe that legislation and 
laws that support political parties are weak, 28.9% agree somewhat and 20.8% 
agree to a small extent or do not agree at all. There seems to be a relation to four 
factors: tribalism (p = .039), standard of living of students (p = .008), field of study 
(p = .041) and year of study (p = .027). Tribal students tend to agree more than 
other students that weak legislation and laws that support political parties 
prevent them from joining a political party. Students living in greater-than-
average standard of living tend to agree less than other students on this issue. 
Students who study political science and law tend to agree more than other 
students on the issue; and students who study humanities or social sciences tend 
to agree more than students who study applied science. Further analysis shows 
that the year of study is influenced by other factors and does not have a relation 
to the answers. 
Nearly one quarter of students (23.8%) agree absolutely or to a large extent 
that they refuse to participate in a political party because they believe that the 
existence of diverse political parties is forbidden in Islam, 14.3% agree somewhat 
and 61.9% agree to a small extent or do not agree at all. There seem to be a 
relation between the answers and two factors: year of study at university (p 
= .039) and the education level of the mother (p = .012). Yet, close examination of 
the figures shows that these differences are only minor. 
The preceding results show different obstacles behind joining a political 
party. Yet, the obstacles which are related to the Jordanian state seem be 
significantly more important than other reasons. For example, the fear of being 
chased by security agencies or the weak legislation and laws which support 
political parties are stronger obstacles than believing that the existence of diverse 
political parties is forbidden in Islam or the domination of tribes over a political 
party. 
 
Results of diverse political parties 
Positive results 
Students were asked to give their opinions about three positive results that 
diverse political parties bring: first, diversity of views in the Jordanian society 
and benefiting from different opinions; second, monitoring the performance of 
the government; and third, organizing political opposition and making it more 
efficient.  
First, nearly three-fourths (74.5%) of students agree absolutely or to a large 
extent that the existence of many political parties in Jordan will lead to diversity 
of views the in Jordanian society and benefiting from different opinions; 14.2% 
agree somewhat and 11.4% agree to a small extent or do not agree at all. There 
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seem to be a relation between the answers and two factors: tribalism (p = .048) 
and going to mosques (p = .042). Students who go to mosques tend to agree more 
than students who barely or do not go to mosques that the presence of several 
political parties in Jordan will lead to benefiting from different and diverse 
opinions. In relation to tribalism, close examination of the figures shows that the 
differences are minor between different groups. 
Second, 61.1% of students agree absolutely or to a large extent that the 
existence of many political parties in Jordan will lead to monitoring the 
performance of the government, 22.1% agree somewhat and 16.8% agree to a 
small extent or do not agree at all. There is no relation between the answers and 
any factor. 
Third, 53.7% of students agree absolutely or to a large extent that the 
existence of many political parties in Jordan will lead to organizing political 
opposition and make it more efficient; 23.5% agree somewhat and 22.8% agree to 
a small extent or do not agree at all. There seem to be a relation between the 
answers and one factor: going to mosques (p = .047). Students who go to 
mosques almost daily tend to agree that political parties in Jordan will lead to 
organizing political opposition and make it more efficient clearly more than 
other students. 
 
Negative results 
Students were asked to give their opinions about two negative results of diverse 
political parties: first, the fragmentation of the Jordanian society, and second, the 
foundation of groups which fight over power. 
First, 36.1% of the students agree absolutely or to a large extent that the 
existence of many political parties in Jordan will lead to fragmentation of the 
Jordanian society; 20.7% agree somewhat and 43.1% agree to a small extent or do 
not agree at all. There seems to be a relation between the answers and five 
factors: gender (p = .005), going to mosques (p = .016), tribalism (p = .000), 
standard of living and field of study (p = .036). Female students tend to agree 
more than male students that political parties will lead to the fragmentation of 
the Jordanian society. In the same manner, students who barely go to mosques 
or do not go at all and tribal students tend to agree more than other students on 
this issue. Further analysis shows that the standard of living is influenced by the 
tribal factor and the field of study is influenced by the other factors - hence they 
have no relation to the answers. In addition, tribalism seems to have relation to 
the answers among Transjordanian students but not among Palestinian 
Jordanian students. 
Second, nearly half of the students (48.5%) agree absolutely or to a large 
extent that the existence of many political parties in Jordan will lead to the 
foundation of groups which fight over power; 22.8% agree somewhat and 28.7% 
agree to a small extent or do not agree at all. There seems to be a relation 
between the answers and two factors: gender (p = .043) and tribalism (p = .034). 
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Female students and tribal students tend to agree respectively more than male 
students and other students that the existence of many political parties in Jordan 
will lead to the foundation of groups which fight over power. However, 
tribalism seems to have a relation to the answers among Transjordanian 
students but not among Palestinian Jordanian students. 
Clearly there are positive attitudes among students towards the benefits of 
having political parties. Simultaneously, there are strong attitudes towards the 
disadvantages of having political parties. This affirms the previous analysis 
which shows that most of the students have positive attitudes toward political 
parties, yet a considerable number also have a negative attitude. An important 
note here is that the negative results of having diverse political parties are more 
related to different factors than the positive results; for example, gender, 
tribalism and going to mosques factors are related to the former and only going 
to mosques factor is related to the latter. This suggests that the negative results 
are common among certain subgroups unlike the positive ones which are more 
generally accepted. 
The analyses of students’ attitudes towards political parties show that 
political parties face many challenges in the students’ democratic culture. A 
related question to this discussion is: how important are political parties for 
democracy? For many scholars, researchers, political activists, and other 
important projects which aim at supporting or developing democracy, political 
parties are perceived as essential for modern representative democracy (Burnell, 
2004, 3-5; Norries, 2005, 3; Ingrid, 2004, 1-2; Kelly and Ashiagbor, 2011, 3). This 
view is challenged by other scholars who argue that “it would be too much to 
argue that institutionally strong political parties are a necessary condition for 
consolidating democracy or maintaining its vitality” (Diamond and Gunther, 
2001, x [original emphasis]). In the second view, “reasonable stable political 
parties are the inevitable by-product of a viable mass democracy” (Toka, 1997, 5). 
Indeed as some scholars note, it is often that democracies emerge before the 
existence of diverse political parties as in Czech Republic, Hungary Poland and 
Slovakia (Toka, 1997, 4). However, Diamond and Gnuther (2001, x) note that 
“where democracy is not rapidly legitimated by other means, […] weak political 
institutions, poor political performance, and the consequent cynicism about 
parties and politicians obstruct the consolidation—and even risk undermining 
the viability—of democracy”. Political parties in western democracies have 
certain functions, for example, nominating candidates, mobilizing electoral 
support and structuring the choices among competing groups26. Such functions, 
according to Harik (2001) can be performed by other communal institutions in 
Arab countries, such as tribes. In the understanding of democracy in this study, 
political parties are not essential for democracy. However, negative attitudes 
towards political parties could undermine democracy since it increases the 
                                                     
26 For a discussion of these functions and others, see Diamond and Gnuther (2001, 7-8)  
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Female students and tribal students tend to agree respectively more than male 
students and other students that the existence of many political parties in Jordan 
will lead to the foundation of groups which fight over power. However, 
tribalism seems to have a relation to the answers among Transjordanian 
students but not among Palestinian Jordanian students. 
Clearly there are positive attitudes among students towards the benefits of 
having political parties. Simultaneously, there are strong attitudes towards the 
disadvantages of having political parties. This affirms the previous analysis 
which shows that most of the students have positive attitudes toward political 
parties, yet a considerable number also have a negative attitude. An important 
note here is that the negative results of having diverse political parties are more 
related to different factors than the positive results; for example, gender, 
tribalism and going to mosques factors are related to the former and only going 
to mosques factor is related to the latter. This suggests that the negative results 
are common among certain subgroups unlike the positive ones which are more 
generally accepted. 
The analyses of students’ attitudes towards political parties show that 
political parties face many challenges in the students’ democratic culture. A 
related question to this discussion is: how important are political parties for 
democracy? For many scholars, researchers, political activists, and other 
important projects which aim at supporting or developing democracy, political 
parties are perceived as essential for modern representative democracy (Burnell, 
2004, 3-5; Norries, 2005, 3; Ingrid, 2004, 1-2; Kelly and Ashiagbor, 2011, 3). This 
view is challenged by other scholars who argue that “it would be too much to 
argue that institutionally strong political parties are a necessary condition for 
consolidating democracy or maintaining its vitality” (Diamond and Gunther, 
2001, x [original emphasis]). In the second view, “reasonable stable political 
parties are the inevitable by-product of a viable mass democracy” (Toka, 1997, 5). 
Indeed as some scholars note, it is often that democracies emerge before the 
existence of diverse political parties as in Czech Republic, Hungary Poland and 
Slovakia (Toka, 1997, 4). However, Diamond and Gnuther (2001, x) note that 
“where democracy is not rapidly legitimated by other means, […] weak political 
institutions, poor political performance, and the consequent cynicism about 
parties and politicians obstruct the consolidation—and even risk undermining 
the viability—of democracy”. Political parties in western democracies have 
certain functions, for example, nominating candidates, mobilizing electoral 
support and structuring the choices among competing groups26. Such functions, 
according to Harik (2001) can be performed by other communal institutions in 
Arab countries, such as tribes. In the understanding of democracy in this study, 
political parties are not essential for democracy. However, negative attitudes 
towards political parties could undermine democracy since it increases the 
                                                     
26 For a discussion of these functions and others, see Diamond and Gnuther (2001, 7-8)  
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insulation of trust networks from public politics. On the other hand, extremely 
strong political parties could undermine democracy by increasing the autonomy 
of power groups to operate outside the public sphere. 
 
4.2.2 Social factors and democratic institutions 
The analysis shows considerable percentage of negative attitudes towards 
democratic institutions in general, towards the Jordanian parliament and 
towards political parties. These attitudes are related to seven factors as shown in 
Table 4. Tribalism, gender, religiosity and country of origin and appear to have 
more relations to the answers than standard of living, field of study and year of 
study. Tribalism has the highest number of relations followed by gender, 
country of origin and going to mosques. This trend is similar to the one that was 
found in questions related to democratic concepts. However, religiosity has 
significantly more relation to democratic concepts than to democratic 
institutions. The similarity in trends suggests that democratization processes in 
Jordan affect students’ attitudes towards democratic concepts and institutions. 
The next section examines if the same trend appears in attitudes towards 
democratic practices. 
 
 
 
Factors Number of Questions 
Tribalism 6 
Gender 5 
Religiosity Going to mosques 4 
Attending religious lessons 1 
Country of origin  4 
Standard of living 1 
Field of Study 1 
Year of study 1 
 
 
4.3 STUDENTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC 
PRACTICES 
 
4.3.1 State and democracy in Jordan 
The highest percentage of students (40.9%) agree that democratic practice in 
Jordan is average, 9.6% agree that it is excellent, 29.5% agree that it is good, 
13.9% agree that it is bad and 6.2% agree that it is unacceptable. There seems to 
be a relation between the answers and six factors: the country of origin (p = .015), 
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going to mosques (p = .044), attending religious lessons (p = .01), Tribalism (p 
= .012), the year of study (p = .048) and the education level of the father (p = .013). 
Further analysis shows that the education level of the father is influenced by the 
country of origin factor and does not have a relation. In addition, the year of 
education has a relation only among non-religious students. Non-religious 
students who spend more than two years at the university tend to say that the 
democratic practice in Jordan is not good more frequently than other students. 
Religious students tend to say that the democratic practice in Jordan is 
unacceptable more frequently than non-religious students. Extreme Tribal 
students and non-tribal students tend to be strongly polarized in their opinions 
about the democratic practice in Jordan more than other students; i.e. they tend 
to say that the democratic practice is either good or bad to a greater degree than 
other students. 
The students had to assess four reasons which led the Jordanian government 
to adopt the democratic choice: a) it believes that democracy is the optimal way 
to govern and develop Jordan, b) it attempts to silence, calm or contain the 
opposition in the Jordanian street c) it seeks to appease Western countries that 
seek to spread democracy d) it tries to find legitimacy for its policies. The first 
reason (a) is the most supported among students with 50.8% of students 
agreeing with it absolutely and 25.8% agreeing to a large extent. The second 
most supported reason is (c) with 37.2% of students agreeing with it absolutely 
and 15.2% agreeing to a large extent. The second (b) and the fourth (d) reasons 
received almost equal support among the students with 25.5% agreeing with (b) 
absolutely and 28.2% agreeing to a large extent, while 27.1% agree with (d) 
absolutely and 26.7% to a large extent. 
There seems to be a relationship between the answers of the second reason 
and two factors: tribalism (p = .042) and the country of origin (p = .044). Further 
analysis shows that the country of origin factor in influenced by tribalism and 
thus has no relation to the answers. Tribal students tend to agree that the 
government adopts the democratic choice as an attempt to silence, calm or 
contain the opposition in the Jordanian street more than other students. There is 
also a relation between the tribal factor (p = .042) and the answers of the third 
reason: tribal students tend to agree more than other students that the state 
adopts the democratic choice in order to appease Western countries that seek to 
spread democracy. 
Saying that the government adopts the democratic choice because it believes 
that democracy is the optimal way to govern and develop Jordan does not mean 
that officials are serious about adopting the democratic choice. The majority of 
students say that officials (63.1%) are not serious about adopting the democratic 
choice, 21.9% agree somewhat and the rest (15%) agree to a small extent or do 
not agree at all. There is a relation between the answers here and three factors: 
gender (p = .033), the country of origin (p = .011) and tribalism (p = .020). Male 
students, Transjordanian students and tribal students tend to agree respectively 
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more than female students, Palestinian Jordanian students and non-tribal 
students that officials are not serious about adopting the democratic choice. 
When it comes to democracy in Jordan, the majority of students (56.8%) agree 
absolutely or to a large extent that the government fears that Islamists will take 
over the government; 16.6% agree somewhat and 26.6% agree to a small extent 
or do not agree at all. There seems to be a relationship between the answers here 
and six factors: gender (p = .048), going to mosques (p = .005), attending religious 
lessons (p = .011), tribalism (p = .015), the education level of the mother (p = .008) 
and the year of study (p = .027). Further analysis shows that the year of study 
factor is influenced by tribalism and does not have a relation to the answers. 
Male students, students who go to mosques daily, students who attend religious 
lessons at least once a week, tribal students and students whose mothers have 
lower education than university level tend to agree more than other students 
that the government fears that Islamists will take over the government. 
One quarter of the students (25.3%) agree absolutely or to a large extent that 
some articles in the Jordanian constitution or law limits democracy; 28% agree 
somewhat, 46.7% agree to a small extent or do not agree at all. There seems to be 
a relation between the answers and four factors: gender (p = .003), going to 
mosques (p = .002), attending religious lessons (p = .008), and the work sector of 
the father (p = .001). Further analysis shows that the work sector of the father is 
related to the answers only among nonreligious students. Female students, 
students who attend religious lessons once or more a week and students who go 
to mosques daily tend to agree more other students that some articles in the 
Jordanian constitution or law limits democracy. 
The results demonstrate that the students’ attitudes towards the relationship 
between the state and democracy are negative. The majority of students tend to 
think that the state applies democracy as a tool to negotiate power relations with 
different international and national parties. Still, a considerable percentage of the 
students do not perceive the relation as such. In addition, the majority of 
students do not perceive the democratic practice in Jordan as bad or 
unacceptable. Consequently, it is hard to say that there is a strong demand 
among students for more democratic reform. At the end of this thesis, it becomes 
clear why the situation is as such and what someone would expect for the future 
of democracy in Jordan. 
 
4.3.2 Demonstrations 
The majority of students (52%) say that it is mandatory to allow all peaceful 
demonstrations merely by informing the government and without any 
restrictions; 35.7% of students say that it is mandatory to allow only peaceful 
demonstrations which are permitted by the government, 5.4% say that it is 
mandatory to prevent all peaceful demonstrations and 6.9% say something else. 
There is a relationship between the answers and the county of origin factor (p 
= .004). Compared to Transjordanian students, Palestinian Jordanians tend to 
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more frequently say that it is mandatory to allow all peaceful demonstrations 
merely by informing the government and without any restrictions. 
Transjordanians on the other hand tend to say that that it is mandatory to allow 
only peaceful demonstrations which are permitted by the government. 
The majority of students (56.8%) agree absolutely or to a large extent that 
they would participate in a peaceful demonstration against some governmental 
policies, for example, the removal of fuel subsidies; 11.9% agree somewhat, 
19.3% agree to a small extent or do not agree at all, and 11.9% do not know. 
There is a relationship between the answers and three factors: attending 
religious lessons (p = .006), going to mosques (p = .040) and tribalism (p = .029). 
The more the students attend religious lessons, the more they tend to say that 
they would participate in a peaceful demonstration against some governmental 
policies, for example, the removal of fuel subsidies. Extremely tribal students 
and students who go to mosques daily tend to say that they would participate in 
a peaceful demonstration against some governmental policies more than other 
students. The results related to demonstrations show positive attitudes towards 
peaceful demonstration and towards participating in demonstrations. However, 
negative attitudes are not uncommon. 
 
4.3.3 Elections 
The majority of students (55.3%) who had already reached the voting age27 did 
not participate in parliamentary elections. There seem to be a relation between 
the answers and five factors: gender (p = .029), country of origin (p = .000), 
standard of living (p = .003), the education level of the father (p = .005) and the 
working sector of the father (p = .024). Further analysis shows that the working 
sector of the father factor is influenced by the country of origin factor and does 
not relate to the answers. Female students tend to participate less in 
parliamentary elections than male students. Yet, a closer examination of the 
results shows that these gender differences appear only among Transjordanians 
and do not appear among Palestinian Jordanians: the former clearly tend to 
participate more in parliamentary elections than the latter. Students with a less-
than-average standard of living tend to participate in parliamentary elections 
more than other students. Students whose fathers have college or university 
level education tend to participate in parliamentary elections less than other 
students. 
 
 
 
                                                     
27 According to article 3(a) of the 2001 election law, “To every Jordanian, who completed eighteen 
calendar years of age on the first day of the first month of the election year, the right to elect 
members of the House of Representatives if he or she is registered in one of the final electoral rolls”. 
Since the questionnaire was conducted between January and April in the year 2008, students who 
were nineteen years old or younger are not counted in the analyses of this question. 
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27 According to article 3(a) of the 2001 election law, “To every Jordanian, who completed eighteen 
calendar years of age on the first day of the first month of the election year, the right to elect 
members of the House of Representatives if he or she is registered in one of the final electoral rolls”. 
Since the questionnaire was conducted between January and April in the year 2008, students who 
were nineteen years old or younger are not counted in the analyses of this question. 
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Opinions about elections in Jordan 
Regarding the fairness of elections in Jordan, 26.1% of students agree absolutely 
that the elections are unfair, 16% agree to a large extent, 20.8% agree somewhat, 
19.5% agree to a small extent and 17.5% do not agree at all. There seem to be a 
relation between the answers and three factors: gender (p = .029), field of study 
(p = .035) and tribalism (p = .035). Further examination of the tribal factor shows 
that it does not have a clear relation to the answers. Male students tend to say 
that elections are fair more frequently than female students. Students who study 
social and humanity sciences tend to say that elections are unfair more than 
those studying natural sciences, political science and law. 
In a question about candidates and electoral platforms, 18.1% of the students 
agree absolutely that candidates do not have electoral platforms; 27.8% agree to 
a large extent, 24% agree somewhat, 21% agree to a small extent and 9% do not 
agree at all. There seems to be a relation between the answers and the education 
level of the father factor (p = .013). Students whose fathers are illiterate or have a 
low level of education tend to agree more that candidates do not have electoral 
platforms than students whose fathers have high school, college or university 
degrees. 
Regarding the results of elections, 22.2% of the students agree absolutely that 
the elections results are futile; 21.3% agree to a large extent, 23.3% agree 
somewhat, 17% agree to a small extent and 16.1% do not agree at all. There seem 
to be a relation between the answers and two factors: the year of study (p = .05) 
and going to mosques (p = .013). Students who have been studying at university 
for a longer time tend to agree that the results of elections are futile more than 
other students. Students who barely or do not go to mosques agree more than 
other students that the results of elections are futile. 
In relation to students’ attitudes towards Islam and elections, 3.7% of the 
students agree absolutely that election are forbidden in Islam, 4.8% agree to a 
large extent, 9.7% agree somewhat, 9.2% agree to a small extent and 72.5% do 
not agree at all. There seems to be a relationship between the answers and the 
gender factor (p = .022). Female students agree less than male students that 
elections are forbidden in Islam. 
In the last question about elections in Jordan, 17.1% of the students agree 
absolutely that the electoral system is not convincing; 16.2% agree to a large 
extent, 21.1% agree somewhat, 18.6% agree to a small extent and 27.1% do not 
agree at all. There seem to be a relationship between the answers and two factors: 
standard of living (p = .027) and the year of study (p = .022). Students with less-
than-average standard of living and students who have been studying for more 
than two years agree more than other students that the electoral system is not 
convincing. 
The results of the questions related to elections in Jordan show more negative 
attitudes than positive ones regarding the fairness of elections, electoral 
platforms, and the usefulness of election results. 
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Factors behind choosing a candidate 
Students were asked to which degree six different factors would motivate them 
to choose a candidate. These factors are: the candidate’s platform; his or her tribe; 
his or her country of origin; his or her gender; his or her religion; and if the 
candidate is an Islamist. The most important factor for the students was the 
electoral platform of the candidate; 40.1% of the students agree absolutely that 
they will choose a candidate based on this criteria, 31.9% agree to a large extent, 
15.1% agree somewhat, 6.7% agree to a small extent and 6.2% do not agree at all. 
There seems to be a relationship between the answers and two factors: tribalism 
(p = .001) and gender (p = .05). Further analyses show that the gender factor is 
influenced by the tribalism factor and does not have a relation to the answers. 
Tribal students tend to be less motivated to choose a candidate based on the 
candidate’s platform. 
As for the tribe of the candidate, 27.4% of students agree absolutely that they 
will choose a candidate based on his or her tribe, 24.7% agree to a large extent, 
23.1% agree somewhat, 11.9% agree to a small extent and 12.8% do not agree at 
all. There seem to be a relation between the answers and four factors: country of 
origin (p = .000), tribalism (p = 000), the work of the father (p = .012) and the 
education level of the father (p = .004). Further analysis shows that the work of 
the father and the education level of the father factors are influenced by the 
country of origin factor and they do not have a relation to the answers. 
Transjordanian students and tribal students tend to take the tribe of the 
candidate into consideration more than other students. 
If the candidate is an Islamist, 35.7% of students agree absolutely that they 
will choose that candidate; 23% agree to a large extent, 24.6% agree somewhat, 
11.1% agree to a small extent and 5.6% do not agree at all. There seems to be a 
relationship between the answers and three factors: gender (p = .001), attending 
religious lessons (p = .004) and the field of study (p = .004). Further analyses 
show that the field of study factor is influenced by gender and going to mosques 
and does not have a relation to the answers. Female students and students who 
attend religious lessons at least once a week tend to prefer Islamist candidates 
more than other students do. 
Regarding the origin of the candidate, 31% of students agree absolutely that 
they will choose the candidate based on this factor; 15.2% agree to a large extent, 
16.7% agree somewhat, 12.7% agree to a small extent and 24.4% do not agree at 
all. There seems to be a relation between the answers and three factors: the 
country of origin (p = .000), tribalism (p = .019) and the year of study (p = .049). 
Further analysis shows that the year of study is influenced by the country of 
origin factor and does not have relation to the answers. In addition, tribalism 
seems to have a relation to the answers only among Transjordanians and not 
among Palestinian Jordanians. This is to say that Transjordanian tribal students 
tend to consider the origin of the candidate more than other Transjordanians. 
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Opinions about elections in Jordan 
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Factors behind choosing a candidate 
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tend to consider the origin of the candidate more than other Transjordanians. 
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Moreover, Transjordanians in general tend to consider the origin of the 
candidate more than Palestinian Jordanians. 
As for gender, 24.8% of students agree absolutely that they will choose the 
candidate based on his or her gender, 18.3% agree to a large extent, 18.5% agree 
somewhat, 14.2% agree to a small extent and 24.2% do not agree at all. There 
seems to be a relation between the answers and two factors: the country of origin 
(p = .000) and the father’s work (p = .013). Further analysis shows that the father’s 
work factor is influenced by the country of origin factor and thus does not relate 
to the answers. Transjordanians tend to consider the gender of the candidate 
more than Palestinian Jordanians. 
Regarding the religion of the candidate, 46.5% of students agree absolutely 
that they will choose the candidate based on his or her religion, 13.9% agree to a 
large extent, 18.3% agree somewhat, 8.1% agree to a small extent and 13.2% do 
not agree at all. There seems to be a relation between the answers and three 
factors: the country of origin (p = .000), tribalism (p = .011) and going to mosques 
(p = .023). Transjordanian students, tribal students and students that go to 
mosques almost daily tend to consider the religion of the candidate more than 
other students. 
 
4.3.4 Students’ attitudes towards democratic practices 
The majority of students, as noted before, support peaceful demonstrations. Yet, 
a considerable percentage of students are against peaceful demonstrations which 
are not approved by the government. This negative attitude towards 
demonstrations defines some undemocratic boundaries for the freedom of 
political expression, especially in the Jordanian context where demonstrations 
were restricted at the time of the questionnaire’s distribution. 
The analysis also shows negative attitudes towards elections in Jordan. These 
negative attitudes are reflected in the low level of participation in elections 
among students and in their opinions on elections in Jordan which are 
commonly seen as unfair and futile. The majority of students say that the 
electoral platform of a candidate affects their choice. Moreover, the electoral 
platform is more important than any other factor for choosing a candidate. Yet, 
nearly seventy percent of the students doubt that candidates actually have 
electoral platforms. Consequently, other factors for choosing a candidate would 
replace the electoral platform factor; for instance, tribalism, Islamism, gender, 
religion and country of origin become more significant in elections than the 
electoral platform of the candidate and strongly influence students’ choices. 
 
4.3.5 Social factors and democratic practices 
The students’ answers to the questions about democratic practices have 
relationships to eleven factors. These are: country of origin; tribalism; gender; 
going to mosques; attending religious lessons; standard of living; year of study; 
education of the father; field of study; the education of the mother; and the work 
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of the father. The four factors which have the strongest relationship to students’ 
answers regarding democratic concepts and institutions appear to also have the 
strongest relations to answers regarding democratic practices as well. These 
factors are country of origin, tribalism, gender and religiosity. In the Jordanian 
context, each of these factors, unlike the others, have at least three features: first, 
they are related to the culture or structure of the society, second, they are related 
to direct state-citizen relations and third, they are impossible or extremely hard 
to change by personal choices, for example, the person is born with it. Other 
factors, namely the standard of living, education level of the father and year of 
study, are first, not related to the culture or structure of the society; second, not 
related to direct state-citizen relations, and third, not impossible or extremely 
hard to change by personal choices. For example, the education level of the 
father is not related to the Jordanian culture as in the in case of religion, the year 
of study is not related to direct state-citizen relation as in the case of the country 
of origin and tribalism, and the standard of living is not impossible or extremely 
hard to change by personal choices as in the case of gender. The latter factors 
appear to have more connection to students’ attitudes towards democratic 
practices than they do towards democratic concepts and institutions. More 
precisely, attitudes toward democratic practices have more relations than 
attitudes toward democratic concepts and institutions, to factors that are: first, 
not related to the culture or structure of the society, second: not related to direct 
state-citizen relations, and third, not impossible or extremely hard to change by 
personal choices. This suggests that attitudes towards democratic practices 
could change easier than attitudes towards concepts and institutions. Table 5 
shows the factors that are related to students’ attitudes towards democratic 
practices and the number of questions they are related to. 
 
 
Factors Number of Questions 
Tribalism 9 
Country of origin 8 
Gender 7 
Religiosity Going to mosques 
Attending religious lessons 
6 
4 
Year of study 3 
Standard of living 2 
The education level of the father 2 
Field of study 1 
The education level of the mother 1 
The work of the father 1 
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The results here ascertain that the three processes of democratization in Jordan 
affect students’ attitudes towards democratic concepts, institutions and practices 
and the students’ political culture. Again, by the three processes of 
democratization in Jordan the study means to what degree the state increases 
the integration of Islamists into public politics, the insulation of gender and 
country of origin inequality from public politics and the insulation of tribes to 
operate outside public politics. How and why the three processes of 
democratization in Jordan affect students’ attitudes is discussed in the coming 
chapters. For the moment, it is enough to notice a relationship between 
democratization processes and the students’ democratic political culture. 
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5 Islamists-State Relations 
and Student’s Attitudes 
towards Democracy  
Around the mid-1980s I was occasionally attending Friday prayers with some 
relatives. Being a nine years old kid, I was not really paying attention to the 
ceremony. Yet, I remember some shuiukh (religious men) standing outside the 
mosque after the prayer encouraging people with loud voices to donate money 
for the mujahidin in Afghanistan. Back then, I had no idea whether the state had 
the same ideology of Islamists or not. I also did not know that public activities 
by other ideologists such as communists and leftists were prohibited by the state. 
This chapter discusses the relation between Islamists’ trust networks and the 
state in Jordan and its effect on democratization and students’ attitudes towards 
democracy. Within this framework, four topics are discussed: first, the relation 
between Islam and the state according to Islamists and the Jordanian state; 
second, Islamists’ opinions on democracy; third, the relation between the state 
and Islamists; and fourth, how these relations and opinions affect 
democratization in Jordan. This discussion informs the later assessment of 
students’ attitudes towards democratic concepts, institutions and practices. The 
analysis of students’ attitudes focuses on two sets of questions: first, those 
related to Islam or Islamists, and second those related to one of the religiosity 
factors (going to Mosques or attending religious lessons).  
 
 
5.1 ISLAM AND STATE BETWEEN ISLAMISTS AND THE 
JORDANIANS STATE 
 
5.1.1 Secularism and State-Religion Relations 
In his discussion of the relationship between state and religion in Western 
democracies, Iliya Harik (2004) presents two models: first, the French or 
American model and second, the Northern European model. The first model is 
characterized officially by a strict separation between state and religion. This 
does not mean that the French and American forms of separation are alike; 
Harik (2004) recognizes the difference in the smooth separation between state 
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and religion in the American model and the sharp separation in the French one 
(Harik 2004, 18-19). Yet, as Alfred Stepan (2001, 222) notes, France still provides 
support for teachers in private Catholic schools. 
The second model takes three forms: first, states with an established church 
such as Denmark, Finland, Norway, Greece and United Kingdom (Stepan, 2001, 
222). In this form, as Harik (2004, 21) notes, the church constitutes part of the 
governmental institutions. The second form of the relationship is concordat 
where the state recognizes “certain religious groups and extends to them 
privileges such as public funding for schools and tax-exempt status” (Tatari, 
2009, 287) as in Germany, Austria and Italy (Stepan, 2001, 220). The third form is 
‘consociational’ 28  where the state recognizes and supports religious groups 
through limited constitutional arrangements or political negotiations as in 
Netherlands and Belgium (Tatari, 2009, 279; Stepan, 2001, 219-220). The same 
typology with minor variations is used by Cesari (2004), Soper and Fetzer (2007). 
Regardless of whether we count the second model and its sub-forms as secular, 
the state remains the dominant partner in this relationship (Harik 2004, 21). 
More importantly, religion in those forms is at best one reference point among 
many others in the nation-building paradigm.  
Other important models are found in the context of undemocratic states. 
Here we have two models: the first is a secular model where the state has a 
hostile attitude towards religion, as in former communist states. The second 
model, again whether we call it secular or not, is where the state has an 
established official religion. This is the case of most undemocratic Muslim 
countries (Harik, 2004, 21-24). 
 
5.1.2 State-Religion Relations between Islamists and the State 
Many Islamists, for example those who support Muslim secular governments29, 
adopt a secular view regarding the relationship between religion and the state. 
Adel Daher (1998) argues that any religious ideology in its essence is a secular 
one since it bears a human understanding of religion. 
Other Islamists refuse the secular view of the relationship. Their alternative is 
an Islamic state which differs not only from the secular state but also from a 
theocratic one. Nevertheless, Islamists have different opinions about many 
issues related to the Islamic state; e.g. about the methods to establish an Islamic 
state (peaceful or militant); about the structure of the Islamic state (democratic or 
undemocratic); and about the spectrum of Islamic principles that the state 
should preserve or apply. 
                                                     
28 A term used by Arend Lijphart (1977) to describe a form of democracy in societies with ethnic and 
religious divisions. 
29 Someone might argue that those are not Islamists. Yet, this is a matter of definition. The chapter 
tackles the issue in coming discussions. 
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Bobby Sayyid (1997) recognizes that Islam in Muslim societies bears different 
and even contradictory beliefs and practices. Yet, Islam in these societies is the 
ideal of goodness, which creates a feeling of belonging and common identity 
(Sayyid 1997). Al-Bishri (2005) recognizes Islam as the prime reference point in 
building a national identity. However, he emphasizes that some Islamic 
principles, for example hudud (legal punishments defined by shari‘a; literally 
'boundaries') and furud (certain commands defined by shari‘a; literally 
'obligations') are part of the reality of Islam that can never change (Albishri 2005, 
107). In the Jordanian context Islamists agree with Al-Bishri. However, many of 
them expand the area of Islamic principles. 
The Jordanian state, for its part, recognizes Islam as the official religion of the 
state in its constitution. Additionally religious education is compulsory in public 
schools, many mosques are managed directly by the state and the state promotes 
and supports a tolerant version of Islam30. As a result of these measures, many 
people would think of Jordan as religious rather than secular31. However, some 
or many Islamists recognize Jordan as a secular state. At least two issues would 
support the latter designation. First, the Jordanian state does not recognize Islam 
as the prime reference point in nation-building but rather as one among others – 
notably Bedouin culture and Jordanian nationalism. Joseph Massad (2001) 
argues, for instance, that British colonial power and state institutions of the 
military and law created the Jordanian identity by adopting, refining and 
redefining the Bedouin culture. Islamists in Jordan, on the other hand, promote 
Islam either as the prime, or indeed only, reference point for the nation When 
King Abdullah II proposed “Al-’Urdun awwalan” (Jordan First) as a slogan32, it 
was criticized and rejected by many Islamists who stated “Allah First” and 
“Islam First”. 
Another important difference between Islamists and the state in Jordan is 
that the state promotes religious practices and moralities which fit with its 
nation-building project, such as celebrating religious ceremonies, hospitality, 
honor and loyalty, while it neglects those which do not align with its project, 
such as alcohol consumption and bacchanalian parties. Islamists, on the other 
hand, promote religious practices and moralities, such as gender roles, women's 
veiling, and banning alcohol, which set them apart from the state and allow 
them to criticize the state’s nation-building project. Regardless of the differences 
between the Jordanian state and Islamists, the rhetoric of both regarding Islam, 
                                                     
30 See, for instance, The Amman Message. A project led by King Abdullah the Second to promote a 
moderate understanding of Islam 
http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16&Itemid=30 
31 For a more detailed account of the relation between the Jordanian state and Islam see Abu 
Rumman and Haniyeh, (2012) Al-Hal Al-’Slami fi Al-’Urdon. 
32 For a discussion of the slogan and its social and political implications, see Ryan (2004) and Jamal 
(2012, 79-83) 
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30 See, for instance, The Amman Message. A project led by King Abdullah the Second to promote a 
moderate understanding of Islam 
http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16&Itemid=30 
31 For a more detailed account of the relation between the Jordanian state and Islam see Abu 
Rumman and Haniyeh, (2012) Al-Hal Al-’Slami fi Al-’Urdon. 
32 For a discussion of the slogan and its social and political implications, see Ryan (2004) and Jamal 
(2012, 79-83) 
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though different, increases the value of Islam in the public sphere and assists 
conservative values. 
 
 
5.2 ISLAMISTS AND DEMOCRACY IN JORDAN 
 
Hassan Haniyeh (2008, 11) identifies two main groups of Islamists in Jordan: 
Islamists who refuse to participate in democracy and have a hostile attitude 
towards it, and Islamists who believe in political participation and the 
democratic process. Each of these two categories includes different movements 
and parties which adopt distinctive views about political reform. The first 
category includes Hizb Al-Tahrir (The Liberation Party), established in 1952; Al-
Salafiyah Al-Taqlidiyah (Traditional Salafists), which emerged in the early 1970s; 
Jama‘at Al-Da‘wa Wa-t-tabligh (or missionary groups / groups of ‘calling to’, 
‘conveyance’ or ‘invocation’ of God), which emerged in late 1960s; and Al-
Salafiyah Al-Jihadiyah (Jihadist Salafists), which emerged in the early 1990s. The 
second category includes four political movements and parties: the Muslim 
Brotherhood, established in 1946; the Islamic Action Front party (IAF), 
established in 1992 (basically it is the political party of the Muslim Brotherhood); 
the Islamic Center party; and the Du‘a’ party (Haniyeh 2008, 11, 15, 16). Apart 
from the movement of Jihadist Salafists which adopts a militant ideology, all 
other Islamists adopt peaceful methods to establish an Islamic state, for example 
education, purification of belief, providing social services, etc. Islamists also have 
different understandings of Islamic principles and religious moralities that 
should prevail in the society. Yet, promoting and/or applying religious 
moralities are at the heart of their discourses.  
 
5.2.1 Anti-democracy Islamist movements in Jordan 
Islamists who refuse democracy argue that democracy is kufr (disbelief; literally 
‘covering’) and it essentially contradicts Islam. In their understanding, Islam is 
the rule of God or shar‘ia, while democracy is the rule of the people. Accordingly, 
they ban political parties, elections and political opposition and argue that these 
procedures and ideas, in their democratic form, are un-Islamic33 (Al-Maqdisi, 
n.d.; Mustafa, 1999; Haniyeh, 2010; Haniyeh, 2008; Haniyeh 2009; Abu Rumman, 
2007). Moreover, they encourage Muslims to stay away from public politics and 
criticize other Islamists for participating in the political sphere. Sheikh 
Muhammad Naser Al-Din Al-Albani, for instance, the founder of the Al-Salafiyah 
Al-Taqlidiyah movement in Jordan, emphasized in one of his fatwas34 that “It is 
                                                     
33  I could not find any opinion by Jama'at Alda'wa Wattatabilgh regarding these matters. The 
movement has strict rules not to talk or discuss politics. Yet, the arguments of the movements about 
the rule of shari’a give good indications that the movement agree with other antidemocratic Islamists 
on these matters. 
34 A religious decree based on Islamic law. 
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politics to leave politics” (Salman, 2004, 33); by this he means that politics in the 
modern context should not be practiced as it contradicts with what politics is, as 
defined by the Sharia (Salman, 2004, 33). His disciple sheikh Shaqra says:  
 
“We should not mingle with political currents as they stand now. There are no 
legal grounds to remove this restriction from the circle of that which is forbidden 
to us by the Sharia. Those that mingle in these circles, commit sin, and those that 
repent, God forgives them” (cited by Haniyeh, 2008, 29). 
 
Apparently, the passive political stance of these movements is political by virtue; 
it weakens state opposition and increases state capacity. 
It is problematic to find accurate information about the size and level of 
influence of anti-democracy movements. Yet, some of these movements run 
different kinds of institutions such as research centers and charity institutions. 
They have lecturers at universities and preachers in mosques. Semi-official 
sources estimate that the number of followers of Al-Salafiyah Al-Taqlidiyah who 
are directly affiliated to the movement is five thousand (Haniyeh, 2010, 105). The 
number of Al-Salafiyah Al-Jihadiyah activists is estimated to be between eight 
hundred and one thousand individuals (Haniyeh, 2009, 86). There is no research 
available which presents estimated numbers of Hizb Al-Tahrir and Jama'at Al-
Da‘wa Wattatabilgh; yet, from my visits to their center in Mukhayyam Shnellar, it is 
clear that thousands of members visit the center weekly. 
 
5.2.2 Pro-democracy Islamists in Jordan 
The Muslim Brotherhood movement and its political party - the Islamic Action 
Front party (IAF) - are the major pro-democracy Islamist groups. In addition, 
they are the biggest, oldest and most organized groups of Islamists in Jordan. 
They operate through a wide range of social services and institutions; for 
example, mosques, charity organizations, schools, universities and hospitals. 
The attitudes of the Muslim Brotherhood movement towards democracy 
have been changing to adjust with political and social changes. Zaki Al-Talha 
(1996, 22-28) classifies four different attitudes towards democracy within the 
Muslim Brotherhood movement: 1) the official attitude, 2) conservative leaders’ 
attitude, 3) the rejectionists’ attitude and 4) the youths’ attitude. According to Al-
Talha (1996), the official attitude accepts democracy, expansion of freedoms, 
cooperation with all political powers and participation in the government and 
the parliament. Conservative leaders have a faltering attitude towards 
democracy; they accept democracy as a temporal solution and as a tool to 
expand the power of the movement and its political participation. However, 
they reject democracy as an ideology. Adopters of the rejectionists’ attitude 
refuse to participate in the executive branch of government, yet they accept 
participation in the legislative branch. The youths’ attitude (the largest current in 
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the movement according, to Al-Talha (1996) identifies with the official attitude 
of the movement. 
Another important and more common typology within the Brotherhood 
recognizes two groups: the doves and the falcons. The doves are more open to 
democratic participation and to negotiate with the government. The falcons, for 
their part, are more critical towards democracy and to the government. In the 
mid-1990s, a new group within the Brotherhood emerged which promoted 
focusing on national issues rather than regional or international ones as the first 
step to establish an Islamic state (Abu Rumman, 2007). Many disagreements, 
conflicts and minor splits happened within the Brotherhood in Jordan. However, 
until the present, the Brotherhood consistently demonstrates strong cohesion 
and high levels of organizational structure. Moreover, there are many 
democratic practices within the Brotherhood, such as the elections of the Shura 
Council, discussions and voting when disputes are not settled by consensus. 
According to Haniyeh (2010, 79, 83), the Islamic Center party and Du‘a’ party 
are two small Islamic parties, which have 750 and 850 members respectively. 
The parties seem to accept democratic mechanisms such as elections and 
devolution of power without any reservations (Haniyeh, 2010, 77-85). Yet, the 
parties do not seem to have any significant weight in the political scene. 
 
 
5.3 ISLAMISTS-STATE RELATIONS  
 
Since the Brotherhood is the major Islamist group and thus the most relevant to 
democracy and public politics, the main focus of this section is on the 
Brotherhood movement and its political party, the IAF.  
Relations between the state and Islamists in Jordan have been fluctuating 
between calm and tense. Abu Rumman (2007, 11-21) argues that the regime had 
been using Islamists to encounter many domestic challenges, for example, 
oppressing socialist, communist and leftist movements during the 1950s and 
1960s or containing the effects of the conflict with Palestinian guerillas in the 
early 1970s. Nonetheless, the differences between the state’s and Islamists’ 
respective ideologies and agendas occasionally increases the tensions between 
them, especially after the democratic reform; for example, during the peace 
process with Israel and during the parliamentary elections of 2003 and 2007 
(Abu Rumman, 2007, 11-21). 
The Brotherhood movement was established in 1946 as a charitable 
organization under the patronage of King Abdullah I. In 1953, the movement 
successfully applied to the authorities to register as a General Islamic Assembly 
rather than merely a charitable organization (Haniyeh, 2008, 55-56; Ggharaybeh, 
1997, 62). This official recognition and support established a strong relationship 
between the movement and the regime and allowed the former to hold public 
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meetings, which were usually attended by government officials and army 
officers (Al-Kilani, 1990, 29). 
In 1957, King Husain abolished political parties in Jordan. However, this did 
not include the movement because it was not registered as a political party. 
Hamadah Fara‘neh35 (2003) claims in his book Muslim Brotherhood Party in Scale 
that the Brotherhood has a strong alliance with the Jordanian regime. In this 
alliance, the former serves the interest of the latter and the latter grants the 
former privileges to work freely in the public sphere. However, this claim 
neglects the other side of the relationship in which the Brotherhood and the 
regime have conflicts and different agendas. According to Haniyeh (2008, 56), 
the change in the official status of the Brotherhood to a General Islamic 
Assembly, made it more organized and politicized. The movement, for instance, 
denounced the Baghdad Alliance of 1955, opposed the Eisenhower project36, and 
criticized the government’s policies, which deviated from its understanding of 
Islamic morals (Abu Fares, 2000, 29-36). These attitudes brought the relations 
between the state and the movement to heated levels, and leading to the arrest 
and the expulsion of many of its members (Al-Kilani 1990, 28-30). However, it is 
hard to argue that the movement constituted in that period any significant threat 
to the state or that the relationship was completely damaged. Gharaybeh (1997, 
60) suggests that the reasons behind allowing the movement to continue its 
activities is that it did not participate in un-peaceful opposition to the 
government, did not try to recruit members from the army and security forces 
and its nature and policies were useful for the government to counter 
communists and Arab nationalists). The common interests, goals and enemies 
(communists, socialists, Arab Nationalists, etc.) of the state and the movement 
and the light political weight of the movement compared to the one of socialists 
and Arab nationalists consolidated the relationship and prevented to the 
emergence of dramatic scenarios. 
The struggle between the state and different power groups led to the 
increasing integration of the opposition (Islamists) trust networks into public 
politics and the decreasing integration of other (communists, socialists, Arab 
Nationalists, etc.) opposition trust networks into public politics. By so doing, the 
state increased its power and consolidated its regime. 
The turning point in the social and political weight of the movement started 
after the defeat of Arab socialist and nationalist regimes against Israel in the Six-
Days War or an-Naksah (literally ‘setback’), which took place in 1967 (Haniyeh, 
2008, 56). The Brotherhood’s ideology started to expand at the expense of other, 
failing ideologies. During this period the state was facing a serious domestic 
                                                     
35 A member of Fatah movement  
36 According to Abu Fares (2000, 31), the project aimed to fill the vacuum left by colonial Western 
powers in the region by the United States in order to prevent the spread of the Soviet Union 
influence. 
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35 A member of Fatah movement  
36 According to Abu Fares (2000, 31), the project aimed to fill the vacuum left by colonial Western 
powers in the region by the United States in order to prevent the spread of the Soviet Union 
influence. 
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conflict and threat caused by Palestinian guerrillas. The conflict ended with the 
defeat of the Palestinian guerrillas in black/white September37 and their final 
defeat and expulsion from the country in July 1971 by the Jordanian army. The 
conflict increased the political and social status of Bedouins and tribesmen who 
largely formed the Jordanian Army. Consequently, the regime’s dependency on 
and close relationship with the tribes became more significant than with any 
other social group, including Islamists38. Yet, the Brotherhood, as a neutral party 
in the conflict, was given more space in the public sphere to fill the void and 
decrease the tension between Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians which 
resulted from the conflict. Haniyeh (2008, 57) notes that in that period 
 
“the movement became actively involved in student unions; it set up the Islamic 
Hospital and the Islamic Center Society, established many Islamic schools in all 
the major cities in the kingdom, and bolstered its presence in the mosques, trade 
and professional unions and student organizations throughout the country”. 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Jordan opened its borders for Brotherhood 
members who were persecuted in Syria. This policy increased the tension 
between the Jordanian and Syrian regimes, demonstrated part of the state 
support to the movement and increased the size of the movement in Jordan. 
However, according to Gharaybeh (1997, 84-86), the Islamic revival during that 
time, the increase of the Brotherhood strength in the Jordanian street and the 
defeat of the Brotherhood in Syria led the Jordanian state to feel threatened by 
the position of the Brotherhood in the Jordanian street. To rectify this situation, 
the Jordanian state sent an official apology to the Syrian regime and established 
some laws which tightened and restricted the movement’s activities. 
The popularity of the Brotherhood movement appeared after parliamentary 
election in 1989. The movement raised its famous slogan ‘Islam is the solution’ 
and gained 22 out of 80 seats in the parliament. By allying with individual 
Islamists they formed the biggest opposition bloc in the parliament with 32 seats 
(Abu Rumman, 2007, 19). The popularity of the Brotherhood was also refulected 
in the results of the 1993 and 2003 elections, when it gained 17 seats in each 
instance (Abu Rumman, 2007, 21). 
The state’s decision to enter a peace process with Israel in early 1990s 
increased tensions with the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood had strongly 
opposed any peace agreement with Israel. The tension was intensified after the 
government proposed a new electoral law 39 , which was perceived by the 
movement as a mean to reduce its political power in the parliament and increase 
                                                     
37 Black or white September refers to the military actions by the Jordanian military against 
Palestinian militias, which took place in September 1970 in Jordan. Many Palestinian Jordanians call 
it black September while some Transjordanians call it white September (Nevo, 2003, 200). 
38 State-tribes relations are discussed in details in chapter seven. 
39 Chapter seven provides a detailed discussion of the law. 
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the one of conservatives and tribes (Abu Fares, 2000, 133,167; Ggharaybeh, 1997, 
128; Abu Rumman, 2007, 19). The law was established as a temporary law by the 
government before the 1993 elections and after King Husain dissolved the 
parliament (Mahafza, 2001, 284). The state’s policies to reduce the Brotherhood’s 
activities did not stop at changing the electoral law. The state, for instance, 
prohibited many Brotherhood’s preachers from preaching, arrested Brotherhood 
members, aborted promulgation for teachers’ unions and restricted the 
Brotherhood’s activities at universities (Abu Fares, 2000, 158) (by appointing half 
of the students’ union councils members instead of electing them). These policies 
pushed the movement to boycott parliamentary elections in 1997 (Abu Rumman, 
2007, 19). 
After the death of King Husain in 1999 and the coronation of King Abdullah 
the Second, a new phase between the state and the movement started. Abu 
Rumman (2007, 20) notes that the Brotherhood file became the responsibility of 
the security agencies rather than the royal court, a new situation which closed 
many communication channels and created tension in the relationship between 
the state and the movement. However, the relationship did not reach a dead-end 
or turn to serious conflicts. 
In 2006, the Jordanian government put its hand over the Islamic Center 
Society40 and resolved the administrative body of the association. A known 
politician who opposes the movement claimed that the association forms thirty 
percent of the movement’s power (Abu Rumman, 2007, 21). The government has 
also been trying to reduce the movement control over The Conservative of the 
Holy Quran Society (Hoffaz, n.d.])41, another important association which is run 
by the movement. However, the lack of a strong capacity prevented the state 
from having absolute control over these associations and other religious 
institutions. For instance, most of the workers in The Conservative of the Holy 
Quran Society are volunteers and members of the movement or sympathize with 
it. The state, for its part, does not have the capacity to find enough qualified 
volunteers or to employee professionals and pay them salaries. The same 
problem applies to mosques; according to the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic 
Affairs (2009) website the number of mosques in Jordan is 6243, while the 
number of appointed imams is only 2002. Hereby, 4241 mosques are run by 
volunteer imams or by privately appointed ones. Indeed, this situation 
demonstrates the relatively weak capacity of the Jordanian state and the wide 
space for Islamists’ activities. 
In the 2007 elections the Brotherhood gained only six seats in the parliament. 
The Brotherhood accused the government of electoral fraud including the illegal 
transfer of votes and allowing vote buying. Paul McCarthy, director of the 
                                                     
40 A charity association that runs 56 centers for the care of orphans,  15 vocational centers, 16 medical 
centers, 50 schools and kindergartens and 2 hospitals (’alawneh, 2011). 
41 The association has 37 branches and 750 centers. http://www.hoffaz.org/ 
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37 Black or white September refers to the military actions by the Jordanian military against 
Palestinian militias, which took place in September 1970 in Jordan. Many Palestinian Jordanians call 
it black September while some Transjordanians call it white September (Nevo, 2003, 200). 
38 State-tribes relations are discussed in details in chapter seven. 
39 Chapter seven provides a detailed discussion of the law. 
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the one of conservatives and tribes (Abu Fares, 2000, 133,167; Ggharaybeh, 1997, 
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40 A charity association that runs 56 centers for the care of orphans,  15 vocational centers, 16 medical 
centers, 50 schools and kindergartens and 2 hospitals (’alawneh, 2011). 
41 The association has 37 branches and 750 centers. http://www.hoffaz.org/ 
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International Republican Institute (IRI) in Jordan confirmed that the polls 
conducted by the IRI before and after the elections proved clearly that the results 
were manipulated in at least two constituencies out of six where the polls were 
conducted 42 . Other observers suggested alternative explanations behind the 
failure of the movement in the elections: 1) the decline of their popularity among 
people because of state policies towards them in the last few years or because of 
the crisis of political Islam, 2) the movement’s mistakes in evaluating electoral 
equations and in choosing the candidates, and 3) the disagreements inside the 
movement between moderates and extremists (Abu Rumman, 2007, 48). 
 
5.3.1 Democratization, state and Islamists’ trust networks 
According to Tilly (2007), a change in state capacity either decreases the 
integration of trust networks in public politics and allows the state to create its 
politically connected trust networks, or increases the degree of integration. The 
relationship between the Jordanian state and the Brotherhood demonstrates a 
third path between state and trust networks wherein the Jordanian state 
integrated the non-politically connected trust network of Islamists into public 
politics in order to consolidate its capacity and segregate other parties and 
movements. 
In this context, democratization increased in three dimensions; first, the state 
increased its capacity and managed to encounter domestic violence, for example, 
ending the domestic violence of the 1950s and 1960s and coping with the results 
of the civil war in the early 1970s. Apparently, democracy is more possible in 
stable societies than in those which suffer from civil war or extreme domestic 
violence. Second, the state’s policies and the international and regional contexts 
pushed the major group of Islamists to adopt fundamental changes in their 
views of democracy and to accept it as a political system to different degrees. 
Third, the state increased the integration of the major Islamist trust networks 
into public politics especially in the 1950s through to the 1970s. The relatively 
weak state capacity and the expansion of Islamist trust networks impeded the 
state from having full control over Islamists’ institutions and organizations. 
Consequently, in the last three decades, the state became incapable of effectively 
segregating Islamist trust networks from public politics. 
On the other hand, de-democratization was accelerating in other dimensions: 
first, the state’s policies assisted the position of Islamists who opposed 
democracy in Jordan as a consequence of the free space that Islamists enjoy. 
Second, the differences in the ideologies and the political views of the state and 
the Brotherhood kept the relationship tense and created mistrust between both 
parties. Yet, the relatively weak capacity of the state impeded it from having full 
control over civil institutions of the movement and other Islamists. Third, other 
trust networks such as political parties and movements became weak and 
                                                     
42 Author’s interview with Paul McCarthy in 2008 in the IRI office in Amman. 
 
  87 
 
insulated from public politics. Fourth, the state’s relationship with Islamists and 
Islam largely assisted conservative culture which insulates women from public 
politics. This issue is discussed thoroughly in the next chapter. Fifth, by focusing 
on elections and some laws, the meaning of democracy was diluted in state and 
Islamist discourses to a few procedural and legal aspects and neglected the basic 
meaning of democracy which requires cooperation, deliberation and inclusion. 
The analysis of state relation to Islamists’ trust networks demonstrates that 
the integration of trust networks into public politics has democratization and de-
democratization effects. Similar results appear in the analyses of the other 
democratization processes in next chapters. Tilly’s flat analysis does not 
recognize the multidimensional and contradictory results of democratization 
processes (Tilly 2007). This situation leads to unstable and confused political 
culture where the boundaries and the rules of the political game are not defined. 
Brumberg (2003) describes political transition in this context as a ‘transition to 
nowhere’ (Brumberg, 2003, 13). He argues that state policies regarding 
democratic transition in liberalized autocracies go in unstable cycles, which do 
not allow “regimes and oppositions to define a new political system based on a 
common set of values and aspirations” (Brumberg, 2003, 13). Liberalized 
autocracies take advantage of this situation to contain possible threats. However, 
on the long run, as Brumberg (2003) and Lust-Okar (2006) suggest, the political 
confusion will decrease the regime legitimacy (Brumberg, 2003, 12; Lust-Okar, 
2006, 460). 
 
 
5.4 TRUST NETWORKS AND STUDENT’S ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS DEMOCRACY 
 
The study has thus far discussed Islamists’ attitudes towards democracy and 
examined the relationship between the Jordanian state, Islamists and 
democratization. In this section, the study analyzes how the relationship 
between state and trust networks - mainly Islamist ones - affects students’ 
attitudes towards democratic concepts, institutions and practices. Additionally, 
the section discusses how the relationship creates new understandings of the 
role of religion in public life, which does not identify with Islamists or state 
understandings. In chapter three, religiosity factors appeared to relate to 
students’ attitudes towards democracy eleven times. The focus here is on these 
questions and on questions about trust networks, Islamists and religion43. After 
the analysis, the study examines the common trends that religiosity formulates 
among students’ attitudes towards democratic concepts, institutions and 
                                                     
43 As mentioned previously, religiosity is measured by going to mosques and attending religious 
lessons. For statistical purposes the study excludes Christian students from the analyses of this 
section. There are 7 Christian respondents and 447 Muslim respondents. 
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43 As mentioned previously, religiosity is measured by going to mosques and attending religious 
lessons. For statistical purposes the study excludes Christian students from the analyses of this 
section. There are 7 Christian respondents and 447 Muslim respondents. 
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practices and the relation between the trends and decreasing and increasing the 
integration of trust networks into public politics. 
 
5.4.1 Religiosity and democratic concepts 
 
Students and state-religion relations 
The students were asked about the relationship between the state and the 
application of moral religious rules such as praying, veiling, banning alcohol 
and banning sexually suggestive or explicit music videos. A high percentage of 
the students (39.4%) said that the state must apply these rules 9.2% said that 
these rules are personal issues and the state should not interfere, 6.7% said that it 
is up to the state to decide and 42.1% said that the state has the right to apply 
some of these rules and does not have the right to apply others. 
Crosstabulation analysis reveals relations between the students' answers and 
two variables; the standard of living and the religiosity of the students. Students 
living in less than average conditions tend to say that the state must apply such 
religious rules more than students living in average conditions and the latter 
tend to support that choice more than students living in higher than average 
conditions. The analysis also shows that the more religious the students are, the 
more they tend to say that the state must apply religious rules. However, there is 
a relationship between going to the mosque and the standard of living of the 
students. Table 6 shows that the lower the standard of living of the students is, 
the more they go to the mosque. 
 
 
 
 
Going to mosques 
Total 
Almost 
daily 
Once a month at 
least 
Barely or do 
not go 
Standard 
of Living 
group 
Less than 
average 
15 11 24 50 
30.0% 22.0% 48.0% 100.0% 
Average 42 57 155 254 
16.5% 22.4% 61.0% 100.0% 
More than 
average 
11 18 79 108 
10.2% 16.7% 73.1% 100.0% 
Total 68 86 258 412 
16.5% 20.9% 62.6% 100.0% 
 = 13.097; d.f. = 4; p = .011 
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In order to determine whether or not the two variables affect each other in their 
relation to the students’ answers, I added each of the two variables as a layer to 
the crosstabulation analysis of the other variable. These additional analyses 
show that the standard of living does not have a relationship to the students' 
answers among the first two categories of going to mosque; i.e. students who go 
to mosque daily or at least once a month. The analysis also shows that going to 
mosque has a relation to students' answers among all the categories of the 
standard of living; i.e. students who go to mosques, regardless of their standard 
of living, are more likely to say that the state must apply religious rules. These 
analyses suggest that the standard of living has a relation to the students' 
answers only when religiosity is weak or absent. The poorer the students who 
do not or barely go to mosques are, the more they say that the state must apply 
religious rules. 
Religiosity, as already mentioned, is measured by going to mosques and 
attending religious lessons. The former gives an indication about religiosity 
among males and the latter gives an indication about religiosity among both 
genders. The above analyses depend on the mosque-attendance variable, rather 
than religious lessons attendance. Adding the standard of living variable as a 
layer to the crosstabulation analysis of attending religious lessons shows that 
religiosity does not seem to have a relation to the students' answers. This 
suggests that gender is a factor in dividing the opinions of students who tend to 
be religious. Further analysis of the gender variable shows that male students 
tend to say that the state must apply religious rules more frequently than female 
students. The analysis also shows that the standard of living of male students 
has a relation to their answers. However, the standard of living of female 
students does not have a relation. 
Putting all the above analyses together demonstrates that male students, 
religious students and male non-religious poorer students tend to think that the 
state must apply religious rules such as wearing the veil, prayers, banning 
alcohol and banning sexually suggestive or explicit music videos more than 
other students. These results suggest two important points: first, social injustice 
in terms of the distribution of wealth and financial support plays a role in 
supporting an alternative ideology for salvation even among groups who are not 
involved in practicing this ideology. This is clear in the trend among non-
religious students who support applying religious rules more than other 
students. Islam in this regard is important as a salvation ideology, but not as 
rituals and practices. Second, the opinions about the relation between the state 
and applying religious moralities are not based only on religious arguments 
even among religious students. Gender, for instance, plays an important role in 
creating different perceptions about the relation between the state and the 
application of religious moralities. As the next chapter demonstrates, further 
analyses of the data  show clearly that male students are more critical towards 
the Jordanian state policies regarding democracy and that they have less trust in 
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the state than female students. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that religious 
males feel political injustice more acutely than religious females and thus seek a 
salvation from other ideologies44. 
The majority of the rest of the students say that the state has the right to 
impose some religious rules but not others. This group of students was asked 
specifically if the state has the right to interfere with each of the four rules; i.e. 
wearing the veil, prayers, banning alcohol and sexually suggestive or explicit 
music videos. 
The answers of this group vary depending on the religious rule they were 
asked about; 75.1% of the students say that the state has the right to interfere to 
ban alcohol, 57% and 52.3% of the students say that the state has the right to 
impose prayers and to ban sexually suggestive or explicit music videos 
respectively, and 39.3% of the students say that the state has the right to interfere 
to impose wearing the veil. Yet, there is no relationship between the answers 
and any variable. Regarding the veil, male students tend to agree that the state 
has the right to impose the veil more than female students. However, p-value in 
Chi-square tests shows that the differences are not statistically significant. 
These four moral issues are strongly present in the Islamists’ discourse and 
the public sphere. It was hard to discuss religiosity with some students without 
being asked whether or not I pray. The veil, as opposed to sufur (being unveiled) 
is prominent in many TV programs in the Arab media, in the Islamists’ 
discourse, and in some activities at universities. Alcohol is almost the first issue 
to be brought to the table when discussing the un-Islamic aspects of the state. 
Sexually suggestive or explicit music videos have been proliferating over the last 
few years in Jordan. Many Muslims, though they watch the clips and enjoy 
talking about them, have a critical, or at least ambivalent, perspective on their 
contents. Yet, these are only examples of what is discussed among students 
regarding religious or traditional morality. 
 
The state, shari‘a and reform 
Students were asked about the relationship between shari‘a and reform. Table 7 
presents the answers. The majority (63.1%) said that the shari‘a will lead to 
political, economic and social reform, 23.7% said that it is important to consider 
the shari‘a but reform has priority, 2.7% said that it is better to put the shari‘a 
aside; the same percentage said that the shari‘a should not be considered and 
3.6% said something else. Crosstabulation analysis shows that there is no 
relation between the students' answers and any of the social variables. 
Another crosstabulation analysis shows a relation between the answers to 
this question and the first question. A significant majority of students who say 
that the state must impose religious rules say that the shari'a will lead to reform. 
                                                     
44 The relation between the students’ support of applying religious rules and the social and political 
injustice is confirmed in interviews with students (Kabatilo, 2013). 
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In addition, the majority of students who select other choices say that the shari'a 
will lead to reform (see Chart 1). 
 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
The shari‘a will lead to political, economic and social reform 282 65.9 
It is important to consider the shari‘a but reform has priority 106 24.8 
It is better to put the shari‘a aside 12 2.8 
The shari‘a should not be considered 12 2.8 
Something else 16 3.7 
 Total 428 100.0 
Missing 19   
Total 447   
 
 
 
 
 
In another question, students were asked to rank the importance of different 
issues that a political party should consider in its platform. These are: economic 
development; Arab issues; Islamic issues; national issues; and social 
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44 The relation between the students’ support of applying religious rules and the social and political 
injustice is confirmed in interviews with students (Kabatilo, 2013). 
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In addition, the majority of students who select other choices say that the shari'a 
will lead to reform (see Chart 1). 
 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
The shari‘a will lead to political, economic and social reform 282 65.9 
It is important to consider the shari‘a but reform has priority 106 24.8 
It is better to put the shari‘a aside 12 2.8 
The shari‘a should not be considered 12 2.8 
Something else 16 3.7 
 Total 428 100.0 
Missing 19   
Total 447   
 
 
 
 
 
In another question, students were asked to rank the importance of different 
issues that a political party should consider in its platform. These are: economic 
development; Arab issues; Islamic issues; national issues; and social 
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development. Islamic issues scored the highest with 4.18 point out of 5; followed 
by national issues - 2.96 points; Arab issues - 2.71 points; economic development 
- 2.59 points, and social development with 2.55 points. Once again, 
crosstabulation shows that there is no relation between the students' answers 
and their support of Islamic issues based on their social backgrounds. Clearly, 
the percentage of students who consider Islam as an indispensable source is 
significantly higher than the percentage of students who say that the state must 
apply religious moralities. 
These results suggest two important points: first, the vast majority of 
students perceive shari‘a as an ideal ideology and an important source of 
instruction for living a good life. The shari‘a in this context builds a collective 
identity that is superior to Arab nationalism and national identities. In this 
respect, the state’s nation-building project seems to be unsuccessful; the 
Jordanian state which prioritizes Jordanian nationalism and interests to define 
its identity, did not manage to displace the superiority of Islam in forming the 
students’ identity and loyalty. Secondly, students do not necessarily connect 
their notion of the shari‘a as an ideal and imagined solution for reform to specific 
policies regarding the application of religious moralities and practices. The 
majority of the students who say that the state should not apply all religious 
rules still think that the shari'a will lead to political, social and economic reform. 
This challenges the Islamists’ discourse which considers the discussed religious 
rules as part of the very reality of Islam. 
 
Freedom of expression 
The results show that religiosity increases the support of freedom of expression 
in two questions: the first is related to criticizing the government publicly and 
the second is related to flouting the government publicly. The more the students 
attend religious lessons, the more they agree that freedom of expression should 
include criticizing the government publicly (see Table 8). In addition, students 
who attend religious lessons at least once per week agree clearly more than 
other students that freedom of expression should include flouting the 
government publicly (see Table 9). These results identify with Islamists being the 
major opposition to the government. 
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 Criticizing the government 
Total Agree 
Somewhat 
agree Disagree 
Attending Religious 
Lessons 
Once or more a week 47 17 7 71 
66.2% 23.9% 9.9% 100.0% 
Once a month 52 15 12 79 
65.8% 19.0% 15.2% 100.0% 
Barely or do not go 137 56 85 278 
49.3% 20.1% 30.6% 100.0% 
Total 236 88 104 428 
 55.1% 20.6% 24.3% 100.0% 
 = 23.94; d.f. = 8; p = .002 
 
 
 
 Flouting the government 
Total Agree 
Somewhat 
agree Disagree 
Attending 
Religious 
Lessons 
Once or more a week 16 9 46 71 
22.5% 12.7% 64.8% 100.0% 
Once a month 7 18 55 80 
8.8% 22.5% 68.8% 100.0% 
Barely or do not go 24 46 208 278 
8.6% 16.5% 74.8% 100.0% 
Total 47 73 309 429 
11.0% 17.0% 72.0% 100.0% 
 = 12.27; d.f. = 4; p = .015 
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Shari‘a and gender equality 
The majority of students agree that equality between men and women should 
not contradict with shari‘a (see table 10). The high percentage assures the strong 
position of Islam among students. 
 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Absolutely 334 80.1 
To a Large Extent 52 12.5 
Somewhat 19 4.6 
To a Small Extent 5 1.2 
not at all 7 1.7 
Total 417 100.0 
Missing System 30  
Total 447  
 
 
Shari‘a and the space of majority 
The majority of the students agree that the winning majority have the right to 
impose their opinion on minorities or individuals in any issue that is compatible 
with shari‘a and the general opinion of Muslim scholars. However the support 
here is less than the support of any question related to shari‘a that does not 
mention Muslim scholars or Islamists. Again there is no relation between 
students’ answers and religiosity variables. Yet, there is a relation between the 
answers and the gender variable; female students tend to agree more on that 
than male students (see Chart 2). The result assures that the support of shari‘a is 
different than the support of Islamists. In addition, the result suggests that other 
factors affect students’ attitudes towards Islamists. 
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5.4.2 Democratic Institutions 
 
Religiosity and Political Parties 
Religiosity has a positive relation to political parties in four questions. The more 
the students go to mosques, the more they agree that political parties will lead to 
the organization of political opposition and make it more efficient (see Table 11). 
In addition, students who go to mosques tend to agree more than students who 
barely or do not go to mosques that the presence of several political parties in 
Jordan will lead to benefiting from different and diverse opinions (see Table 12). 
Further, the more the students attend religious lessons or go to mosques, the 
more they might join a political party. Furthermore, students who go to mosques 
tend to agree less than students who barely or do not go to mosques that 
political parties will lead to the fragmentation of the Jordanian society (see Table 
13). These results refute any claims which suggest that Islam or the Islamic 
culture is not compatible with or a threat to any kind of political diversity. 
Further, the results could suggest that the political engagement of Islamists in 
public politics increases the democratic awareness about political parties among 
religious students. This awareness is reflected on political parties in general 
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rather than Islamist political parties. This point is discussed further in the next 
section. 
 
 
 Organize political opposition and 
make it more efficient 
Total Agree 
Somewhat 
agree Disagree 
Go to Mosques Almost daily 48 10 11 69 
69.6% 14.5% 15.9% 100.0% 
Once a month at 
least 
46 23 17 86 
53.5% 26.7% 19.8% 100.0% 
Barely or do not go 128 61 67 256 
50.0% 23.8% 26.2% 100.0% 
Total 222 94 95 411 
54.0% 22.9% 23.1% 100.0% 
 = 9.63; d.f. = 4; p = .047 
 
 
 
 Benefiting from different and diverse 
opinions 
Total Agree Somewhat agree Disagree 
Going to 
Mosques 
Almost daily 53 9 7 69 
76.8% 13.0% 10.1% 100.0% 
Once a month at 
least 
73 12 2 87 
83.9% 13.8% 2.3% 100.0% 
Barely or do not 
go 
183 39 36 258 
70.9% 15.1% 14.0% 100.0% 
Total 309 60 45 414 
74.6% 14.5% 10.9% 100.0% 
 = 9.889; d.f. = 4; p = .042 
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 Fragmentation of the Jordanian society 
Total Agree Somewhat agree Disagree 
Going to 
Mosques 
Almost daily 24 10 35 69 
34.8% 14.5% 50.7% 100.0% 
Once a month at 
least 
25 11 46 82 
30.5% 13.4% 56.1% 100.0% 
Barely or do not 
go 
104 59 95 258 
40.3% 22.9% 36.8% 100.0% 
Total 153 80 176 409 
37.4% 19.6% 43.0% 100.0% 
 = 12.205; d.f. = 4; p = .016 
 
 
Students, Islamists and Islamists political parties: Who is an Islamist? 
The students were asked whether they would not vote for a political party if it 
were controlled by Islamists. 34.5% of the students answered not at all, i.e. the 
Islamist identity of a party would not prevent them from voting for it. Other 
students’ answers varied between absolutely and to a small extent (see Table 14). 
The percentage here is a bit less than the percentage (39.4%) who said that the 
state must apply religious rules. 
 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Absolutely 51 11,5 
To a Large Extent 48 10,8 
Somewhat 103 23,3 
To a Small Extent 88 19,9 
not at all 153 34,5 
Total 443 100,0 
Missing System 21  
Total 464  
 
 
Crosstabulation analysis shows that the answers are related to two variables: 
gender and country of origin (i.e., Transjordanians or Palestinian Jordanians). 
The answers do not seem to have a relation to the religiosity of the students; i.e., 
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students go to the mosque or attend religious lessons do not support an Islamist 
party any more than other students. This result is very important as it shows 
that religious students who support the role of the state in applying religious 
moralities are not necessarily Islamists, i.e. they are not part of political Islam. 
Hence, it challenges the dichotomy which divides people into secular and Islamist 
and suggests a third group. This group is not secular in the sense of separating 
the state from applying religious rules. However, the group does not support 
Islamist political parties. Islam as stated before is supported by state and 
Islamists’ discourses. These discourses differ in how they present Islam and in 
how they represent each other. Consequently, there appear to be hybrid 
students who recognize certain religious practices and care about increasing 
their knowledge about Islam. By so doing they identify themselves with the 
Islamic discourse. Yet, they do not support Islamists politically. By so doing they 
identify with the state discourse. 
Male students tend to be less averse to voting for an Islamist political party 
than female students (see Chart 3). The differences here do not mean that male 
students are more supportive of Islamists than female students, as some might 
suggest. In fact, all the other questions related to Islamists in the questionnaire 
show that female students support Islamists more than male students. The 
results here can be understood by recognizing that female students are much 
more critical towards political parties in general than male students45. Hence, 
their attitude towards political parties is reflected also in Islamist political parties. 
The results here are very important in presenting the complex position of 
Islamist political parties and Islamists; supporting one of them is not equal to 
supporting the other. Understanding the role of each of them by students is 
different, i.e. the role of an Islamist is perceived differently than the role of the 
Islamists’ political parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
45 The results which are related to the gender factor are presented and discussed in details in the next 
chapter. 
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In the case of students, defining a religious person does not seem to follow a 
clear path either. In most cases students mention the five prayers as a sign of 
religiosity. Yet they are aware that prayers should lead to good morals, 
otherwise they are not enough. Some students identify themselves as religious 
but they assert that they are not mutzamitin (literally strict) or muta‘asibin 
(literally fanatics). They give different and sometimes contradictory examples of 
being mutazamet (singular of mutzamitin) or muta‘aseb (singular of muta‘asibin). 
For example, having a beard, wearing a galabia or not listening to music identify 
a person as strict or fanatical for some students, but do not identify a person as 
such for others. In the same manner, the definition of an Islamist does not seem 
to be consistent among students. Some identify an Islamist as a religious person, 
others as a fanatic religious person and others choose to connect Islamists with 
the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Palestinian Jordanian students tend to support Islamist parties more than 
Transjordanian students (see Chart 4). This can be understood by recognizing 
that Transjordanians are usually members of Jordanian tribes. These tribes 
participate in public politics through a tribal framework. Palestinian Jordanians, 
on the other hand, are more marginalized politically and the Islamic Action 
Front party as the major opposition party in Jordan is the chief place in which 
Palestinian Jordanians can express their political demands. 
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Students’ perceptions of Islamist political parties are based on their gender and 
country of origin rather than on their religiosity, their way of perceiving the role 
of the Islamic state in applying religious moralities, or their way of perceiving 
the role of shari‘a in reform. The political discourse of the Islamist political 
parties about the Islamic state and religious moralities is not identical with the 
students’ perceptions. Hence, students do not identify or imagine the Islamic 
state in the same manner as Islamists. 
 
5.4.3 Democratic practices 
Student who barely or do not go to mosques or attend religious lessons appear 
to be less critical than other students towards the relation between the state and 
democratic practice. For instance, they agree less than religious students that the 
democratic practice in Jordan is bad (see Table 15). In addition, they disagree 
more than religious students that some articles in the Jordanian constitution or 
law limits democracy (see table 16). In line with these results, nonreligious 
students disagree more than religious students that the government fears that 
Islamists will rule (see table 17). These results suggest strongly that the tension 
and mistrust between state and Islamists is reflected in the students’ attitudes 
towards democratic practice. 
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 The democratic practice in 
Jordan is 
Total Good Average Bad 
Attending Religious 
Lessons 
Once or more a 
week 
22 32 16 70 
31.4% 45.7% 22.9% 100.0% 
Once a month 29 23 24 76 
38.2% 30.3% 31.6% 100.0% 
Barely or do not go 109 112 39 260 
41.9% 43.1% 15.0% 100.0% 
Total 160 167 79 406 
39.4% 41.1% 19.5% 100.0% 
 = 13.167; d.f. = 4; p = .01 
 
 
  Some articles in the Jordanian 
Constitution or law limit democratic 
reform 
Total   Agree Somewhat agree Disagree 
Attending Religious 
Lessons 
Once or more 
a week 
26 20 22 68 
38.2% 29.4% 32.4% 100.0% 
Once a month 13 28 35 76 
17.1% 36.8% 46.1% 100.0% 
Barely or do 
not go 
65 63 132 260 
25.0% 24.2% 50.8% 100.0% 
Total 104 111 189 404 
25.7% 27.5% 46.8% 100.0% 
 = 13.815; d.f. = 4; p = .008 
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 The government fears that 
Islamists will rule 
Total Agree 
Somewhat 
agree Disagree 
Attending Religious 
Lessons 
Once or more a 
week 
49 15 8 72 
68.1% 20.8% 11.1% 100.0% 
Once a month 40 17 23 80 
50.0% 21.3% 28.8% 100.0% 
Barely or do not go 150 40 84 274 
54.7% 14.6% 30.7% 100.0% 
Total 239 72 115 426 
56.1% 16.9% 27.0% 100.0% 
 = 13.05; d.f. = 4; p = .011 
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Demonstrations 
The more students attend religious lessons, the more they would participate in a 
peaceful demonstration against some governmental policies - for example, the 
removal of fuel subsidies (see Table 18). In addition, students who go to 
mosques daily tend to agree more than other students on participating in such 
demonstrations.  
 
 
 Participating in a demonstration against the 
government policies 
Total Absolutely 
To a 
Large 
Extent Somewhat 
To a 
Small 
Extent 
Not 
at all 
I do 
not 
know 
Attending 
Religious 
Lessons 
Once or 
more a 
week 
39 8 12 5 5 4 73 
53.4% 11.0% 16.4% 6.8% 6.8% 5.5% 100.0% 
Once a 
month 
33 19 12 4 3 8 79 
41.8% 24.1% 15.2% 5.1% 3.8% 10.1% 100.0% 
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or do 
not go 
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41.9% 11.6% 9.7% 9.0% 14.4% 13.4% 100.0% 
Total 188 59 51 34 48 49 429 
43.8% 13.8% 11.9% 7.9% 11.2% 11.4% 100.0% 
 = 24.727; d.f. = 10; p = .006 
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 The government fears that 
Islamists will rule 
Total Agree 
Somewhat 
agree Disagree 
Attending Religious 
Lessons 
Once or more a 
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56.1% 16.9% 27.0% 100.0% 
 = 13.05; d.f. = 4; p = .011 
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Demonstrations 
The more students attend religious lessons, the more they would participate in a 
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Elections 
Students who barely or do not go to mosques agree more than other students 
that elections results are futile (See Table 19). However, in the 2007 elections 
Islamists got poor results, winning only six seats in the parliament and 
subsequently they accused the government of manipulating the results. The 
result assures that the Islamists’ discourse is not identical with religious 
students’ attitudes though it influences it generally as the previous results 
demonstrate. 
 
 
 Election results are futile 
Total Agree 
Somewhat 
agree Disagree 
Going to 
Mosques 
Almost daily 26 11 31 68 
38.2% 16.2% 45.6% 100.0% 
Once a month at least 34 30 27 91 
37.4% 33.0% 29.7% 100.0% 
Barely or do not go 126 59 79 264 
47.7% 22.3% 29.9% 100.0% 
Total 186 100 137 423 
44.0% 23.6% 32.4% 100.0% 
 = 12.688; d.f. = 4; p = .013 
 
 
A small percentage of the students agree that elections are forbidden in Islam. 
Male students appear to agree more than female students. There is no relation 
between the answer of this question and any other variable. The results here 
assure previous findings that factors other than religiosity define the student’s 
understanding of Islam. In addition, the results assure that anti-democratic 
attitudes are not common among religious students. 
The majority of students tend to consider when electing a candidate if the 
candidate is an Islamist (see Table 20). This shows that Islamists are largely 
influential in elections and consequently in the political scene. Students who 
attend religious lessons at least once a week tend to consider Islamist candidates 
more than other students. Yet, gender also influences the students’ answers. 
Female students tend to consider Islamists more than other students. 
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  Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Very important 158 35.7 
Important 102 23.0 
Average 109 24.6 
Weak 49 11.1 
No role 25 5.6 
Total 443 100.0 
Missing System 21  
Total 464  
 
 
The majority of students did not participate in the student union elections. There 
is a relation between the answer and going to the mosque factor. The majority of 
students who go to mosques almost daily participated in the student union 
elections and participated more than other students. Further analyses which add 
gender as a layer show that the relation exists only among male students who go 
to mosques and does not exist among female students. Student union elections 
at universities are highly political; the competition is largely between Islamists 
and pro-regime candidates. The results here assure that religiosity increases the 
democratic political practice among students. 
After we finished presenting the students’ attitudes towards trust networks 
and the religiosity factor, let us examine the possible trends in these attitudes 
and their relation to the integration of trust networks into public politics.  
 
 
5.5 TRENDS, STUDENTS’ ATTITUDES, TRUST NETWORKS 
AND THE STATE 
 
From the previous analysis it is possible to single out five trends among 
university students in Jordan related to Islamists’ trust networks and religiosity: 
First, Islam is the ideal which transcends all social divisions. The vast 
majority of students say that Islam will lead to reform and that political parties 
should consider for most Islamic issues in their political platform. Promoting 
Islam as part of the national identity by the state, giving some political space for 
Islamists networks, oppressing for a long time other political networks and 
failing in economic and social developments have been major factors which 
promote Islam not as an ideal but as the ideal for good life. This situation 
increases the capacity of Islamists’ trust networks and makes it harder for the 
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state to insulate these networks completely from public politics. In addition, it 
decreases the capacity of the Jordanian state which tries in its nation-building 
project to promote Islam as an ideal not as the primary ideal. However, the 
differences between state and Islamist perceptions of the role of Islam do not 
create strong public polarization in society, which undermines democracy since 
both parties promote Islam in their discourse. 
Second, pro-democratic attitudes are clearly present among religious 
students more than other students. These positive attitudes are related to 
democratic concepts, institutions and practices - for example, religious students 
support freedom of expression more than other students, they have more 
positive attitude towards political parties and they participate in elections more 
than other students. Apparently, the active participation of Islamists in the 
public sphere, their engagement in democratic reforms and their position as an 
opposition to state policies increases the democratic culture among religious 
students. 
Third, some undemocratic attitudes are clear among a considerable 
percentage of students especially attitudes towards democratic concepts and, to 
a lesser extent, attitudes towards democratic institutions. For example, there is a 
clear trend among students which opposes the political freedom of expression, 
equality and political parties. Yet, these trends appear weaker among religious 
students. The absence of political parties in Jordan until 1989, the spread of 
Islamists’ trust networks in the public sphere and the suppression of non-
Islamists’ trust networks from public politics are consistent with the 
undemocratic attitudes towards political parties. In addition, decreasing the 
integration of non-Islamists’ trust networks increased the state capacity to create 
its own political connected trust networks. Consequently, undemocratic 
attitudes towards freedom of expression and political parties grow. The position 
of Islamists as the main opposition party after the democratic reform provides 
an explanation of why undemocratic attitudes towards some democratic 
concepts - namely freedom of expression - are less common among religious 
students. This is to say that political opposition tends to support freedom of 
expression. However, these explanations do not provide sufficient 
understanding of the undemocratic attitudes towards equality. The following 
chapters help in providing better understanding of those attitudes. 
Fourth, there is a relatively strong trend among students that support 
Islamists. Yet, the support is not related chiefly to the religiosity factor. In 
addition, the support of Islamists is much weaker than the support of Islam. The 
support of Islamists is clear among female students and to a less extent among 
students of Palestinian origin 46 . This suggests that Islamists are mainly 
supported not because of their religious ideas but for other reasons: first, 
                                                     
46 More about the position of Islamists among females and Palestinian Jordanians is discussed in the 
following chapters. 
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increasing the integration of Islamists into the public sphere enabled them to 
provide services through different kinds of political and social institutions; 
second, Islamists provide an access for Palestinian Jordanians to public politics; 
and third, the position of Islamists as the only alternative for the state economic 
and social failure policies. 
Fifth, religious students appear to be more critical of the government and the 
political situation in Jordan, for example they agree less than other students that 
the democratic practice in Jordan is good, they are more critical towards the 
compatibility between the Jordanian constitution and democracy and they tend 
to think the government fears Islamists more than other students. The tensions 
between the Jordanian state and Islamists provide sufficient explanations for 
these attitudes. 
 The previous analysis of the relationship between state and Islamists 
and the influence of this relation on students’ attitudes towards democracy 
suggest that increasing and/or decreasing the integration of trust networks into 
public politics influence the democratic political culture of Jordanian university 
students. In the case of Jordan, increasing the integration of Islamists trust 
networks into public politics increased the democratic political culture among 
religious students. On the other hand, decreasing the integration of other trust 
networks into public politics decreased the democratic political culture among 
people. 
The analysis also sheds light on the relationship between democracy and 
religion. It might be surprising to see that democratic concepts, institutions and 
practices are more popular among religious students than other students. Yet, 
putting this result in the socio-political context makes it clear and assures it 
authenticity. Rather than claiming that Islam, for instance, is intrinsically anti-
democratic, the results suggest that Islam in practice is shaped through the 
relation between state and trust networks. 
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6 Democratization and 
Gender in Jordan 
When John Stuart Mill (1869) wrote his essay Subjection of Women, he brought 
about a discussion on women’s rights and gender equality and his views were 
ahead of the gender-related social and political practices of his time. These days 
some of Mill’s views about gender roles do not satisfy many feminists who ask 
for more gender equality (Wilson, 2009). Yet, this is not to say that Mill (1869) 
was against gender equality, but rather to hint that the understanding of gender 
equality is shaped by complex interrelations between social practices, economic 
conditions, political orders and power relations. Nonetheless, democracy as the 
rule of people implies in principle that any person regardless of his or her 
gender should have an equal right to rule. Thus, the more the state insulates 
gender inequality from public politics, the more the state moves towards 
democratization (Tilly, 2007, 23). 
In Jordan, the insulation of gender inequality from public politics has been 
increasing for decades. For instance, women got the right to vote and to run for 
elections in the early 1970s, they were elected in municipal councils and 
appointed in high ranking official positions, many laws were amended to bring 
more gender equalities or to improve the position of women, etc. (Brand, 1998a; 
Ridwan, 2010). These changes, whether they are considered significant or minor, 
could be perceived as a step towards greater democratization in the country. 
However, Altal and Hammad (2008, 218) and others (Sharaf, 1996, 17; Kharmeh, 
2012, 207) say that such changes emerged from an upper political decision or 
leadership political decision rather than from mass public pressure coming from 
women’s organizations or political parties. More importantly, the changes, as 
this chapter argues, have been crystallizing different gender roles and assuring 
the position of woman as an apolitical person. By crystallizing, the chapter 
means extending the support of different gender roles from social norms and 
practices to public institutions and laws. By so doing, different gender roles 
gained support not only at the social level but also the institutional and legal 
levels. As such, the changes in women’s education, labor, political participation, 
etc. do not necessarily imply greater democratization. Rather, the changes work 
in a multidimensional and complex manner within the sphere of gender equality 
where democratization increases and decreases. In addition, increasing or 
decreasing the insulation of gender inequality from public politics could be 
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associated with other democratization processes, causing more or less 
democratization. Moreover, the contradictory and multidimensional results of 
gender equality in relation to democratization affect student attitudes towards 
democracy. In order to construct and clarify this argument, this chapter 
discusses four topics relevant to the insulation of gender equality from public 
politics: first, tribes and gender equality; second, Islamists and gender equality; 
third, state and negotiating gender equality; and fourth, women in education 
labor and parliamentary elections. After the discussion, this chapter analyses the 
relationship between the insulation of gender inequalities from public politics 
and students' attitudes towards democracy. 
 
 
6.1 TRIBES AND GENDER EQUALITY 
 
The Bedouin and tribal cultures are neither static nor well defined, and the space 
of equality and women’s activities could differ and change from time to time 
and from one tribe to another. In an interesting paragraph about the Jordanian 
society, George Harris and Moukhtar Ani (1958, 209) noted: 
The veiling and seclusion of women has always been confined to a small 
segment of Jordanian society, centered in the upper classes of the towns. Nomad 
and village women as a rule are not veiled. While their sphere of activity is 
largely confined to the family circle, they may help their husbands outside the 
home; they also participate in the traditional forms of bedouin and peasant 
hospitality, a considerable amount of social contact between men and women 
not related to each other having long been accepted. 
The above picture of women and gender relations does not fit with other 
images about veiled Bedouin or tribal women. Many feminists, as Joseph 
Massad (2001, 98-99) notes, use Bedouin tradition to argue against 
discriminative practices and laws against women. These different - and in some 
cases contradictory - representations of Bedouin women are reflected in different 
laws, and are supported or criticized by different state and civic actors and 
institutions (Massad, 2001, 98-99). The ultimate hegemony of one over the other 
has not yet taken place. However, it inclines heavily towards the division of 
gender roles. 
The starting point of the crystallization of different gender roles emerged in 
an early stage of Jordan modern history from the relationship between state and 
tribes. The Jordanian state, as some scholars note, subjugated tribes to the rule of 
central administration by recruiting them in public offices and military services 
(Alzyud, 2010, 66; Alon, 2009, 84; Brand, 1998a, 101; Massad, 2001, 102). 
Consequently, the conservative culture of Bedouins and tribes regarding gender 
roles transferred to state institutions and is reflected in many laws related to 
nationality and citizenship (Massad, 2001, 46-47). As Annika Rabo (1996, 166) 
suggests, the royal house, the main representative of state in Jordan, “has been 
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active not only in 'preserving' but in creating 'tribal' sentiment. The male Arab 
Bedouin is evoked as a cultural ideal”.  
Laurie Brand (1998a, 101) argues that in Jordan the military as an institution 
“plays a role in reproducing gender notions of the two sexes” by asserting that 
men should be ready “to kill and die on behalf of the state and thus prove their 
manhood” and demands that women should probably be “subservient to the 
needs of the military and the men who serve in it”. In addition, by spending 52 
percent of central government expenditures between 1955 and 1970 on public 
security, “the Jordanian state has provided well for the men who serve in its 
military, including offering benefits that improve the lot of the entire family” 
(Brand, 1998a, 101). This asserted the economic and social superiority of men 
over women. Moreover, “the focus on the military over the years has led to less 
of an emphasis on investment in crucial social welfare projects, projects that 
generally tend to benefit women” (Brand, 1998a, 101). 
From another angle, the creation and expansion of state institutions in urban 
areas and the state sedentarization policies of Bedouins brought state-related 
work opportunities to tribesmen and caused – in combination with other 
factors47 - a large and swift immigration from desert and rural areas to cities. 
Matruk Alfaleh (2002, 113-117) argues that the large and swift immigration 
creates a city-ruralism phenomenon (tariyof al-mudon) instead of rural 
urbanization (tamadon al-rif). This means that traditional norms and values of 
Bedouins and peasants dominate the relations between and within civil 
institutions in urban areas, rather than modern norms and values among which 
different social gender roles. 
The Jordanian state managed to decrease the autonomy of tribes to operate 
outside state public politics. Yet, this affected gender equality in many ways. 
First, it brought conservative views regarding gender roles to public institutions. 
Second, it emphasized the superiority of men in the tribal tradition, for example, 
by supporting the economic role of men but not the one of women. Third, it 
asserted different gender roles. Fourth, it transformed some social inequality 
norms regarding gender to legislation. Consequently, this decreased in many 
aspects the insulation of gender inequality from public politics and 
institutionalized de-democratization. Yet, before providing examples of the 
effects of tribal traditions regarding gender roles on education, work and legal 
institutions, the chapter discusses Islamists’ views regarding gender roles in 
Jordan and the relationship between the Jordanian state and gender equality. 
 
 
 
                                                     
47 The Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967 caused a mass and rapid change in the 
demography of Jordan. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees settled in Jordanian cities 
after the occupation (Alfaleh, 2002, 112). 
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6.2 ISLAMISTS AND GENDER EQUALITY 
 
In the previous chapter, the study presented the relation between the regime and 
Islamists in Jordan and demonstrated that this has been fluctuating between 
calm and tense. The friendly relationship initially granted Islamists a space to 
operate in the public sphere and to expand their social institutions and services. 
This expansion allowed Islamists to promote directly or indirectly their views 
about women’s social and political roles. Islamists agree that social and political 
roles of people are defined by gender. They also agree that Islam ‘honored’ 
women and raised their status. For this purpose, they cite verses from Quran 
and teachings of Prophet Muhammad. In addition, the status of women in Islam 
is usually compared to their status in the West. In the latter, women are treated 
as a commodity and are utilized sexually in advertising while in the former they 
are protected from such abuses48. Nonetheless, Islamists have different opinions 
about the borders and the common areas of gender roles. These differences are 
discussed by presenting the views of major Islamist groups in Jordan. 
 
6.2.1 Hizb Al-Tahrir or the Liberation Party 
The party view of the role of women can be summarized in two points: First, 
women and men are equal in terms of their humanity and in being accountable 
for their actions (an-Nabahani, 1990, 15). Second, despite these equalities, the 
role of women, their rights and their duties are different than that of men. In its 
drafted constitution, the party states that 
 
“a woman is primarily a mother and a home maker. She is an honor that must be 
safeguarded […] Men and women are basically to be segregated from each other. 
They should not mix together except for a need permitted by the Shari‘a […] 
Women can participate in the election process and in the giving of the Bay‘ah 
[pledge of allegiance] to the Khalifah. They can be members of Majlis al-Ummah 
[parliament]. She can also be employed by the State […] It is not permitted for a 
woman to assume responsibility for government. Consequently, women cannot 
hold the positions of the Khalifah, Wali, ‘Amel and she cannot undertake any task 
that is considered to be an aspect of government” (cited by an-Nabahani, 1998, 
261-262). 
 
Haniyeh (2008, 23) notes that since the party is banned in Jordan, “the party’s 
curriculum for ‘change’ in Jordan has worked to reduce the woman’s role due to 
risks that party members are exposed to”. 
 
 
                                                     
48 See for example, Al-Maqdisi (n.d., 46); Albanna (1988, 5-6, 11-12); and An-
Nabahani, (1990, 10-11). 
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47 The Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967 caused a mass and rapid change in the 
demography of Jordan. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees settled in Jordanian cities 
after the occupation (Alfaleh, 2002, 112). 
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48 See for example, Al-Maqdisi (n.d., 46); Albanna (1988, 5-6, 11-12); and An-
Nabahani, (1990, 10-11). 
 112   
 
 
6.2.2 Al-Salafiyah Al-Taqlidiyah 
Muhammad Al-Albani (the founder of Al-Salafiyah Al-Taqlidiyah in Jordan) 
stated that a woman should not “ask to be equal with her husband in all his 
rights […] Woman, in particular, should obey her husband in what he 
commands as much as she can since this is part of the preference that God gave 
for men over women” (Al-Albani, 1409 AH, 278, 281)49. In addition, in his 
comment on Muhammad Rashid Rida, Al-Albani rejected the call of those who 
allow women to participate as men in social or political actions (Rida, 1984, 11). 
According to Haniyeh (2008), Al-Salafiyah Al-Taqlidiyah employed women in 
the context of its political ethos or theory, and established a women’s council at 
the Imam Al-Albani Center. The council’s mission is to communicate with 
women in their homes and to give lectures to women. This has assisted the 
movement’s expansion in many of the poorest neighborhoods in major cities, 
and the spread of the movement widely among women in these areas (Haniyeh, 
2008, 31). Yet, Haniyeh (2008) does not provide any evidence or assessment 
which supports his claim about the spread of the movement among women in 
poor areas. Moreover, as the study mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
movement forbids political participation.  
 
6.2.3 Al-Salafiyah Al-Jihadiyah 
The movement’s opinion regarding gender roles within the family does not 
differ from that of Al-Salafiyah Al-Taqlidiyah. However, the movement promotes 
an active role for women in the public sphere. For instance, Almaqdisi (n.d., 47) -
a prominent theorist of Al-Salafiyah Al-Jihadiyah in Jordan - states that  
 
“anyone who reflects upon Islamic history will see the active role of women in 
supporting religion and raising its banner […] The first to believe in the prophet 
peace be upon him was a woman, woman participated in Al-‘Aqaba pledge of 
allegiance and she was an aid and a shield in the story of Al-Hijra (the migration to 
Mecca). In many battles of Muslims woman had clear participation in consultancy 
and in assisting the fighters in many ways even by fighting.” 
 
 In the same line of Almaqdisi, Yusef Al-‘ayiri, (one of the most important 
theorists of the Jihadist Salafists and the First Emir of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia), 
wrote a letter about The Role of Women in Fighting the Enemy where he explained 
thoroughly that role, which includes public participation (Al-‘ayiri, n.d.). 
Apparently, Al-Salafiyah Al-Jihadiyah literature gives a wider role for women 
than simply to stay at home. However, this does not mean that the movement 
does not ascribe to women traditional roles, such as obeying the husband and 
                                                     
49 AH (After Hijrah): The publishing date is written according to the Islamic calendar, which starts 
from the day prophet Muhammad immigrated from Mecca to Medina. In the Georgian calendar the 
publishing date is 1989. 
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taking care of the household. In additions in mid-1990s the movement started to 
change its priorities from fighting the state and the ‘non-Islamic’ regimes in 
Muslim countries to fighting the United States and the West (Haniyeh, 2008, 40). 
Hereby, the role of women inside Jordan is naturally and largely limited to 
home and nurturing generations (Haniyeh, 2008, 40). Nonetheless, one of the 
four attackers in 2005 Amman bombings was a woman. 
 
6.2.4 Jama‘at Al-Da‘wa Wa-t-tabligh 
In an interview with Sheikh Abdel Hay Abu Khaled, a prominent member of the 
movement in Jordan, Abu Khaled (2008) stated that women in Jordan during the 
1990s began to actively participate in the missionary and advocacy work of the 
movement. They began to travel and tour within and outside the kingdom with 
their husbands, sons or guardians in order to perform their share of the work in 
al-Da’wa and tabligh process. These tablighi (missionary) women are active in 
missionary activities inside homes among women only, especially in poor and 
marginalized neighborhoods (interviewed by Haniyeh, 2008). However, the 
movement prevents its members from participating in or engaging with politics. 
Moreover, the movement’s opinions about gender roles are conservative and as 
such the activities of women inside the movement affirm gender roles more than 
increasing their presence in the public sphere. 
 
6.2.5 The Muslim Brotherhood and women 
In a letter about Muslim women, Hassan Albanna (1988)50, the founder of the 
Brotherhood movement in Egypt, stated that women are to be educated in fields 
related to their work in the house and that any education, which is beyond this 
sphere is useless since their position, first and last, is at home. In addition, 
Albanna (1988, 9-10, 18) forbade women to work in public. Hassan Haniyeh 
(2008, 58) notes that Albanna was convinced of the necessity for women to 
participate in public work and saw them as important agents of change and as 
means with which the reform program of the Muslim Brotherhood could be 
achieved - as stated in the internal charter of the principal organization of the 
Muslim Sisterhood. Based on this, Haniyeh (2008) argues that Albanna’s actual 
practice was different from his expressed view. Yet, Haniyeh (2008) fails to 
recognize that recruiting women in the movement and considering them as an 
important means for change does not necessarily imply that their activities are 
open to the public male sphere or that their role differs fundamentally from the 
one that Albanna (1988) ascribed in his writings. 
The movement in Jordan adopts largely but not completely51 Albanna's views 
about women which are in line with the conservative view of Jordanian tribes. 
                                                     
50 Albanna died in 1948. Yet, his legacy is still alive among members of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Jordan. His writings and opinions are largely circulated, discussed and taught in their meetings.   
51 For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan do not forbid woman to work in public. 
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50 Albanna died in 1948. Yet, his legacy is still alive among members of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Jordan. His writings and opinions are largely circulated, discussed and taught in their meetings.   
51 For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan do not forbid woman to work in public. 
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For instance, the movement did not nominate any women in parliamentary 
elections until 2003 or in municipal elections until 2007 52 . In addition, the 
movement’s members in the parliament rejected the amendments related to 
criminal and family laws. The amendments were designed to change the law on 
so-called honor killings which grants the murderer a light punishment; to raise 
the age of marriage to 18 years instead of 15; and to grant women easier 
regulations to issue a divorce (Allsmadi, 2004, 74-76). During the discussion of 
the so-called honor killings law, ‘Abd Al-Latif ‘Arabiyat, secretary general of the 
Islamic Action Front Party and an a member of the parliament, stated that  
 
“we feel that whoever is leading all these campaigns to change is aimed at 
demoralizing our society, and the women's issue has been used by the West 
against the Arabs and the Muslims to push Arab women to abandon their honor 
and values and start acting like animals” (cited by Nanes 2003).  
 
Moreover, the Brotherhood members of parliament who were elected in 1989 
and the Brotherhood ministers in Mudar Badran cabinet in 1991 proposed and 
supported laws and practices which emphasize gender inequality and, in some 
cases, the superiority of man (Brand, 1998b, 104-106). In some cases, the 
Brotherhood used empowering women arguments to justify its support for 
gender inequality laws. For example, when a law to ban male hairdressers for 
women was implemented, the Brotherhood stated that it welcomes the law 
because it increased women’s employment chances (Brand, 1998b, 105). 
Despite the conservative views and practices of the Brotherhood against 
women, Arwa Alkilani - the head of the women’s sector in the IAF party - 
claimed that the IAF received seventy percent of the women’s vote in the 2003 
parliamentary elections (cited by Haniyeh, 2008, 75). This claimed percentage is 
exaggerated when we consider the following factors. First, the percentage of 
women who voted in 2003 elections was 52.12 percent of the voters (Al-Shikhani, 
n.d.). Second, the percentage of women who voted in 2003 election outside 
Amman and Zarqa constituencies was between 80-89 percent of the voters 
(Mqdad, 2004, 316). Third, the number of seats in Amman and Zarqa 
constituencies is 33 seats of the 106 parliament seats (Mudiriyat Al-Dirasat wa 
Al-Ma‘lumat [Department of Research and Information], 2006). Fourth, there is 
no difference in how the electoral system translates male and female votes into 
seats. Fifth, the number of seats that the movement got in the parliament is not 
compatible with the claimed percentage even when considering that no male 
voted for the IAF53. Additionally, in representative surveys about democracy 
conducted in Jordan in 1997 and 2003, only 26.9 percent of male respondents and 
15.4 percent of females said that being a member of the IAF is among the reasons 
                                                     
52 The Brotherhood boycotted the parliamentary elections of 1997 and the municipal elections of 2003.  
53 In 2003 elections the party got 17 seats out of 110 seats.  
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that they would value when choosing a candidate. The 15.4 percent in the 2003 
election is much less than Alkilani’s claim. Yet, 68.9 percent in 1997 and 67.7 
percent in 2003 said in both surveys that being a religious candidate is among 
the reasons that they would value when choosing a candidate (Center of 
Strategic Studies University of Jordan 2003, 37). Brand (1998b, 102) says that 
“outside Amman women were among the fundamentalists’ [Islamists] strongest 
base of support”. In the 1997 survey, 75.8 percent of women respondents stated 
that being a religious candidate is among the reasons that they would value 
when choosing a candidate compared to 65.8 percent of men. 
In spite of the conservative views of the Brotherhood regarding women, 
Haniyeh (2008, 64, 75) notes that the movement’s views have been changing. For 
instance, the IAF nominated one woman in the 2003 parliamentary elections and 
became the first political party to do so (Sulayman, 2003). In 2007 election the 
party nominated two women for the parliamentary election and another two 
women in the municipal elections. Further, as Haniyeh (2008, 73) says,  
Sisterhood women are active in professional unions and other civil institutions 
such as the Charitable Association of Virtue and The Conservative of the Holy Quran 
Society which has more than sixty centers for women in Amman alone. Further, 
Al-Kilani (cited by Haniyeh 2008, 74) stated that the women of the IAF have 
even begun the groundwork for a comprehensive project that will encompass a 
team of women who will coordinate with other Islamic women activists who are 
not IAF members. This project is entitled ’Liberated Women‘ and tries to define 
an Islamic feminist philosophy and methodology, the core mission of which is to 
educate and to raise awareness of women on their legitimate rights under 
Islamic Law, or the Shari’a. It seems that the democratic reform, the competition 
with socialist, leftist and other ideologies, the support that the IAF is getting 
from women and the state policies which aim at increasing the participation of 
women in politics (for example, the women’s quota in parliamentary and 
municipal elections) 54  pushed the movement to reconsider some of its 
conservative views about the political participation of women. In addition, these 
changes increased the capacity of the movement to mobilize women. 
Nonetheless, the changes in the position of women in the movement are not 
essentially different from the gender roles that the movement promotes. For 
instance, the Charitable Association of Virtue and The Conservative of the Holy Quran 
Society promote strong conservative values regarding gender roles. More 
importantly, Islamist women’s contribution to public debates about female 
political participation and rights or gender roles is extremely weak and mostly 
in line with the conservative views. 
 
 
 
                                                     
54 The state policies are discussed in the coming section of this chapter. 
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Women and the support of Islamists 
The popularity of Islamists among women puts on the table an important 
question: why do women support Islamists in a large scale, even though 
Islamists have conservative views which can be perceived as unfair to women? 
Providing a complete answer for this important question could be an interesting 
result for another study. Yet, within the scope of this study it is possible to 
suggest the following reasons: first, the social role that Islamists in Jordan give to 
women is largely compatible with the conservative tribal culture and with the 
state’s views of gender roles. Second, Islamists have a large number of social 
projects which target or serve women directly or indirectly more than men, such 
as free summer schools for children. These services increase Islamists’ abilities to 
mobilize women and gain their support. Third, Islamists promote their views of 
women as the best view to protect and respect women rather than stating that 
women are inferior. Fourth, Islamists’ views are often promoted as the 
alternative of the Western view, which perceive women as a commodity. Fifth, 
the weak presence of women in the discourse of non-Islamist political parties. In 
a study about women and political parties in Jordan the percentage of women as 
founding members in Jordanian political parties was only nine percent. In 
addition, the presence of women decreases when heading upwards in the 
hierarchy of the Jordanian parties (Alquds Centre for Political Studies, 2007, 3). 
Based on the previous discussion, women are strongly present in Islamists 
discourses as a respected being which have different role in the society than that 
of men. In this role, women are expected to take care of the house and children 
and to obey men, at least inside the family. Islamists support any development 
of women’s status that nurses women to fulfill her social role. 
Regarding political participation, Islamists are against expanding women’s 
political participation either because they are apolitical; i.e. they encourage their 
members - males and females alike - to avoid politics, or because they believe 
that large political participation is exclusively a male domain. Many Islamists, 
on the other hand, support expanding the space of women’s political 
participation. However, those Islamists still believe that the main responsibilities 
of women reside inside the house. Consequently, Islamists’ discussions focus on 
whether women have certain political rights or not, rather than whether women 
should be encouraged or empowered to practice those rights or not. Moreover, 
discussions among Islamists about women’s roles and their political 
participation are dominated by males. 
Apparently, Islamists’ opinions could help in developing the social status of 
women in a society where women suffer from higher illiteracy rates than men or 
a lack of social services for women. Yet, women in Jordan do not suffer 
significantly from such problems. Moreover, in previous decades when such 
problems were present, there is no evidence that Islamists in Jordan contributed 
in any way to decreasing these problems. As such, Islamists in Jordan do not 
seem to contribute to increasing gender equality from public politics. On the 
 
  117 
 
contrary, they contribute to decreasing gender equality from public politics by 
asserting gender roles, which consider public politics as a male domain. 
Nevertheless, Islamists views regarding gender equality are developing slowly 
as a response to democratic reforms and some state policies. 
In relation to democratization processes, it is possible to argue that increasing 
the integration of Islamists’ trust networks into public politics (more 
democratization) is decreasing the insulation of gender inequality from public 
politics (more de-democratization) and is altering slightly few conservative 
views of Islamists about gender inequality. 
 
 
6.3 THE STATE AND NEGOTIATING GENDER EQUALITY 
 
So far, the study has argued that decreasing the autonomy of tribes to operate 
outside public politics by recruiting them in public institutions and increasing 
the integration of Islamists’ trust networks into public politics resulted in 
decreasing the insulation of gender inequality from public politics. This outcome 
contradicts with the Royal-liberal current within the state, which aims at 
developing the status of women and increasing their participation in some areas 
of the political and social spheres. Moreover, the outcome contradicts with some 
demands of western and international powers for gender equality. This situation 
creates two challenges to the state: first, the state has to appease conservatives in 
order to avoid domestic conflicts. At the same time, the state has to appease 
western and international powers which provide financial aid to the regime 
besides perusing its own views about women. The second challenge is that 
increasing the political participation of women could increase political 
opposition to the regime from women or other sources. Apparently, this would 
not be a problem in advanced democracies, yet Jordan is not such a polity. 
 
6.3.1 State negotiation of different gender demands 
In relation to the first challenge, Catherine Warrick (2009) argues that the 
Jordanian state applies dual legal systems in negotiating gender issues. The first 
system is secular or Western and the second is Islamic or traditional. According 
to Warrick (2009, 42-43), the dual legal systems 
 
“are neither accidental nor anomalous but rather represent purposive choices by 
the state for dealing with a host of political issues, particularly the need for 
legitimacy. Dual legal systems provide a flexible framework for social regulation, 
the exercise of state power and the maintenance of popular legitimacy in various 
sectors of society”. 
 
For instance, Jordan signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1980 and ratified it in 1992. 
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However, Jordan held reservations on certain articles and paragraphs, which 
contradict with its conservative and religious culture. These are: Article 9 
Paragraph 2; Article 15 Paragraph 4; and Article 16 Paragraph 1/(c), (d) and (g). 
In 2008 Jordan ratified all the articles of the convention (Jordanian Parliament 
Monitor, 2008). Yet, the state suspended the implementation of the articles in 
practice. By so doing, the state managed to negotiate the demands of 
conservatives and Islamists on one side and liberals and international powers on 
the other. In this negotiation, the insulation of gender inequality from public 
politics in some aspects was accompanied with the affirmation of gender 
inequality in public politics in other aspects. 
In her study about women labor in Jordan, Amira El-Azhary Sonbol (2003, 
10-13) argues that the genesis of the legal system in Jordan is related to social 
and economic changes that have been taking place since the establishment of 
Jordan as a modern state. In this view, the legal system is not mainly a purposive 
choice by the state as Warrick (2009) argues but rather a result of social and 
economic changes. An extreme understanding of Warrick’s argument would 
suggest that the state should have a high capacity to estimate and cope with the 
outcome of its choices. However, the Jordanian state’s capacity is not high. 
Moreover, the state’s laws could be driven by political or economic interests in 
order to increase the state capacity but not the state legitimacy. For instance, it is 
hard to accept that preventing a woman from taking the pension of her dead 
husband would increase or even preserve the state’s legitimacy. This is to say 
that the law does not satisfy traditionalists, Islamists, Western powers or the 
Jordanian society at large. However, the law could increase the state capacity by 
decreasing the load on its budget. Another problem in Warrick’s (2009) basic 
argument is that state authorities have different understandings and opinions 
about gender equalities. For instance, to what extent they should be applied and 
how they should be applied; contradictory legislations regarding gender 
equality represent these different opinions among state authorities. Thus, the 
legitimacy factor is just one factor that defines the relevant legislation. 
In regard to Sonbol’s (2003) argument, it should be noted that the state’s 
capacity and the power struggle within the state determines to what extent and 
how social and economic processes define gender-related laws. The weak 
capacity of the Jordanian regime, especially, in the early stage of Jordan’s 
modern history allowed social and economic processes, as Sonbol (2003) argues, 
to interfere largely not only with gender-related laws but also with the 
recreation and distribution of gender roles; for example, by lacking the capacity 
to support the economy of Bedouins and peasants during drought seasons and 
recruiting Bedouins into the army instead. However, with the increase of the 
state’s capacity, especially after eliminating domestic conflicts with tribes, 
nationalists, Palestinian guerrillas and other political and social actors, the state 
increased or decreased the insulation of gender equality from public politics to 
sustain or further increase its capacity. Consequently, neither the 
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social/economic changes nor the purposive choices determine by themselves the 
state’s policies towards gender equality. Rather, the relationship between these 
factors and the state’s capacity - besides the different views within state 
authorities - determine the state’s policies towards gender equality. This point is 
clarified more in the following discussions of this chapter. 
 
6.3.2 The state and independent women activists 
The second challenge for the state is that increasing the political participation of 
women could result in greater opposition from women or other political groups 
such as Islamists to the regime. Depending on the case in question, the state used 
different strategies to respond to this challenge. Consequently, these strategies 
affected the insulation of women from public politics in different ways and 
preserved or increased the state’s capacity. 
The first strategy consists of eliminating women’s political activities which 
are not connected to the regime by employing women in the political sphere. For 
instance, in November 1974 the state licensed the ‘Society of the Women's 
Federation in Jordan’ (WFJ) as an association and allowed some of its 
independent members to represent Jordan in the United Nations International 
Women conference. According to Brand (1998a, 117), “had there not been a UN 
Decade for Women on the horizon, WFJ would not have been established, 
certainly not in 1974”. In 1979, the state appointed ’In‘am Almufti as the first 
female minister. Almufti occupied the portfolio of social development; a position 
that was established at that time. According to Altal (1984, 155-166), the ministry 
started to harass the WFJ which was growing steadily and put impediments in 
front of its projects. In November 1981, the ‘General Federation of Jordanian 
Women’ (GFJW) was established under official supervision. Shortly after its 
establishment, the Ministry of Interior ordered the WFJ to shut down within one 
month. The Supreme Court refuted the Ministry’s decision but through 
bureaucratic procedures the Ministry succeeded in shutting down the union 
(Altal, 1984, 130, 153-158; Brand 1998a, 116). In this case, the state increased 
women’s participation in public politics by establishing the GFJW and by 
appointing a female minster for the first time55. Such practices could slightly 
alter the cultural perceptions of the role of women by increasing their presence 
in the political sphere. However, the state also decreased the participation of 
women by shutting down the WJF and establishing politically-connected trust 
networks to put this participation under its supervision. 
In the second strategy, the state creates impediments and allies with or 
utilizes conservatives and Islamists to respond to political opposition from 
women. The best example here is Toujan Faysal, who in a controversial TV 
                                                     
55 Many activists consider that appointing ’In‘am Almufti was a step towards increasing women’s 
political participation without paying attention that the state utilized Almufti as a woman to control 
the activities of the WFJ. 
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55 Many activists consider that appointing ’In‘am Almufti was a step towards increasing women’s 
political participation without paying attention that the state utilized Almufti as a woman to control 
the activities of the WFJ. 
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program in 1988, criticized the subjugation of women in Jordanian society and 
the discriminatory laws against them. The program provoked fundamentalists, 
who responded by threatening her and requesting the program to be banned 
(Kelber, 1994, 25). After one year, the program was banned by The Jordanian 
authorities (Kelber, 1994, 26). In 1989, following Faysal’s announcement that she 
would run as a candidate for parliamentary elections, a case was raised against 
her accusing her of apostasy and requiring divorce from her husband. The case 
was ultimately rejected by the court (Kelber, 1994, 26). However, there were no 
legal charges against those who accused her of apostasy; an accusation which 
could have resulted in her death. 
In the 1993 parliamentary election, Faysal won through the quota seat for 
Chechens and Circassians and thus became the first elected woman to enter the 
parliament in Jordan (Ryan, 2003, 135; Baaklini et al, 1999, 158). As a member of 
parliament, Faysal strongly opposed the government’s policies, accused officials 
of corruption, criticized the peace treaty with Israel, and criticized the abuse of 
women and discriminatory laws against them. These positions provoked the 
regime, conservatives and Islamists in different ways. Consequently, the 
parliament debated removing her from her post (Brynen, 1998, 98). 
In the 1997 election, Faysal lost her seat in the parliament. She accused the 
government of manipulating the elections results (Albrecht, 1997). Others 
suggest that Faysal’s failure was because she did not develop a positive platform 
and her parliamentary “antics from the last session lost voters' sympathies, and 
women turned away from her” (Albrecht, 1997). 
In 2002, Faysal accused Prime Minister Ali Abu Alrageb and other 
government officials of corruption. Shortly afterwards, she was accused of 
belittling the dignity of the state and sentenced by a military court to eighteen 
months in prison (Aljazeera, 2002a and 2002b). After staging a hunger strike, she 
was released by a Royal pardon (Aljazeera, 2002c). However, the charges were 
not dropped. Consequently, she was unable to run for parliamentary elections 
again because of her criminal record. 
In Faysal’s case, the state did not go against Faysal for being a woman but for 
her political opinions. However, the case demonstrates the additional difficulties 
that women face because of the lack of democracy. The state’s policies resulted 
in increasing the regime’s capacity by reducing significantly the political 
opposition of Faysal. In addition, the state’s policies resulted in increasing 
radical opinions about women and freedom in the public sphere by 
sympathizing and allying directly or indirectly with conservatives and Islamists. 
The third strategy that the state uses to respond to political opposition 
related to women is the containment or absorption strategy. An excellent 
example here is the case of the Campaign to Eliminate So-Called Crimes of 
Honor which started in 1999. The campaign received attention from the media 
and managed to gather over fifteen thousand signatures from Jordanians for its 
petition to revoke laws which are related to so-called honor crimes. Yet the 
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campaign faced some difficulties because the organizers insisted on their 
independence and refused to work under, or affiliate with any official 
organization or party (Nanes, 2003). However, some of these difficulties were 
solved with the support of some Royal family members (Nanes, 2003). In 
response to the campaign, the government proposed a new law which would 
cancel the problematic articles. Prince Ali bin Al-Husain “proclaimed his disgust 
with honor killings and the people who condone them” (Nanes, 2003). Moreover, 
the prince called for and participated in a protest against so-called honor killings. 
Known tribal leaders from all over Jordan joined the demonstration. According 
to Stefanie Nanes (2003) the “palace bussed in these tribal leaders to support the 
position of its appointed government against Article 340”56. Nonetheless, the 
proposed law was rejected by the parliament after conservatives and Islamists 
voted against it. The regime did not attempt to push the issue further. 
Regardless of whether or not the regime supported the campaign to co-opt and 
control it as Nanes (2003) speculates, it managed to contain and absorb the 
movement. This avoided any instability that the campaign might have caused at 
the national and international levels without strongly confronting conservatives 
and Islamists. This was achieved by adopting the campaign goals and alleviating 
its strategies of change. 
The fourth and last strategy to discuss is where the state not only contains 
but also supports increasing gender equality in public politics. However, by so 
doing, the state eliminates the political participation of other opposition. An 
example of this case is municipal elections. In 1994, HRH Princess Basma pushed 
the cabinet to appoint ninety-nine women in municipal committees which were 
responsible for organizing and supervising municipal elections. Consequently, 
for the first time, nineteen women ran for municipal elections in year 1995. Nine 
women became members of municipal councils and one woman was elected as 
mayor. Later on, another twenty three women were appointed in municipal 
councils. The appointments were according to the municipals law which grants 
the minister of municipalities the authority, after the approval of the cabinet, to 
appoint members in favor of women (Abu Rumman, 2008, 126). Brand (1998a, 
119) suggests that while the princess “has certainly raised the profile of women's 
issues, her involvement has also placed the regime back in a position of direct 
control of women's organizations”. 
In 2003, the government amended the municipal elections law. The new law 
empowered the government to appoint half of the seats of municipal councils 
including burgomasters. In addition, the electoral system changed to 'single non-
                                                     
56 At the time of the campaign “article 340 (a) "stipulates" he who discovers his wife or one of his 
'maharem' (female relatives of such degree of consanguinity as precludes marriage), while 
committing adultery with another man and kills, wounds,  or injures one or both of them, is exempt 
from any penalty; (b) he who discovers his wife, or any of his sisters, or female relatives with another 
man in an illegitimate bed, and kills, wounds or injures one or both of them, benefits from a 
reduction of penalty” (Nimry, 2009, 12). 
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responsible for organizing and supervising municipal elections. Consequently, 
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56 At the time of the campaign “article 340 (a) "stipulates" he who discovers his wife or one of his 
'maharem' (female relatives of such degree of consanguinity as precludes marriage), while 
committing adultery with another man and kills, wounds,  or injures one or both of them, is exempt 
from any penalty; (b) he who discovers his wife, or any of his sisters, or female relatives with another 
man in an illegitimate bed, and kills, wounds or injures one or both of them, benefits from a 
reduction of penalty” (Nimry, 2009, 12). 
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transferable vote'. These changes consequently limited the chances of women to 
win in elections 57 . The number of women who ran for municipal election 
dropped to forty, among whom five were elected. However, ninety-nine women 
were appointed (Abu Rumman, 2008, 127). 
The municipal elections law was amended again in 2005. This time the 
amendments included a quota for women in municipal councils; twenty percent 
of the seats should be given to women. In the 2007 elections, the number of 
women who ran for election jumped to 380 and twenty-three of them won 
through competition. Later on, the government appointed only seven women in 
the fifty percent seats that the government appoints (Abu Rumman, 2008, 134). 
Indeed, the political participation of women in municipal councils increased 
significantly. However, by appointing women in the 1995, 1999 and 2003 
municipal councils rather than using a quota system, the state granted more 
support for its policies and a weaker position for the opposition. It is more likely 
that the women who were appointed either support the state’s policies, or at 
least do not oppose them. As a consequence, women were utilized to decrease 
the integration of the opposition into public politics and to increase the state’s 
capacity. The state did not adopt the quota law except after the amendments in 
2003 which granted the state right to appoint half of the seats. Should the state 
adopted the quota before the amendments, then women in the opposition and 
those who support the state’s policies would have equal chances and only then it 
would be possible to argue that there was a serious inclusion of women into 
public politics. 
The previous analysis demonstrates that the state increases its capacity by 
either increasing or decreasing the political participation of women. In the cases 
where women’s political participation is increasing, democratization does not 
increase in all dimensions. For instance, in some cases, increasing women’s 
participation leads to minimizing the presence of opposition or to confronting 
non-state trust networks or civil institutions. However, increasing women’s 
political participation in a society that has conservative values about gender 
political roles could assist altering, at least slightly, these values by making them 
less aversive to the inclusion of women in the political sphere and consequently 
to democracy. 
 
6.3.3 State, laws and gender roles 
Besides affecting the political participation of women, the state affects gender 
equality at the social level, for instance, through laws which define directly or 
indirectly different social gender roles. Many laws which were considered unfair 
to women were amended or abolished (Brand, 1998a; Khader, 2008; Ridwan, 
2010). Nonetheless, there are still many laws which discriminate between men 
                                                     
57 In 1999 municipal elections, forty three women ran for election, eight won and another twenty five 
were appointed. 
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and women either by granting women more rights or divesting from them other 
rights. These discriminations are based on considering women as ‘weak’ and in 
need of men’s protection and support (Brand, 1998a, 106-109; Altal, 1984, 97-109). 
Apparently, the law takes into account, first, a conservative understanding of 
shari‘a58 - for example, in the Jordanian Personal Status Law59; second, the tribal 
culture, for example, in the Jordanian Penal Code60; and third, the state economic 
and political interests, for example, in the Jordanian Citizenship Law61.  
The laws in Jordan do not discriminate directly against women’s political 
participation. However, they impede democratization and undermine 
democracy by translating the everyday gender differences and the conservative 
gender views to public politics and by institutionalizing indirectly the apolitical 
role of women. The influence of the state, tribes and Islamists on gender social 
roles, the political participation of women and consequently on democratization 
appears in education, labor market and parliamentary elections. 
 
 
6.4 WOMEN IN EDUCATION, LABOR AND 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
 
6.4.1 Women and education 
In education, gender inequality has been dropping in the last four decades. For 
instance, the percentage of illiterate women in 1979 was 33.4 percent. It went 
down to 25 percent in 1992 (Allajnah Al-Wataniyyah Al-’Urduniyyah Lishu’un 
Al-Mar’ah, 1995, 37) to 11.4 percent in 2008 (Department of Statistics ‘DOS’, 
2008). Moreover, the percentage of females who were enrolled at universities at 
the bachelor level increased from 35.9 percent of the total students in 1985 
(Allajnah Al-Wataniyyah Al-’Urduniyyah Lishu’un Al-Mar’ah, 1995, 1995, 37) to 
50.8 percent in 2009 (DOS, 2009a). Apparently, the state’s policies support the 
insulation of gender inequality from education. However, a study by the 
Jordanian National Commission for Women showed that “out of 605 women 
                                                     
58  It is important to note that shari‘a bears a wide range of opinions, which in many cases contradict 
with each other. 
59 For instance, it is much harder for a woman to get a divorce than for a man; females inherit a 
smaller percentage or amount than males; men have the right to marry four wives and they have to 
cover the living expenses of their wives and children whether the wife works or not. 
60 The Jordanian Penal Code Article 340 grants the male a reduction of penalty if he kills, wounds, or 
injures his wife, any of his ascendant or descendent female relatives or any of his sisters while she is 
committing adultery with another man in an illegitimate bed. The female is granted the same 
reduction of penalty if she finds only her husband committing the same crime (The Jordanian Penal 
Code, Article 340). For previous versions of the law and further discussion see Crimes of Honor in 
Jordan and the Arab World (Nimry, 2009, 12). 
61 The Citizenship Law does not give the Jordanian women the right to grant her children or spouse a 
Jordanian citizenship unlike the Jordanian man (The Citizenship Law, articles 8 and 9). Asma Khader 
(2008, 51), a previous minister and spokeswoman for the government, declared that there are 
political and economic concerns, which prevent the government from amending the law. 
 122   
 
 
transferable vote'. These changes consequently limited the chances of women to 
win in elections 57 . The number of women who ran for municipal election 
dropped to forty, among whom five were elected. However, ninety-nine women 
were appointed (Abu Rumman, 2008, 127). 
The municipal elections law was amended again in 2005. This time the 
amendments included a quota for women in municipal councils; twenty percent 
of the seats should be given to women. In the 2007 elections, the number of 
women who ran for election jumped to 380 and twenty-three of them won 
through competition. Later on, the government appointed only seven women in 
the fifty percent seats that the government appoints (Abu Rumman, 2008, 134). 
Indeed, the political participation of women in municipal councils increased 
significantly. However, by appointing women in the 1995, 1999 and 2003 
municipal councils rather than using a quota system, the state granted more 
support for its policies and a weaker position for the opposition. It is more likely 
that the women who were appointed either support the state’s policies, or at 
least do not oppose them. As a consequence, women were utilized to decrease 
the integration of the opposition into public politics and to increase the state’s 
capacity. The state did not adopt the quota law except after the amendments in 
2003 which granted the state right to appoint half of the seats. Should the state 
adopted the quota before the amendments, then women in the opposition and 
those who support the state’s policies would have equal chances and only then it 
would be possible to argue that there was a serious inclusion of women into 
public politics. 
The previous analysis demonstrates that the state increases its capacity by 
either increasing or decreasing the political participation of women. In the cases 
where women’s political participation is increasing, democratization does not 
increase in all dimensions. For instance, in some cases, increasing women’s 
participation leads to minimizing the presence of opposition or to confronting 
non-state trust networks or civil institutions. However, increasing women’s 
political participation in a society that has conservative values about gender 
political roles could assist altering, at least slightly, these values by making them 
less aversive to the inclusion of women in the political sphere and consequently 
to democracy. 
 
6.3.3 State, laws and gender roles 
Besides affecting the political participation of women, the state affects gender 
equality at the social level, for instance, through laws which define directly or 
indirectly different social gender roles. Many laws which were considered unfair 
to women were amended or abolished (Brand, 1998a; Khader, 2008; Ridwan, 
2010). Nonetheless, there are still many laws which discriminate between men 
                                                     
57 In 1999 municipal elections, forty three women ran for election, eight won and another twenty five 
were appointed. 
 
  123 
 
and women either by granting women more rights or divesting from them other 
rights. These discriminations are based on considering women as ‘weak’ and in 
need of men’s protection and support (Brand, 1998a, 106-109; Altal, 1984, 97-109). 
Apparently, the law takes into account, first, a conservative understanding of 
shari‘a58 - for example, in the Jordanian Personal Status Law59; second, the tribal 
culture, for example, in the Jordanian Penal Code60; and third, the state economic 
and political interests, for example, in the Jordanian Citizenship Law61.  
The laws in Jordan do not discriminate directly against women’s political 
participation. However, they impede democratization and undermine 
democracy by translating the everyday gender differences and the conservative 
gender views to public politics and by institutionalizing indirectly the apolitical 
role of women. The influence of the state, tribes and Islamists on gender social 
roles, the political participation of women and consequently on democratization 
appears in education, labor market and parliamentary elections. 
 
 
6.4 WOMEN IN EDUCATION, LABOR AND 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
 
6.4.1 Women and education 
In education, gender inequality has been dropping in the last four decades. For 
instance, the percentage of illiterate women in 1979 was 33.4 percent. It went 
down to 25 percent in 1992 (Allajnah Al-Wataniyyah Al-’Urduniyyah Lishu’un 
Al-Mar’ah, 1995, 37) to 11.4 percent in 2008 (Department of Statistics ‘DOS’, 
2008). Moreover, the percentage of females who were enrolled at universities at 
the bachelor level increased from 35.9 percent of the total students in 1985 
(Allajnah Al-Wataniyyah Al-’Urduniyyah Lishu’un Al-Mar’ah, 1995, 1995, 37) to 
50.8 percent in 2009 (DOS, 2009a). Apparently, the state’s policies support the 
insulation of gender inequality from education. However, a study by the 
Jordanian National Commission for Women showed that “out of 605 women 
                                                     
58  It is important to note that shari‘a bears a wide range of opinions, which in many cases contradict 
with each other. 
59 For instance, it is much harder for a woman to get a divorce than for a man; females inherit a 
smaller percentage or amount than males; men have the right to marry four wives and they have to 
cover the living expenses of their wives and children whether the wife works or not. 
60 The Jordanian Penal Code Article 340 grants the male a reduction of penalty if he kills, wounds, or 
injures his wife, any of his ascendant or descendent female relatives or any of his sisters while she is 
committing adultery with another man in an illegitimate bed. The female is granted the same 
reduction of penalty if she finds only her husband committing the same crime (The Jordanian Penal 
Code, Article 340). For previous versions of the law and further discussion see Crimes of Honor in 
Jordan and the Arab World (Nimry, 2009, 12). 
61 The Citizenship Law does not give the Jordanian women the right to grant her children or spouse a 
Jordanian citizenship unlike the Jordanian man (The Citizenship Law, articles 8 and 9). Asma Khader 
(2008, 51), a previous minister and spokeswoman for the government, declared that there are 
political and economic concerns, which prevent the government from amending the law. 
 124   
 
 
surveyed, 50 percent believed that males should be given priority in education” 
(cited by World Bank, 2005, 27). Brand (1998a, 112) notes that for some groups, 
education is perceived positively because “it enables women to find good 
husbands and makes them better homemakers and mothers”. The distribution of 
gender in different disciplines support Brand’s (1998a) note. For instance, the 
percentage of females enrolled in disciplines related to education and social 
studies are significantly higher than that of males. Females account for 59.7 
percent of the students in sociology, 70.1 percent of the students in humanities 
and shari‘a, and 83 percent of students in education departments (Ministry of 
Higher Education and Scientific Research, 2009). 
Bashar Al-Saleem and Nidal Al-Ahmad (2009, 72) claim that the Jordanian 
curriculum 
 
“has highlighted the role of women […] on equal footing with men, thus giving 
them their political and economic roles, explaining that the productive role of 
women outside their homes is an enrichment to the society and the national 
income, provided that it does not prejudice their role in honoring their homes and 
taking full care of their children.” 
 
Other studies demonstrate that school textbooks promote conservative gender 
roles and contain biased information favoring males (Shteiwi, 1999; Hamdan, 
2010; Khwaileh & Zaza, 2011). For instance, Shteiwi’s (1990, 30) study found that 
98.8 percent of political roles and 93.5 percent of public roles in primary school 
textbooks are ascribed to males. Moreover, Shteiwi (1990, 30-31) demonstrates 
that even in private roles such as family or in roles where females have strong 
presence in the society such as teaching the presence of males is much stronger 
than females. Effectively, educational institutions in Jordan do not only promote 
different gender roles but also marginalize or largely conceal the presence of 
women. 
Evidently, there is a strong contradiction here. On the one hand, the state is 
increasing and supporting the presence of females in public life by increasing 
their access to educational institutions. On the other hand, the state is 
marginalizing females and ascribing to them private roles in the curriculum. 
Increasing the presence of females in public life could mean greater 
democratization. However, ascribing different gender roles for males and 
females, transforming them to public institutions and naturalizing them through 
these institutions, increases de-democratization. In this situation, it is impossible 
to argue whether democratization or de-democratization is absolutely 
increasing. 
 
6.4.2 Women and labor 
In the labor market, the evidence shows that the number of women had been 
increasing, from 4 percent in 1970s to 15 percent in 1994 (Hijab, 1988, 95; Ridwan, 
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2010). Some scholars argue that the increase of female labor was caused by the 
flow of male workforce migration from Jordan to the Gulf States during the 
1970s and 1980s. In response to the shortage in the workforce that this caused, 
the Jordanian state advocated the entry of women into the workforce (Hijab 1988, 
95; Abu Kharmeh, 2012, 204). In late twentieth century, around 350 thousand 
Jordanians returned from gulf countries as a result of the first Gulf war. 
Consequently, the unemployment rate jumped to more than twenty percent and 
the percentage of women in the labor force started to fluctuate between eleven 
and fifteen percent (Mahafzah, 2001, 266; Ridwan 2010; Abu Kharmeh 2012, 204). 
Therefore the increase in the number of women in the labor market was not a 
result of state strategies to increase gender equality but rather a result of weak 
state capacity. Because of its relatively weak economy, the Jordanian state was 
not able to create well-paid jobs for its citizens. Thus, male migration increased 
and women entered the labor force, a situation which increases democratization. 
Yet, states with weak capacities are not able to bear economic crises that are 
caused by regional and international conflicts. This could cause a reversal of 
democratization. In the case of Jordan, the aftermath of the first Gulf war 
perpetuated de-democratization by decreasing gender equality in the labor 
market. In addition, the consequences of the Gulf war led, as the study discusses 
in chapter seven, to increasing the tribal role in the public sphere. Consequently, 
this increased conservative views about gender roles. 
In 2008, the Jordanian labor force was forty percent of the population that 
was over fifteen years old (DOS, 2009b, 9). More than sixty-nine percent of the 
inactive economic population was female and 30.1 percent was male. The 
percentage of inactive economic females is very high, especially when one 
considers that female graduation rates from university are almost equal to male 
graduate rates. The percentage of females in the workforce is 15.4 percent (DOS, 
2009b, 15). Moreover, 74.7 percent of employed females have a degree higher 
than high school, compared to 29 percent of employed males (DOS, 2009b, 16). 
In addition, more than half of the working females are employed in education 
and health sectors; 41.2 percent of the female labor force works in the education 
sector (53.1 percent of the sector’s labor force); 15.1 percent of the female labor 
force works in the health sector (45.9 percent of the sector’s labor force). The 
DOS (2009b, 22-23) report connects these figures with women’s nature and the 
inherited customs and traditions in the society. To do so in an official report 
signifies the naturalization of gender inequality within some state institutions. 
The state’s laws do not discriminate against women in education and labor; 
on the contrary they embolden both. However, adopting the Bedouin culture in 
the nation-building process and recognizing this culture in some laws - along 
with the spread of Islamist trust networks, the integration of tribes in public 
institutions and the weak state capacity - defines a limited sphere for women’s 
activities in education and labor and consequently affirms the apolitical role of 
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women. The apolitical role of women is reflected in their performance in 
parliamentary elections. 
 
6.4.3 Women and parliamentary elections 
In parliamentary elections the Jordanian women could not enter the parliament 
outside the women’s quota until the elections of 2007. The inability of women to 
enter the parliament is not only related to the political culture which defines an 
apolitical role for women but also to the ‘Single Non-Transferable Vote’62 system. 
According to many observers this system was introduced to favor tribes and 
conservatives and diminish Islamists' chances in elections. As a side effect of the 
new electoral system, the chances of women to win in parliamentary elections 
became even more remote. Consequently, the number of women who ran for 
election dropped from twelve in 1989 to three in 1993 (Haniyeh, 2008, 67). 
Increasing gender inequality from public politics became a byproduct of 
decreasing the integration of Islamists’ trust networks in public politics.  
In 1997, seventeen women out of 561 candidates ran for parliamentary 
elections. Nonetheless, none of them won despite women’s committees 
organizing and coordinating with each other in the electoral effort under the 
umbrella of the Jordanian Coordination Committee for Non-Governmental 
Organizations, whose objective was to bring women into the legislature 
(Haniyeh, 2008, 67). In 2001, the state allocated six seats for women through 
quota. The number of women who ran for parliamentary election jumped to 
fifty-four in 2003 and to 199 in 200763 (Alghad, 2011). Introducing a women’s 
quota to parliamentary elections was probably a major factor behind nominating 
women in 2003 and 2007 elections by the Islamic Action Front party. 
Consequently, the state’s policies affected indirectly some Islamists’ attitudes 
towards female participation in public politics, making them more democratic. 
Yet, these policies do not decrease the state’s capacity or challenge its regime. 
The electoral system in Jordan is designed to prevent this from happening as 
chapter seven discusses. 
 To conclude the previous discussion, the study notes that in discussing 
the relationship between gender equality and democratization, it is important to 
recognize two dimensions: first, social equality and second, political 
participation. In addition, it is important to distinguish between gender equality 
                                                     
62 In this system each voter can cast one vote only regardless of the number of seats in his or her 
constituency. Hereby, candidates of the same group in the same constituency will be competing with 
each other unless the group is extremely organized. This weakens political parties and facilitates the 
representation of independents. In this situation, it is more likely that voters give their votes to the 
candidate who shares with them the strongest personal relation; usually a kinship relation. Moreover, 
the system gives rise to many wasted votes. For more information about electoral system see 
Reynolds et al (2005). 
63In 2007, Falak Aljam‘ani a former major in the army became the first woman to win in 
parliamentary elections outside the quota (Alghad, 2011). However, it is hard to argue that the 
success of Aljam‘ani proves any significant change in the inclusion of women in public politics. 
 
  127 
 
in social norms and gender equality in legislation. This recognition clarifies the 
contradictory results of state policies regarding gender equality.  
In social equality, Islamists and tribes hinder democratization by supporting 
conservative social norms about gender equality. The state, for its part, increases 
the presence of females in education and labor market. However, the state’s 
policies hinder democratization in a number of ways. First, by transforming 
some conservative norms about gender equality to public politics through 
legislation; second, by asserting gender inequality in school textbooks; third, by 
increasing the integration of Islamist trust networks into public politics; and 
fourth, by integrating tribes into state institutions. Thus, segments within the 
education and labor institutions are heavily defined by gender. 
In political participation, Islamists and tribes hinder democratization by 
adopting conservative norms about women’s participation in public politics. The 
state, for its part, hinders democratization by decreasing the integration of 
women’s non-state trust networks into public politics and reducing the extent of 
political opposition from women. However, the state also increases gender 
equality and thus democratization through some legislation. Such legislation 
increases the political participation of women and pushes conservatives to adopt 
more tolerant views about the political participation of women. 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the insulation of gender inequality 
from public politics relate to democratization in different dimensions and 
sometimes contradictory manners. How this relation affects students’ attitudes 
towards democratic concepts, institutions and practices is analyzed in the rest of 
the chapter. 
 
 
6.5 GENDER INEQUALITY AND STUDENTS’ ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS DEMOCRACY 
 
This section analyses the questions about gender and democracy and the 
questions where the gender factor seems to affect students’ opinions. After the 
analysis, the study examines the common trends that gender constitutes among 
students’ attitudes towards democracy and the relation between these trends 
and the insulation of gender inequality from public politics in Jordan. 
 
6.5.1 Gender and democratic concepts 
 
Freedom of expression 
Female students tend to accept less than male students that freedom of 
expression should include criticizing the government publicly. This result is in 
line with the political culture which insulates women from public politics 
(Haniyeh, 2008; Brand, 1998a). However, further analysis shows that female 
students who attend religious lessons tend to agree more than male students 
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62 In this system each voter can cast one vote only regardless of the number of seats in his or her 
constituency. Hereby, candidates of the same group in the same constituency will be competing with 
each other unless the group is extremely organized. This weakens political parties and facilitates the 
representation of independents. In this situation, it is more likely that voters give their votes to the 
candidate who shares with them the strongest personal relation; usually a kinship relation. Moreover, 
the system gives rise to many wasted votes. For more information about electoral system see 
Reynolds et al (2005). 
63In 2007, Falak Aljam‘ani a former major in the army became the first woman to win in 
parliamentary elections outside the quota (Alghad, 2011). However, it is hard to argue that the 
success of Aljam‘ani proves any significant change in the inclusion of women in public politics. 
 
  127 
 
in social norms and gender equality in legislation. This recognition clarifies the 
contradictory results of state policies regarding gender equality.  
In social equality, Islamists and tribes hinder democratization by supporting 
conservative social norms about gender equality. The state, for its part, increases 
the presence of females in education and labor market. However, the state’s 
policies hinder democratization in a number of ways. First, by transforming 
some conservative norms about gender equality to public politics through 
legislation; second, by asserting gender inequality in school textbooks; third, by 
increasing the integration of Islamist trust networks into public politics; and 
fourth, by integrating tribes into state institutions. Thus, segments within the 
education and labor institutions are heavily defined by gender. 
In political participation, Islamists and tribes hinder democratization by 
adopting conservative norms about women’s participation in public politics. The 
state, for its part, hinders democratization by decreasing the integration of 
women’s non-state trust networks into public politics and reducing the extent of 
political opposition from women. However, the state also increases gender 
equality and thus democratization through some legislation. Such legislation 
increases the political participation of women and pushes conservatives to adopt 
more tolerant views about the political participation of women. 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the insulation of gender inequality 
from public politics relate to democratization in different dimensions and 
sometimes contradictory manners. How this relation affects students’ attitudes 
towards democratic concepts, institutions and practices is analyzed in the rest of 
the chapter. 
 
 
6.5 GENDER INEQUALITY AND STUDENTS’ ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS DEMOCRACY 
 
This section analyses the questions about gender and democracy and the 
questions where the gender factor seems to affect students’ opinions. After the 
analysis, the study examines the common trends that gender constitutes among 
students’ attitudes towards democracy and the relation between these trends 
and the insulation of gender inequality from public politics in Jordan. 
 
6.5.1 Gender and democratic concepts 
 
Freedom of expression 
Female students tend to accept less than male students that freedom of 
expression should include criticizing the government publicly. This result is in 
line with the political culture which insulates women from public politics 
(Haniyeh, 2008; Brand, 1998a). However, further analysis shows that female 
students who attend religious lessons tend to agree more than male students 
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who barely or do not attend religious lessons that freedom of expression should 
include criticizing the government publicly. Nonetheless, the differences 
between female religious students and male nonreligious students are not 
significant statistically. This result suggests that religiosity increases democratic 
attitudes regarding freedom of expression among religious female students to 
the point that these attitudes become, at least, as democratic as the attitudes of 
nonreligious male students (see Table 21). 
 
 
 
 Criticizing the government publicly 
Total Absolutely 
To a 
Large 
Extent Somewhat 
To a 
Small 
Extent 
not at 
all 
Gender of 
the 
Student 
Barely or do not 
attend religious 
lessons males 
45 17 24 14 21 121 
37.2% 14.0% 19.8% 11.6% 17.4% 100.0% 
Attend religious 
lessons females 
35 16 21 9 6 87 
40.2% 18.4% 24.1% 10.3% 6.9% 100.0% 
Total 80 33 45 23 27 208 
38.5% 15.9% 21.6% 11.1% 13.0% 100.0% 
 = 5.49; d.f. = 4; p = .241 
 
 
Gender social equality 
In the previous chapter, the analysis shows that 92.4 percent of the students 
agree absolutely or to a large extent that gender equality should not contradict 
with Islamic shari‘a. In addition to this, 74.8 percent agree absolutely or to a large 
extent that gender equality should not contradict with the customs and 
traditions of the society. Both answers assure the strong position of shari‘a and 
traditions in defining gender roles among all categories of students (Al-Attiyat, 
2005, 53-54). 
In relation to gender roles, 51 percent of female students agree absolutely or 
to a large extent that the responsibility of women should differ from that of man 
and more than 55 percent of all students agree absolutely or to a large extent on 
the issue. The results here demonstrate the strong support of the division of 
gender roles even among university female students. However, female students 
agree less than male students that the responsibility of women should differ 
from the responsibility of man (see Chart 5). Combining the results here with the 
previous results regarding shari‘a and traditions suggests that in relation to 
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gender roles, students understand shari‘a and traditions differently based on 
their gender. Yet, shari‘a and to a less degree traditions represent ideals that 
should be followed. These results are in line with a detailed study about the 
factors that structure societal perceptions of gender roles in Jordan (Al-‘Ali, 
Muhsen & Mish‘al, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
Manifestation of gender social roles 
The answers to three questions provide manifestations from different angles of 
the influence of the conservative political culture on students’ attitudes towards 
social gender roles. In an important question about the responsibility of women 
to protect the honor of the family, a high percentage of students agree absolutely 
or to a large extent that reducing the punishment of the murderer who kills his 
female relative to preserve the family honor is justice (see Table 22). The result 
confirms the strong acceptance of gender social roles in society, which are 
supported by tribes, Islamists and state legislation. There is no relation between 
the answers here and the gender factor. Yet, nontribal students tend to agree to a 
small extent and not to agree at all more than less tribal or tribal students; 48.9 
percent of nontribal students compared to 40.9 percent and 43.6 percent of less 
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tribal and tribal students respectively. The results here show that gender roles 
are accepted among male and female students. Additionally, the results assure 
the influence of tribalism on gender roles. 
 
 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Absolutely 150 32.5 
To a Large Extent 50 10.8 
Somewhat 51 11.1 
To a Small Extent 55 11.9 
Not at All 155 33.6 
Total 461 100.0 
Missing System 3  
Total 464  
 
 
In another question, male students say more than female students that they 
forced or will force someone under their authority to obey what they consider a 
religious rule such as wearing the veil (see Table 23). 
 
 
 Force someone under your authority to obey a 
religious rule such as wearing the veil 
Total Yes No Do not know 
Gender of the 
Student 
Male 112 52 17 181 
61.9% 28.7% 9.4% 100.0% 
Female 104 98 43 245 
42.4% 40.0% 17.6% 100.0% 
Total 216 150 60 426 
50.7% 35.2% 14.1% 100.0% 
 = 16.425; d.f. = 2; p = .000 
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In answering another question, female students tend to agree more than male 
students that on the importance of social development in the platforms of 
political parties; 13.7 percent of female students rank social development as the 
most important issue that political parties should consider compared to 3.1 
percent of male students (see Table 24). The result here demonstrates how 
Jordanian women are more concerned about social development, which is 
related to their social role. 
 
 
 Importance of social development in the platforms of 
political parties 
Total 
Very 
important Important 
Somewhat 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not 
important 
Gender of the 
Students 
Male 6 34 43 53 56 192 
3.1% 17.7% 22.4% 27.6% 29.2% 100.0% 
Female 35 44 48 66 63 256 
13.7% 17.2% 18.8% 25.8% 24.6% 100.0% 
Total 41 78 91 119 119 448 
9.2% 17.4% 20.3% 26.6% 26.6% 100.0% 
 = 15.066; d.f. = 4; p = .005 
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Gender and political equality 
Female students agree clearly less than male students that a man should be 
elected if there are equally qualified men and women standing for election - 
12.3% and 32.3% respectively. However, both genders prefer largely to elect a 
man (see Table 25). The results here suggest that students’ attitudes towards 
political participation are not necessarily related to the qualifications of the 
candidate. 
 
 
 
 Voting for equally qualified man and woman 
Total 
The man 
should be 
elected 
The 
woman 
should be 
elected 
It is 
better to 
elect the 
Man 
It is 
better to 
elect the 
women 
something 
else 
Gender of 
the Students 
Male 62 8 89 6 27 192 
32.3% 4.2% 46.4% 3.1% 14.1% 100.0% 
Female 32 33 109 22 64 260 
12.3% 12.7% 41.9% 8.5% 24.6% 100.0% 
Total 94 41 198 28 91 452 
20.8% 9.1% 43.8% 6.2% 20.1% 100.0% 
 = 41.74; d.f. = 4; p = .000 
 
 
Students’ explanations for their answers 
In order to provide a better understanding for the students’ tendencies the study 
presents selected quotes, which cover the students’ explanation. Many of these 
explanations are repeated by other students. 
 
First category - students who say that the man should be elected gave the 
following explanations for their opinions: 
Better abilities 
“The man is more able to impose his opinion” - Male and female students 
“He [man] is better in doing his work in an effective manner” - Female student 
“[Man] can talk with [other men] at any time” - Male student 
The sphere of work 
“This is not the responsibility of woman” - Female student 
Natural differences 
“The man is controlled by his mind while woman is controlled by her emotions and 
feelings” - Male student 
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Religious arguments 
Male and female students mentioned versus from Quran or teachings by 
Prophet Muhammad to support their opinion. 
 
Second category - students who say that it is better to elect the man share 
many explanations with the students who say that the man should be elected. 
They mention better abilities, natural differences and religious arguments. Yet, 
there is one explanation that is not mentioned before. This is opposing the West: 
“I am against [women’s] rights as perceived by the west” - Male student 
 
Third category - students who say that the woman should be elected have the 
following explanations: 
Changes in gender roles 
“Women became like men in[ their] rights and responsibilities” - Female student 
Supporting women 
“I am a female and I want to encourage woman to reach positions that [men] do not 
support her to reach” - Female student 
 
Fourth category - students who say that it is better to elect the woman have 
the following explanations: 
Importance of women 
“Woman is half of the society and she is behind every man” - Female student 
Protecting women’s rights 
“[Women have] rights that need to be protected. In many cases [women] won in 
elections and made many achievements” - Female student 
Recognition for women 
“To enable [women] to enter this sphere and proves that [they] can work in all 
spheres” - Female student 
Gender differences 
“She is more able to understand how other [women] think” - Female student 
 
Fifth category - students who say something else have the following 
explanations: 
Other factors 
“There are other factors such as tribalism” - Female student 
Religious arguments 
“There is no distinction in Islam between [men] and [women]; they are all equal 
and the one who is better is the more piety” - Female student  
Serving the country 
“The one who serves the country more” - Female and male students 
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The answers in the first two categories elaborate clearly how students define 
their choices based on their understanding of the different roles of men and 
women. Their understanding is based on different grounds: qualifications; 
comparison with the West; religion; and nature. In relation to the qualification 
and natural grounds, some students who consider gender inequality natural 
imply that this should be reflected in the political sphere. For instance, men 
think rationally and women think emotionally. Consequently, the man should 
be elected or it is better to elect the man. Such arguments assume that the 
‘masculine reason’ is superior to the ‘feminine emotion’ in the political domain, and 
hence, the masculine reason should form the basis on which political roles 
should be distributed. This kind of reasoning not only insulates women from 
public politics but also pushes women who want to participate in public politics 
to adopt masculine attitudes. Some in the fourth category mention the natural 
differences, for example, “She is more able to understand how other [women] think”. 
However, these students use the different natural qualifications to argue for the 
need of having a women representative. 
The students’ explanations elaborate the importance of religion in defining 
attitudes. Yet, religion is used to support contradictory arguments, for instance, 
religion is against women’s political participation in some arguments and 
religion supports gender equality in others. These contradictory understandings 
of Islam show the social influence on understating religion. Moreover, the 
answers here support the argument from the previous chapter that Islam is an 
ideal for what is good or right. 
The fifth category answers are quite interesting. They point to the 
multidimensional criteria in electoral practice. Some students mentioned the 
religious factor as a determinant whereas others mentioned the tribal factor. The 
interesting thing here is that those students do not see a contradiction between 
tribalism or religion and electing a woman or a man. Who is more religious 
among the equally qualified man and woman or to which tribe he or she belongs 
is what defines the students’ selection. The relation between democracy gender 
and religion and the trends among religious female students challenge two main 
findings in other studies. They contest Tessler (2002) study, which says that 
Islam does not have an impact on attitudes towards democracy in Jordan. They 
also defy Maaitah, R. Maaitah, H. Olaimat, and Gharaeibeh (2011) and Kamrava 
(1998, 229) arguments, which do not recognize how Islam as it is manifested in 
Arab countries could support positive attitudes towards some democratic 
concepts. 
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6.5.2 Gender and democratic institutions 
 
The Jordanian Parliament 
Male students’ attitudes tend to be more polarized regarding the performance of 
the Jordanian parliament more than female students’ attitudes. This is to say that 
male students tend to be more satisfied and more unsatisfied at the same time 
than female students (see Table 26). Further analysis shows that this relation 
exists among students who barely or do not attend religious lessons. Religious 
male and female students do not seem to have the same degree of polarization in 
their opinions. In addition, the relation exists only among nontribal students and 
does not exist among tribal students. Accordingly, nonreligious or nontribal 
female students tend to be respectively more moderate in their political opinions 
about the parliament than nonreligious or nontribal male students. Male 
religious or tribal students tend to be respectively as much satisfied as female 
religious or tribal students and as much unsatisfied. 
 
 
 Are you satisfied with the performance of the Jordanian 
parliament? 
Total Absolutely 
To a Large 
Extent Somewhat 
To a Small 
Extent 
not at 
all 
Gender of 
the 
Student 
Male 22 19 58 38 54 191 
11.5% 9.9% 30.4% 19.9% 28.3% 100.0% 
Female 18 17 113 60 51 259 
6.9% 6.6% 43.6% 23.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
Total 40 36 171 98 105 450 
8.9% 8.0% 38.0% 21.8% 23.3% 100.0% 
 = 13.253; d.f. = 4; p = .01 
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Political parties 
Female students tend to have a negative attitude towards the importance of 
political parties significantly more than male students (see Table 27). 
 
 
 The presence of different and diverse political parties  
Total Necessary Desirable Ineffective Not desirable Wrong 
Gender 
of the 
Students 
Male 60 79 28 17 10 194 
30.9% 40.7% 14.4% 8.8% 5.2% 100.0% 
Female 46 88 44 63 19 260 
17.7% 33.8% 16.9% 24.2% 7.3% 100.0% 
Total 106 167 72 80 29 454 
23.3% 36.8% 15.9% 17.6% 6.4% 100.0% 
 = 26.089; d.f. = 4; p = .000 
 
The above result is assured by the following two results: First, the percentage of 
female students who agree absolutely or to a large extent that political parties 
will cause fragmentation in society is 40.3%, compared to 30.3% of male students. 
Second, the percentage of female students who agree absolutely or to a large 
extent that political parties will result in the foundation of groups which fight 
over power is 50.3% compared to 41.6% of male students. Besides banning 
political parties for more than three decades, the weak representation of women 
in political parties - as mentioned earlier in this chapter - aids in understanding 
these negative attitudes among female students. 
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6.5.3 Gender and democratic practices 
 
Gender and participation in elections 
Female students participated in parliamentary elections less than male students; 
30.2% and 41.2% respectively64. However, these gender differences appear only 
among Transjordanian students and do not appear among Palestinian 
Jordanians (see Table 28). 
 
 
The Country of Origin 
Participation in 
parliament elections 
Total Yes No 
Transjordanian 
students* 
Gender of the 
Student 
Male 50 30 80 
62.5% 37.5% 100.0% 
Female 43 50 93 
46.2% 53.8% 100.0% 
Total 93 80 173 
53.8% 46.2% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanian 
students** 
Gender of the 
Student 
Male 9 28 37 
24.3% 75.7% 100.0% 
Female 11 33 44 
25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Total 20 61 81 
24.7% 75.3% 100.0% 
*  = 4.576; d.f. = 1; p = .023 
**  = .005; d.f. = 1; p = .576 
 
 
The answers regarding parliamentary elections here are well-matched with the 
students’ attitudes towards the fairness of these elections. Female students tend 
to agree less than male students that elections are fair in Jordan; 32% agree 
absolutely or to a large extent compared to 43.8% of male students. This could 
suggest that female students do not participate in elections because they do not 
trust the fairness of elections. However, that female students perceive elections 
                                                     
64 Students who are nineteen years old or less are not counted in the analysis of this question. 
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Political parties 
Female students tend to have a negative attitude towards the importance of 
political parties significantly more than male students (see Table 27). 
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extent that political parties will result in the foundation of groups which fight 
over power is 50.3% compared to 41.6% of male students. Besides banning 
political parties for more than three decades, the weak representation of women 
in political parties - as mentioned earlier in this chapter - aids in understanding 
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as unfair is problematic. This is because the electoral law in Jordan favors 
women through the quota system. An answer to this problem could be found by 
examining the relation between Islamists and gender. 
 
Democracy, Islamists and female students 
Female students tend to support an Islamist candidate more than male students. 
The percentage of females who say that it is very important that the candidate is 
an Islamist is 42.7% compared to 25.8% of males (see Table 29). The answer to 
another question reaffirms the notion that female students support Islamists 
more than male students (Brand (1998b, 102). Female students tend to agree 
more than male students that the majority have the right to impose their opinion 
on minorities in any issue that is compatible with shari‘a and the general opinion 
of Muslim scholars; 79.5% of females agreed absolutely or to a large extent 
compared to 67.3% of males. In answering the previous problematic about 
gender and the fairness of elections, it is possible to suggest that Islamists have 
been criticizing the electoral system in Jordan since it changed to ‘Single Non-
Transferable Vote’. Consequently, the overwhelming support for Islamists 
among female students could explain why they agree less than male students 
that elections are fair. 
 
 
  The candidate is an Islamist 
Total 
  Very 
important Important Average Weak No role 
Gender of 
the Students 
Male 48 44 52 25 17 186 
25.8% 23.7% 28.0% 13.4% 9.1% 100.0% 
Female 109 58 57 23 8 255 
42.7% 22.7% 22.4% 9.0% 3.1% 100.0% 
Total 157 102 109 48 25 441 
35.6% 23.1% 24.7% 10.9% 5.7% 100.0% 
 = 18.84; d.f. = 4; p = .001 
 
 
The above explanation could suggest that religious female students should 
participate in elections more or at least as much as nonreligious male or female 
students in order to support Islamists. This suggestion is supported by 
recognizing that religious students participate in elections more than non-
religious students as the study demonstrated in the previous chapter. However, 
additional analysis shows that religious female students do not participate in 
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elections more or as much as nonreligious male or female students. In a similar 
manner, female students agree less than male students that elections are 
forbidden in Islam; 4.8% and 13.7% respectively. This indicates that female 
students tend to understand Islam in a way which is more compatible with 
democratic practices. However, this understanding does not translate into 
increased political participation. These two notes can be problematic if the 
Islamists’ discourse encourages women to participate in public politics as it 
encourages men. Yet, the Islamists’ discourse increases the insulation of women 
from public politics (Haniyeh, 2008; Albanna, 1988). In other words, the 
crystallization of continuing differences between gender roles in the Islamists’ 
discourse seems to have strong impact on women, which decreases the 
participation of religious female students in elections. 
Female students agree less than male students that the government fears that 
Islamists will rule in a democratic system; 29.3% of females agree absolutely 
compared to 36.8% of males. The result indicates that female students do not 
perceive the tension between Islamists and government as strong as male 
students. Three arguments could support this result: First, women are less active 
in the political sphere and consequently less engaged in political conflicts. Men, 
on the other hand, are more involved in politics and hence perceive the conflict 
between the state and Islamists as stronger than female students do. Second, 
both Islamists and the government promote conservative views of gender roles 
with an implication that the conflict between Islamists and government 
regarding women’s social role is minor. Third, the government, as the study 
demonstrated before, gave space to Islamists’ trust networks to operate in the 
public sphere and provide social services which target women. These services, 
which operate in the public sphere, spread the influence of Islamists among 
women and at the same time allow women to see the positive side of the 
relationship between the state and Islamists. 
 
Gender and the state democratic practice 
Female students tend to agree that officials are serious about applying 
democracy absolutely or to a large extent less than male students (see Table 30). 
Moreover, female students tend to agree more strongly than male students that 
some articles in the Jordanian constitution or some laws limit democracy (see 
Table 31). The answers to the two questions demonstrate that female students 
tend to be more critical towards the regime than male students. The results here 
are compatible with the students’ attitudes towards Islamists. That is, female 
students are more supportive of Islamists than male students and Islamists are 
more critical on these issues. 
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 Officials are serious about applying democracy  
Total Absolutely 
To a Large 
Extent Somewhat 
To a Small 
Extent 
not at 
all 
Gender 
of the 
Students 
Male 14 24 33 52 69 192 
7.3% 12.5% 17.2% 27.1% 35.9% 100.0% 
Female 10 20 66 84 79 259 
3.9% 7.7% 25.5% 32.4% 30.5% 100.0% 
Total 24 44 99 136 148 451 
5.3% 9.8% 22.0% 30.2% 32.8% 100.0% 
 = 10.514; d.f. = 4; p = .033 
 
 
 Some items in the Jordanian Constitution or some laws 
limit democracy 
Total Absolutely 
To a Large 
Extent Somewhat 
To a Small 
Extent 
not at 
all 
Gender 
of the 
Students 
Male 14 34 53 30 53 184 
7.6% 18.5% 28.8% 16.3% 28.8% 100.0% 
Female 33 29 68 69 50 249 
13.3% 11.6% 27.3% 27.7% 20.1% 100.0% 
Total 47 63 121 99 103 433 
10.9% 14.5% 27.9% 22.9% 23.8% 100.0% 
 = 15.991; d.f. = 4; p = .003 
 
 
6.6 GENDER AND TRENDS AMONG STUDENTS’ ATTITUDES 
 
From the previous analysis it is possible to single out three trends among 
university students in Jordan related to gender. First, social and political 
attitudes among university students are strongly defined by gender, for example, 
attitudes towards so-called honor killing, forms of equality, and voting. The 
integration of Islamists’ trust network into public politics, the integration of 
tribes into state institutions, and some state policies seem to assist the different 
gender roles among students. The state’s policies succeed to some extent in 
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developing the status of women, for example, in education. However, this 
development makes little change to perceptions of equality in gender roles, 
especially among male students. Indeed, two democratization processes - 
namely the integration of Islamists into public politics and the insulation of 
tribes to operate outside public politics - impeded democratization first, by 
assisting the everyday practice of different gender roles, and second, by 
transforming these differences into public politics. 
Second, female students tend to support Islamists more than male students. 
These attitudes strengthen Islamists’ trust networks and decrease the state 
capacity to insulate Islamists from public politics. In addition, it is possible to 
argue that these attitudes shape some political opinions about democracy among 
female students. Hereby, Islamists seem to increase the political involvement of 
females at an abstract level. However, this involvement does not transfer to 
more political practice, for example, to more participation in elections. 
Third, undemocratic and/or negative attitudes towards democratic 
institutions and practices are more common among female than male students. 
Whilst undemocratic attitudes towards gender equality are common among 
both genders, in some aspects they are less common among female students. 
Moreover, undemocratic attitudes towards freedom of expression are less 
common among religious females than nonreligious ones. The analysis of these 
minor, yet important, differences provides a better understanding of how the 
democratic political culture in Jordan emerges from a complex relationship 
between trust networks, categorical inequality, autonomous powers and the 
state. 
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7 Democratization and the 
Country of Origin 
Public officer: Where are you from? 
Client: I am from Jordan. 
Public officer: I mean your origin? 
Client: My origin is Jordan. 
Public officer: Where from Jordan? 
Client: From Amman. 
Public officer: No Jordanian comes from Amman, where did your father come from? 
Client: My father was born in Amman. 
Public officer in an angry voice: Where did your grandfather come from? 
Client: My grandfather came from X country to Jordan in 1920. 
The public officer was puzzled. He turned to his colleague who was listening to the 
conversation and asked: What should I write in this case? 
The colleague answered: Write he is Jordanian. 
(Muhammad, a Jordanian citizen) 
 
The 1948 catastrophe in Palestine, known as the Annakba in the Arab world, 
resulted in the displacement of around 844,000 Palestinians from their homes 
among which 89,000 fled to Transjordan and 302,000 fled to the West Bank 
(McGhee, 1997, 35-36). The displacement of Palestinians changed dramatically 
the demographic structure of Transjordan and the relation between 
Transjordanians and Palestinians. In addition, the Nakba weakened the power 
of Palestinian political leader Muhammad Amin al-Husayni and minimized the 
presence of Arab armies in Palestine (Shlaim, 2001, 99; Rogan, 2001, 118). This 
situation enabled Kind Abdullah the First to expand his authority over the West 
Bank and to annex it to Transjordan in 1950. The unification of the West Bank 
and the East Bank tripled the Jordanian population. In 1952, the total population 
of Jordan was 1,329,174 inhabitants; 742,289 inhabitants in the West Bank and 
586,885 inhabitants in the East Bank (Sayiegh, 1997, 13). These dramatic and 
swift changes created two groups among Jordanians where classifications are 
based on the place of origin rather than on ethnicity, gender, social class, region 
or religion. In this chapter, the study discusses and analyses the relation between 
state policies and increasing or decreasing the insulation of Palestinian 
Jordanians from public politics. The chapter argues that the state's weak capacity 
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and its policies to respond to different challenges and consolidate its regime 
resulted in increasing the insulation of Palestinian Jordanians from public 
politics and in increasing the rift between both groups. Yet, through exploitation 
of the rift the regime managed to increase its capacity and counter various 
challenges. In these processes de-democratization was increasing. These 
arguments are discussed through the projection of state policies which are 
related to Palestinian Jordanians in three historical phases: First, the post-
unification phase, second, the post-Annaksah war phase and third, the 
democratic reform phase. Following the discussion regarding the relationship 
between the Jordanian state and Palestinians, the chapter analyses the students’ 
attitudes towards democracy on the basis of the country of origin factor and tries 
to depict and explain the trends that this factor has facilitated among students.  
 
 
7.1 THE POST-UNIFICATION PHASE 
 
In 1949 after Annakba catastrophe, King Abdullah I signed an addendum to the 
Law of Nationality. The addendum grants all Palestinians who live in the 
Kingdom or in the Western territory, which is under the Jordanian 
administration a full Jordanian citizenship (Sayigh, 1999, 41). Consequently, 
Palestinians were able to enter the Jordanian parliament and were appointed in 
the government. These decisions established the integration of Palestinians in 
public policies. In additions, they facilitated and assisted annexing the West 
Bank to Jordan in 1950. By 1952, the percentage of Palestinian-Jordanians was at 
least 68.8% of the Jordanian population (Sayiegh, 1997, 14). 
Though the majority of the Jordanian population after the unification was 
living in the West Bank, governmental institutions were concentrated in Amman 
the capital. Job opportunities, economic incentives and public funds were more 
available in the East Bank than in the West Bank. This situation increased the 
migration from the West Bank to the East Bank. By the year 1961, the population 
of the East Bank exceeded the population of the West Bank and the percentage 
of Palestinian Jordanians in the East Bank rose to 43% (Sayiegh, 1997, 13-14). 
Jamil Hilal (1975, 133) suggests that the Jordanian regime had intentionally 
discriminative policies which aimed at degrading the economic position of the 
West Bank and increasing the East Bank’s in order to subjugate the former 
economically to the state just as it was politically. Another opinion suggests that 
the state’s policies aimed at increasing equality between the West Bank which 
was significantly more developed than the East Bank (Sayiegh, 1997, 17). 
Regardless whose opinion is closer to reality, the economic policies supported 
the feeling of discrimination among Palestinian Jordanians in the West Bank. 
Transjordanians in their part since the colonial period had been complaining 
about their relatively low representation in public office especially in high-
ranking administrative positions. Palestinians and other Arabs who had better 
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qualifications than Transjordanians occupied all high administrative positions 
(Shwadran, 1959, 186-187; Anderson, 2005, 43, 51, 54). For instance, until 1996 no 
Transjordanian headed the cabinet (Anderson, 2005, 53). The mass immigration 
of highly skilled Palestinian Jordanians after 1948 made it more difficult for 
Transjordanians to compete in the labor market. However, the state’s policies 
gave priority to the employment of Transjordanians in state institutions (Sayiegh, 
1997, 20). Again, whether these policies were used to empower a weak segment 
of society which happened to be Transjordanian or whether they were against 
Palestinian Jordanians is debatable. The important issue here is that these 
policies increased the borders between Palestinian Jordanians and 
Transjordanians and seeded elements of internal conflict. 
A turning point in the position of Palestinian Jordanians started in 1964 after 
the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The 
Jordanian state recognized and supported the PLO after the Palestinian 
Nationalist Charter stressed that “this organization does not exercise any 
regional sovereignty over the West Bank in [sic] the Hashemite Jordanian 
Kingdom or the Gaza Strip or the Himmah area” (cited by Massad, 2001, 236). 
Yet shortly thereafter, the PLO rapidly started to interfere with the Jordanian 
state’s polices, especially those related to the Palestinian-Israeli struggle. The 
challenge to Jordanian authorities increased with the continuing attacks of 
Palestinian guerrillas on Israel from Jordan. Israel responded aggressively to 
these attacks by attacking villages in the West Bank. The Jordanian army was 
accused of not defending these villages and for the first time protests against the 
Jordanian state broke out in the West Bank alone65. Apparently the PLO and 
Palestinian guerrillas managed to intensify the Palestinian identity among 
Palestinian Jordanians and succeeded in challenging the state’s policies which 
aimed at the opposite. The challenge and tension in the relationship between 
both parties was clear in King Husain’s speech in 1966: 
 
“The [Palestinian] cause ceased to have a Palestinian character the moment the 
Arab armies entered the land of Palestin[e] … and we in this country have a solid 
belief that the unity of both banks is a unity blessed by God and supported by the 
people and that it constitutes a vanguard nucleus for the larger [Arab] unity… we 
shall cut off every hand that extends itself in harm to this unity, to this one 
struggling country, and we shall gouge out every eye that looks askance at us, and 
we shall not be lax or tolerant, not even a fingertip, from this moment on” (cited 
by Massad, 2001, 238). 
 
 
                                                     
65 For more detailed accounts on the conflict between the PLO and the Jordanian state, see Musa 
(1996), Sayiegh (1997) and Massad (2001). 
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The tension between the Jordanian regime, the PLO and Palestinian guerrillas 
threatened the state’s capacity to control the majority of its population; i.e. 
Palestinian Jordanians. As a result, the state’s integration policies with respect to 
Palestinian Jordanians became problematic. This is to say that increasing the 
integration of Palestinian Jordanians in public institutions at that stage meant 
increasing the integration of a group among which many people started to see 
themselves as Palestinians rather than Jordanians. In the long run this would 
result in weakening or even abolishing the regime. Under these circumstances 
not only the national unity but also the national identity started to shake. 
Consequently, democratization was decreasing. 
 
 
7.2 THE POST-ANNAKSAH WAR PHASE 
 
In 1967, the Six-Days War - or Annaksah (literally ‘setback’) war as it is known in 
the Arab World - resulted in both the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza 
strip and substantive damage to Arab armies. The catastrophe gave more 
legitimacy to Palestinian guerrillas and accelerated their growth. This increased 
the Palestinian guerrillas’ aptitude to cross the borders between Arab states and 
attack Israeli troops freely without any control from Arab border forces. In 1968, 
Palestinian guerrillas with the support of the Jordanian army succeeded in 
repelling an attack by the Israeli army in what is known in Jordan as Alkaramah 
(literally ‘dignity’) war. The victory increased the level of support for Palestinian 
guerrillas in the Jordanian street. Yet, the serious challenge for the Jordanian 
state as Sayiegh (1997, 32) suggests was the 256,000 refugees who fled to the East 
Bank. This mass of refugees was enough to change the demographic structure of 
the East Bank and to add huge economic pressure on the Jordanian state and its 
public institutions. The catastrophe decreased the capacity of the Jordanian state 
and enabled Palestinian organizations such as the Palestinian National 
Liberation (PLO) and Fatah to expand their power and recruit more members 
(Khalidi, 1997, 197; Harlow, 1996, 56; Kimmerling & Migdal 2003, 254, 256). Soon 
Palestinian guerrillas became strong autonomous powers representing a 
transnational identity, i.e. Palestinian identity, and working independently from 
the Jordanian state’s public politics. 
These rapid changes decreased security and the respect of law and increased 
the social disorder. Installing checkpoints, carrying and storing weapons inside 
cities, kidnaping opposition members, and harassing citizens became common 
practices of Palestinian organizations. Such practices increased the tension 
between Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians and threatened the 
existence of the Jordanian regime (Musa, 1996, 309). 
The tension reached its peak in 1970 when the Jordanian army started an 
operation to terminate the existence of Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan. The 
operation resulted in the killing of thousands Palestinian guerrillas, expelling 
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the rest outside Jordan and terminating the existence of Palestinian 
organizations in Jordan (Khalidi, 1997, 197; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003, 263). 
The regime managed to consolidate itself, increase its capacity and end the 
internal conflict which was threatening its existence. Yet, increasing its capacity 
which is crucial for increasing democracy came through increasing the rift in 
society between two large segments and increasing the insulation of Palestinian 
Jordanians from public politics. 
The unity between Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians was again 
challenged in 1974 when the PLO was recognized by the Arab League summit in 
Rabat as the sole legitimate representative of Palestinian people on any 
Palestinian land that will be freed from occupation (Brynen, 1998, 74; Baaklini et 
al, 1999, 143). This included the West Bank, which was considered by the 
Jordanian regime as part of Jordan. Prior to the recognition motion, the 
Jordanian regime attempted to have it aborted and then later tried to exclude 
Palestinians residing in the Kingdom, yet the endeavors were in vain (Musa, 
1996, 411-412, 418). In his speech in front of Arab leaders in Rabat, King Husain 
clarified the complexities and challenges that such decision brings to Jordan and 
declared that Jordan cannot accept that the PLO represents the masses of 
Palestinians who live in the kingdom, hold its citizenship and integrate in its 
fields, institutions and all aspects of life (Musa, 1996, 421). The King added “we 
cannot accept that the government of those people does not represent them, 
speak by their name, take over their case, and embrace their hopes and 
aspirations” (cited by Musa, 1996, 421). Despite the strongly negative 
implication of the decision on the Jordanian regime, the weak capacity of the 
Jordanian state and its dependency on the support of other Arab countries 
compelled King Husain to accept unwillingly the decision. Yet, he declared that 
Jordan is exempt from all its political responsibilities towards the Palestinian 
cause. Shortly after that he started decreasing the number of Palestinian 
Jordanians in his administration starting with decreasing the number of 
Palestinians in the Jordanian cabinet (Braizat, 1998, 157; Massad, 2001, 249). 
Nonetheless, according to Musa (1996, 423), Jordan continued to give grants and 
loans for the development of West Bank institutions, loan guarantees for 
municipalities and continued to pay the salaries of six thousand employees in 
the West Bank. The new role of the PLO and the King’s declaration and actions 
led to an increase in the Palestinian identity among Palestinian Jordanians at the 
expense of Jordanian identity. This process naturally increased the insulation of 
Palestinian Jordanians from state public policies and affirmed the regime 
dependency on Transjordanian tribes. 
The new position of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of 
Palestinians enabled the Jordanian regime to suggest two amendments to the 
constitution; the first grants the King the right to dissolve the parliament or 
exempt one of its members from their membership; the second grants the King 
the right to postpone general elections for a period that does not exceed one year 
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in the case of force majeure (Musa, 1996, 427). Two weeks after the amendments 
were implemented, the King dissolved the House of Representatives and the 
House of Senate. Zaid Alrifa‘i, then Jordanian prime minister, justified the 
amendments by stating that after the political separation of the two Banks,  
 
“it became impossible to deal with a Parliament in which half of its members 
represent the West Bank. We did not want to override the powers of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization and to continue our claims about representing 
Palestinians after Rabat summit decisions” (cited by Musa, 1996, 427).  
 
In 1976, the King called the two Houses to meet in order to issue a new 
constitutional amendment which granted the King the right to postpone general 
elections in the case of force majeure for an unlimited period of time. The 
government justified this by declaring that the West Bank is still under 
occupation, and hence it is impossible under such circumstances to hold 
elections. Two days after the amendment passed, the King dissolved the 
parliament again (Musa, 1996, 429). Indeed, for any national state, it is hard to 
accept that half of its parliamentary members are represented by a transnational 
organization or to accept holding elections in an occupied territory. Yet, there is 
a contradiction between the government’s justifications of its decisions in 1974 
and 1976. This is to say that if ridding the powers of the PLO in representing 
Palestinians was the motivation behind dissolving the Parliament in 1974, then 
the state should not be responsible for holding elections in the occupied 
territories of Palestinians. Consequently, the state should not postpone elections 
for an unlimited period of time because of the occupation of the West Bank. The 
natural democratic decision would be the one which protects the rights of 
people who are represented by the state to elect their representatives, rather than 
repealing or suspending this right. Apparently, the regime expanded its power 
and justified its anti-democratic decisions by utilizing the new position of 
Palestinian Jordanians. 
Creating a Palestinian national identity which is independent from the 
Jordanian one was also supported by Transjordanian nationalists who feared 
proposals to establish a Palestinian state in Jordan. With the Likud coming to 
power in Israel and pursuing policies aimed at transforming Jordan to a state for 
Palestinians, such proposals became more threatening to the Transjordanian 
identity (Abu-Odeh, 1999, 213-214)66. Transjordanian nationalists found in Rabat 
summit decisions - which recognized the PLO as the only legitimate 
                                                     
66 Adnan Abu Odeh, born in Nablus (Palestine) in 1933 was a senator in the Jordanian House of 
Parliament from 1998-1999, when he was appointed political advisor to King Abdullah II. He served 
as Jordan's permanent representative to the UN (1992-1995), non-resident Ambassador of Jordan to 
Cuba (1993-1995), Chief of the Royal Court in Jordan (1991-1992), Minister of Information (1976-1979 
and 1980-1984), and Political Advisor to King Husain (1988-1991), Minister of the Court (1984-1988) 
and Minister of Culture and Information (1970-1972 and 1973-1974). 
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representative of Palestinians - a channel to counter such threats. Forging an 
independent Palestinian national identity from the Jordanian one would help 
Transjordanians in purifying the Jordanian identity.  
The Arab League’s decision and its consequences gave more legitimacy for 
the undeclared state policy which aimed to gradually decrease the numbers of 
Palestinian Jordanians from the public sector and increase the numbers of 
Transjordanians 67 . More importantly, the decision made, indirectly, the 
discriminative policies towards Palestinian Jordanians not only possible but also 
acceptable and natural. In this context, it is clear that the insulation of Palestinian 
Jordanians from state public politics was not only supported by the Jordanian 
state and Jordanian nationalists but also indirectly by Palestinian nationalists. 
An example of the decreasing the number of Palestinian Jordanians in public 
institutions appears clearly at Jordanian universities. Joseph Massad (2001, 258) 
notes that during the 1960s and 1970s, Jordanian universities were dominated by 
Palestinian Jordanians. This situation, as Abu-Odeh (1999) observes, started to 
change with the Transjordanization policy that the state applied on faculty 
members and students at public universities. The policy included “screening 
lecturers and professors for security […] admitting students through district 
quota, which allowed more Transjordanian students to join the cheaper and 
more prestigious state universities than Palestinian-Jordanian students” (Abu-
Odeh, 1999, 215) and “granting university seats and scholarships to the children 
of army officers and servicemen whose fathers served for more than ten years in 
the Jordanian armed forces” (Massad, 2001, 219) These policies which proceeded 
as Massad (2001, 258) notes more belligerently “has resulted in emptying 
Jordan’s state universities of Palestinian faculty, as few if any new positions go 
to Palestinian Jordanians”. 
The state’s discriminative policies towards Palestinian Jordanians stuffed 
public institutions in the East Bank 68  with Transjordanian tribesmen. This 
situation transferred kinship and patronage relations to these institutions and 
consequently decreased the ability of these institutions to deliver benefits by 
category of recipient without the need of cajoling, patronage relations or the use 
of third-party influence. The transformation of public institutions services to 
patronage services increased discrimination towards Palestinian Jordanians and 
transformed, to some extent, the civil nature of public institutions to relatively 
primitive communal nature. Though the declared discriminatory policies such 
as admitting students through district quota is a form of ‘positive 
discrimination’ which aims at empowering weak groups and increasing equality 
in the society, the combination of such policies with other undeclared policies 
(for example, Transjordanization of public universities’ staff) and the overuse of 
                                                     
67 Many researchers confirm these policies e.g. Abu-Odeh (1999); Braizat (1998); Massad (2001).  
68 The West Bank was under the Israeli occupation. 
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this positive discrimination resulted in a noticeable insulation of Palestinian 
Jordanians from public politics. 
The PLO success in being the sole legitimate representative of Palestinians 
sustained the self-recognition of some Palestinian Jordanians as guests rather 
than original Jordanian citizens. According to Abu-Odeh (1999, 216), there was a 
growing sense among Palestinian Jordanians that their situation in Jordan was 
temporary rather than permanent and that they were guests who are grateful to 
the privileges they have in Jordan compared to Syria and Lebanon, rather than 
Jordanian citizens. Many Palestinian Jordanians chose to immigrate to Gulf 
countries and work there. Some scholars estimate the numbers of Palestinian 
Jordanians who did so from 200,000 to 500,000 (Sayiegh, 1997, 34). All these 
factors not only increased the insulation of Palestinian Jordanians from public 
politics but also sustained and justified this insulation, increased the stability 
and capacity of the Jordanian state and narrowed the political opposition and 
activities of Palestinian Jordanians in the East Bank. 
In the West Bank the power of the PLO was growing and consequently so 
was the feeling of being Palestinian. The 1976 municipal elections swept all the 
old pro-Jordanian figures from office except one and “brought in younger, more 
radical men who recognized the PLO as their national leadership” (McDowall, 
1989, 73)69. This was a sign for the PLO’s success in decreasing the capacity of the 
Jordanian regime in the West Bank and establishing a political territory which 
geographically separated Jordanians from Palestinians. 
In 1984 King Husain called the Parliament to meet to approve new 
constitutional amendments. The amendments gave the King, after the cabinet’s 
suggestion, the right to call for general elections in at least half of the 
constituencies regardless of the case of force majeure. The winning members in 
elections would then elect half of the members in the other circles (Alda‘jeh, 2005, 
133). These amendments or similar ones should have taken place in 1974 and 
1976 instead of dissolving the parliament. Yet, back then running general 
elections could have resulted in bringing Palestinian Jordanian opposition to the 
political scene again. For the PLO, as Ali Mahafzah (2001, 28) suggests, the new 
amendments gave signs that the Jordanian regime might seek to expand again 
its authority to the West Bank (Mahafzah 2001, 28). Such concerns or fears were 
terminated by the King unexpected decision in 1988 to disengage politically 
from the West Bank. This is to say that the West Bank became no longer part of 
Jordan. 
Following the disengagement decision, the prime minister issued instructions 
on the 20th of August 1988, which consider every person who resided in the West 
                                                     
69 McDowall (1989, 100) argues that the new mayors were not necessarily pro-PLO though they 
recognized the PLO as their national leadership. This opinion might be more accurate than other 
opinions, which see the elections as merely a competition between the PLO and the Jordanian regime 
(Musa, 1996, 427; Massad, 2001, 258; Mahafzah, 2001, 15). 
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69 McDowall (1989, 100) argues that the new mayors were not necessarily pro-PLO though they 
recognized the PLO as their national leadership. This opinion might be more accurate than other 
opinions, which see the elections as merely a competition between the PLO and the Jordanian regime 
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Bank before the 31st of July 1988 a Palestinian citizen rather than a Jordanian one 
(Musa, 1996, 507; Mahafzah, 2001, 44). A study by Anis Al-Qasem (2012) argues 
that denaturalizing Palestinian Jordanians was unconstitutional, illegal and 
against the norms of the international law70. The decision, which denaturalized 
more than one million Palestinian Jordanians (Massad, 2001, 45), balanced the 
percentage of Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians in Jordan, intensified 
the Palestinian identity, decreased the possibility of transnational bodies 
interfering on behalf of Palestinian Jordanians, and assured the Jordanian 
nationalist exclusivists’ distinction between holding a Jordanian nationality and 
holding a Jordanian citizenship71. All these consequences silenced Palestinian 
Jordanians’ political opposition in Jordan; i.e. silenced the political opposition of 
half of the population or more. A year after the disengagement, Jordan had its 
first elections after the democratic reform which opened the doors for political 
and social public debates among which the position of Palestinian Jordanians in 
Jordan. 
 
 
7.3 PALESTINIAN JORDANIANS AND THE DEMOCRATIC 
REFORM PHASE 
 
In the previous section, the study discussed how the relationship between the 
Jordanian state and Palestinian Jordanians after Annaksah war resulted in 
increasing the insulation of Palestinian Jordanians from public politics. In the 
democratic reform phase three important changes related to Palestinian 
Jordanians took place: first, the First Gulf War, second, the electoral system and 
third, the implementation of privatization and economic policies. 
 
7.3.1 The First Gulf War and its consequences 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 2nd, 1990 and the First Gulf War which 
followed the invasion on January 17th, 1991, resulted in the return of 200,000 – 
400,000 Jordanians from gulf countries to Jordan. The majority of them (200,000 
to 300,000) were Palestinian Jordanians (Musa, 1996, 575; Mahafzah, 2001, 266; 
Massad, 2001, 234; Alda‘jeh, 2005, 138). In June 1991, the Jordanian Minister of 
Labor announced in an international conference held in Geneva that the 
percentage of unemployment due to the war increased to twenty percent and 
that the percentage of Jordanians who live below the poverty line reached thirty-
three percent (Mahafzah, 2001, 266). Massad (2001, 268) suggests that Jordanian 
“exclusivist nationalists saw this as “drowning” Transjordanians deeper in a 
                                                     
70 Al-Qasem (2012) presents the Jordanian law of citizenship and discusses the conditions and the 
cases in which the government has the right to withdraw the Jordanian nationality from a Jordanian 
citizen. Based on this, Al-Qasem (2012) argues that the cases and conditions were not applicable in 
the case of Palestinian Jordanians who lived in the West Bank. 
71 Other consequences are discussed in the next section. 
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“sea” of Palestinians that only gets bigger with time”. The sounds of these 
concerns became stronger during the peace process with Israel. 
Jordan found itself suffering from political isolation and economic crisis after 
it refused to join the international alliance against Iraq. In order to overcome 
these challenges the regime accepted to start peace negotiations with Israel. The 
first meetings brought delegations from the PLO, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and 
Israel. The PLO had to participate in the meetings through a joint delegation 
with Jordan since Israel was refusing to recognize the PLO as a legitimate 
organization at that time (October, 1991). However, the coordination between 
the PLO and Jordan failed. According to Mahafzah (2001, 287), the PLO was 
skeptical about the Jordanian intentions behind the coordination and believed 
that Jordan was utilizing the coordination to fulfill its own regional interests72. 
Jordanian exclusivists rejected the joint delegations, however, unlike the PLO 
they “protested the subordination of Jordanian interests to the needs of the 
Palestinians” (Lynch, 2001, 344). In August 1993, the Jordanian state was 
shocked by the news about a peace agreement between Israel and the PLO. The 
agreement resulted from secret negotiations between both parties (Lynch, 2001, 
288; Musa, 1996, 589) but raised many concerns in Jordan related to economic 
relations with the West Bank and the right of return for Palestinian refugees in 
Jordan (Mahafzah, 2001, 288; Lynch, 2001, 348). These changes in the region 
again raised the question of Palestinian Jordanians’ position in Jordan in the 
public debate. Yet this time the debate or confrontation was namely between 
Jordanian exclusivists and Palestinian Jordanians. Columnists and politicians 
from both parties presented their concerns and criticized the other party openly 
in the Jordanian press (Abu-Odeh, 1999, 195-196; Nevo, 2003, 201; Massad, 2011, 
265, 272). On the one hand, Jordanian exclusivists’ main concerns were related to 
the issue of Jordan becoming a substitute homeland for all Palestinians, 
questioning the dual loyalty of Palestinian Jordanians and the domination of 
Palestinians in the private business sector. Consequently, they demand that 
Palestinian Jordanians should carry Palestinian passports and become 
Palestinian residents in Jordan rather than Jordanians. On the other hand, 
Palestinian Jordanian writers complain about the discrimination against 
Palestinian Jordanians, the unequal chances of interring public institutions and 
the absence of Palestinian Jordanian political elites and the position of 
Palestinian Jordanians as tax payers while consumers of salaries and allowances 
are Transjordanians (Abu-Odeh, 1999, 195-196; Nevo, 2003, 201; Massad, 2011, 
265, 272; Al-Rantawi, 1996; Lynch, 2001, 350). However, the confrontational 
opinions about the relationship between both groups were not adopted in the 
                                                     
72 It is important to note that until the moment of revising this line in July 2013, the disengagement 
decision from the West Bank was not issued as a law, has never been published in the official 
newspaper and has never led to any constitutional amendment related to the unity between the two 
banks. 
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mainstream. In October 1995, the Jordanian press published the results of a poll 
about the type of relationship that should exist between Jordan and the would-
be Palestinian entity. The poll showed that 74 percent of respondents were in 
favor of some kind of union, 22 percent where against it and 4 percent had no 
opinion (Abu-Odeh, 1999, 194; Lynch, 2001, 350). 
The regime, which is represented by the King, has never promoted or 
supported the Jordanian nationalist exclusivists’ view. Yet, the regime’s view 
was sometimes challenged by Transjordanian state officials. For instance, after 
the Oslo agreement, the Ministry of the Interior refrained in some cases from 
issuing five year passports for Palestinian Jordanians living in the East Bank. 
According to Abu-Odeh (1999, 194), “the motivation, it seems, was to reduce the 
number of Palestinian Jordanians”. This problem was a result of the 
disengagement decision in 1988. Following this, the regime considered 
Palestinian Jordanians who were residing in the East Bank Jordanian citizens 
and they were entitled to five year passports. Palestinian Jordanians who were 
residing in the West Bank were considered Palestinians and were entitled to two 
year passports. As a response to the ministry practice, King Husain instructed 
the government in 1995 to issue five year passports to Palestinians who reside in 
the West Bank (Abu-Odeh, 1999, 194; Schulz & Hammer, 2003, 47). Apparently 
the domination of Transjordanians over state institutions brought Jordanian 
nationalist exclusivists to decision-making positions through which they tried to 
apply their ideology. 
A related issue to the passports problem is withdrawing citizenship from 
some Palestinian Jordanian citizens who hold yellow cards. Yellow card holders 
are Jordanian citizens who reside in the West Bank temporarily or permanently 
(Ayesh, 2012). Ahmad Saad Eddin (2012) claims that the yellow card means that 
in case of settling the Palestinian issue (i.e. establishing a Palestinian state), the 
card holders will move back to their country; i.e. Palestine. Though there is not 
any evidence which supports Saad Eddin’s claim, it demonstrates part of the 
worries and uncertainty among Palestinian Jordanians. These worries become 
more serious by recognizing that the instruction on which withdrawing the 
citizenship is based are secret (Al-Qasem, 2012; Abu Tair, 2012). In addition, the 
Cabinet waived the right to withdraw the citizenship to the Department of Al-
Mutaba‘ah Wattaftish (literally ‘Follow-up and Inspection’), which is under the 
authority of the Ministry of Interior (Al-Qasem, 2012). This means that the 
decision of withdrawing a citizenship from yellow card holders was put in the 
hands of low ranking officials. According to Saad Eddin (2012), a report issued 
by the Department says that the number of yellow cards which issued by the 
department stands at 267,715, of which 58,930 were issued between 2005 and 
2010. In the same period, the department withdrew the national identity number 
(withdrew citizenship) from 5,552 Palestinian Jordanians (Saad Eddin, 2012). In 
2012, the Cabinet regained the right of withdrawing citizenship and suspended 
the work of the Department. Many columnists suggested that one of the reasons 
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behind the Cabinet decision was to encourage Palestinian Jordanians to 
participate in the coming parliamentary elections (Abu Tair, 2012; Alshekh, 2012; 
Albadaryn, 2012). By doing so, the government could increase the rate of 
participation in elections and give a positive image about political reforms 
which followed the Arab Spring. 
 
7.3.2 Palestinian Jordanians and the electoral system 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to find any reliable statistics on the percentage 
of Palestinian Jordanians which participates in Parliamentary elections. Yet, 
according to Thamer Abu Baker’s (n.d.) analysis of the 2003 parliamentary 
elections, the percentage of participation in Amman and Alzarqa cities, where 
most of Palestinian Jordanians live, was the lowest among all cities; for instance, 
Amman 43% and Jarash 82% (see Table 32). Apparently, participation in 
Transjordanian-dominated cities is higher than in others. This gives a clear 
indication that the participation of Transjordanians in parliamentary elections is 
more than the participation of Palestinian Jordanians. 
 
 
City The percentage of participation in 2003 
parliamentary elections 
Amman 43% 
Zarqa 48% 
Balqa’ 70% 
Mafraq 81% 
Karak 82% 
Jarash 82% 
 
 
In a recent debate in the Jordanian parliament (June, 2012), MP Khalil Atiyeh 
criticized the unfair distribution of electoral seats in constituencies (Almansi 
2012). The objection was based on the fact that the number of seats in each 
constituency does not correspond to the number of inhabitants or voters in that 
constituency (see Table 33). For example, in the 2003 election an MP in Amman 
(the capital) represented 83,348 inhabitants, while in Tafila an MP represents 
19,149 inhabitants73.This unequal setup significantly affects the representation of 
Palestinian Jordanians in the parliament since the cities where most Palestinian 
Jordanians reside (Amman and Zarqa) have substantively fewer seats in the 
parliament corresponding to their population. Following the 1997 elections, the 
                                                     
73 These numbers were taken from Shaker Aljohari (2004). However, Aljohari mistakenly say that the 
numbers represent the voters in each constituency rather than the inhabitants. 
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number of Palestinian Jordanian MPs in the parliament was thirteen; i.e. 16.25% 
of the seats74 (Abu-Odeh 1999, 231). In 2003, the number rose to twenty (Abu 
Baker, n.d.), i.e. 18.18% of the seats (the number of parliamentary seats rose from 
80 in 1997 to 110 following the 2003 elections). 
 
 
Constituency Number of inhabitants represented by an MP 
Amman 83,348 
Zarqa 79,263 
Mafraq 58,075 
Irbid 56,185 
Jarash 37,036 
Balqa 33,055 
Madaba 32,123 
Ajloun 27,966 
M‘an 23,565 
Karak 20,257 
Tafila 19,149 
 
 
According to former Prime Minister, Ali Abu Alrageb, based on the 1994 census 
the percentage of Palestinian Jordanians was 43 percent (cited by Aljohari, 
2004)75. Aljohari (2004) points out that other sources suggest that when Abu 
Alrageb announced these figures, he did not take into consideration one and half 
million Jordanians who are registered in the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) as Palestinian refugees yet hold 
Jordanian citizenship. Consequently, Aljohari (2004) suggests that the actual 
percentage of Palestinian Jordanians is 71 percent of the total population. 
Regardless of which is the more accurate, the percentage of Palestinian 
Jordanian members of parliament is significantly less than either. Abu-Odeh 
(1999, 230) says that according to the distribution of constituencies and the seats 
of each circle, “even if Palestinian Jordanians were to cast their ballots purely on 
a communal basis, banding together to elect only Palestinian Jordanians 
candidates”, Palestinian Jordanians could secure at most 25 percent of the seats. 
                                                     
74 Thamer Abu Baker suggests that the number is eleven members since some Palestinian Jordanians 
who were born in Jordan refuse to count themselves as Palestinian Jordanians. 
75 This is the only official announced figure about the percentage of Palestinian Jordanians in Jordan. 
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A common argument to justify the regulations which lower the percentage of 
Palestinian Jordanian representation in the parliament is the fear of transforming 
Jordan to an alternative homeland for Palestinians (Abu Baker, n.d.; Aljohari, 
2004). This is to say that increasing the presence of Palestinian Jordanians in the 
parliament and other political institutions would dye Jordan with the Palestinian 
identity, and hence Jordan would become an alternative homeland for 
Palestinians. Apparently, these concerns would not be legitimate or would not 
have any value if Palestinian Jordanians are considered Jordanians. Indeed, the 
argument about the alternative homeland does not recognize that Palestinians 
reside in the West Bank not in Jordan and those who reside in Jordan are by 
constitution and law Jordanians of Palestinian origin rather than Palestinians. 
Indeed the Jordanian state policies confuses the Jordanian identity by accepting 
Palestinian Jordanians as Jordanians and at the same time depriving them from 
representing Jordanians as Transjordanians do. 
 
7.3.3 Privatization and economic policies 
Discrimination against Palestinian Jordanians in state institutions pushed them 
to work in the private, rather than public, sector. This trend along with the 
economic boom in late 1970s76 assisted, as Abu-Odeh (1999, 216) suggests, the 
communal stability in Jordan and prevented Palestinian Jordanians from 
protesting against the discrimination. Nevertheless, the discrimination resulted 
in the Palestinian Jordanians’ domination of the private sector and the 
Transjordanians’ domination of the public sector. A study by the Center of 
Strategic Studies (an academic unit of the University of Jordan) in 1996 shows 
that the Palestinian participation in the country’s capital reached 82.6 percent, 
while Transjordanian participation reached just 11 percent. The rest was the 
participation of other minorities (cited by Abu-Odeh, 1999, 196). Results in the 
same direction were found in Reiter’s (2004) study of the top five hundred 
economic concerns in Jordan between 1995 and 1996 and of 173 large companies 
that were traded on the Jordanian stock exchange in 1996. 
Orayb Al-Rantawi77 (1996) says that the tension between the Jordanian state 
and the PLO led to the creation of a governmental sector which supports 
Transjordanians and a communal sector where Palestinian Jordanians are 
concentrated. According to Al-Rantawi (1996), this means that tax payers belong 
to Palestinian Jordanians, while consumers of salaries and allowances belong to 
Transjordanians, yet with many exceptions and interrelations. An opposite 
opinion of Al-Rantawi (1996) is the view of Jordanian exclusivist nationalists, 
who criticize the domination of Palestinian Jordanians in the private sector 
                                                     
76 For instance, per capita income rose from 291.83$ in 1973 to 1089.20$ in 1979 (Abu-Odeh 1999, 216). 
See also (Sayiegh 1997, 45) 
77 A Palestinian Jordanian columnist and an advisor of King Abdullah II 
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76 For instance, per capita income rose from 291.83$ in 1973 to 1089.20$ in 1979 (Abu-Odeh 1999, 216). 
See also (Sayiegh 1997, 45) 
77 A Palestinian Jordanian columnist and an advisor of King Abdullah II 
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(Nevo, 2003, 201). For instance, Ahmad Al‘abbadi - a Jordanian exclusivist 
nationalist - says that 
 
“Government jobs should be confined to Jordanians and the priority in everything 
should be given to them […] The crumbs should be given to the Palestinians. 
Besides, Jordanians are entitled to a share of the Palestinian wealth, which they 
couldn’t have gained without the Jordanian passport. This share should amount to 
51 percent. Palestinians should not have any political rights whether in the 
executive or legislative branch […] I believe in withdrawing Jordanian passports 
from the Palestinians and giving them instead travel documents” (cited by Abu-
Odeh, 1999, 245). 
 
Both Al-Rantawi and Al‘abbadi’s opinions fail to consider an important issue 
addressed by Yazeed Sayiegh (1997) in his analysis of the social classes of 
Palestinian Jordanians. Rather than looking at Palestinian Jordanians as one 
group which has the same social and political positions, Sayiegh (1997) argues 
that Palestinian Jordanians are divided into three social classes: almuqimun 
(literally ‘residents’) before 1948, alnazihun (literally ‘displaced’) who fled to 
Jordan during and after 1948, and allaji’un (literally ‘refugees’) who escaped to 
Jordan during and after 1967. The first group represents a high social class which 
includes well established businessmen, highly educated professionals and high 
ranking politicians; the second group represents a middle social class, which 
includes educated professionals, small businessmen, employees in the private 
sector and some public sectors; the third group represents a low social class with 
less education and fewer professional skills (Sayiegh, 1997, 32-33)78. 
Sayiegh (1997) does not disagree with Al-Rantawi (1996) fundamentally on 
recognizing that Palestinians Jordanians are insulated from public politics since 
he sees Palestinian Jordanians who occupy high ranking governmental or 
political positions as part of the elite who ally with the regime policies. However, 
Al‘abbadi argues that the state policies 
 
“placed the economy in the hands of Palestinians and the stick in the hands of 
Jordanians. If the Palestinian became a threat, the state would use the Jordanian 
stick to repress him; and if the Jordanian became the threat, the government 
would deprive him from his source of living” (cited by Abu-Odeh 1999, 245).  
 
As such, the division of Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians into public 
and private sectors does not only insulate Palestinian Jordanians from public 
policies but also facilitates the regime’s attempts to insulate Transjordanians 
from opposing the state’s public politics by building an economic patron 
relationship with them. 
                                                     
78 Needless to say that the boundaries between these groups are not sharp and movement from one 
group to another is possible. 
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Many scholars such as Al‘abbadi, Al-Rantawi (1996), Abu-Odeh (1999) and 
Massad (2001) suggest that the state’s policies are responsible for the division 
between Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians in work sectors. However, 
the preceding analysis of the relationship between the state and Palestinian 
Jordanians suggests strongly that the state was to a large extent reacting towards 
different challenges that came from other power groups such as Israel, the Arab 
League and Palestinian guerrillas rather than pursuing a planned discriminative 
policy. The reaction, which was crucial for the state’s stability or even existence, 
produced the division as a byproduct. Later on, the regime utilized this situation 
to consolidate its stability and increase its power. 
In 1992, the Jordanian government started a privatization process as part of 
the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) economic reform plan which initially 
was scheduled to last until 1998 and was ultimately extended three times until 
2004 (Alassaf, 2009, 141). The process increased the size of the private sector at 
the expense of the public sector. Consequently, the social status of 
Transjordanians was decreasing compared to the one of Palestinian Jordanians. 
The changes according to Massad (2001, 267) signaled to Jordanian exclusivist 
nationalists “a loss of bureaucratic power, which […] was one of the mainstays 
(along with the military) of Transjordanian influence in the country”. Yet, 
Jordanian exclusivist nationalists, as Massad (2001, 267) argues, fail to recognize 
that privatization 
 
“was in fact expanding the ranks of the Transjordanian bourgeoisie by 
accelerating a Transjordanian exodus from the overinflated bureaucracy to the 
private sector through preferential treatment. Most of the new bids solicited by the 
state and its bureaucracy were given to Transjordanians […], who are also the 
beneficiaries of bureaucratic favoritism on account of Transjordanian hegemony in 
the bureaucracy”. 
 
Moreover, as Abu-Odeh (1999, 197) and Reiter (2004) argue, Palestinian 
Jordanian businesspeople resorted or partnered with prominent Transjordanians 
to ensure that their company’s official transactions penetrate the disruption of 
bureaucracy. Nonetheless, the latter arguments do not necessarily override the 
argument that privatization policies decreased the economic status of 
Transjordanians. It is possible to argue that some high ranking bureaucratic 
Transjordanians were able to enter the private sector and/or utilize privatization 
to develop their own economic conditions. Yet, the economic conditions of 
middle and lower social classes of Transjordanians were naturally declining. 
Since Palestinian Jordanians work mostly in the private sector, this change did 
not take place aggressively among them as much as it did among 
Transjordanians. This situation was utilized by Jordanian nationalist exclusivists 
not only to perceive the insulation of Palestinian Jordanians from public 
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institutions as fair but also to justify considering Palestinian Jordanians as 
foreigners rather than citizens. 
The previous discussion demonstrates a unique case of the insulation of 
categorical inequality from public politics. What makes the case unique is that 
the insulation is not based on gender, social class, religion, ethnicity or any other 
known base of discrimination. In fact, even the country of origin is not an 
accurate factor to describe all the bases of the insulation of Palestine Jordanians 
from public politics. A more accurate argument would be a combination of 
political, economic and social factors which established and increased the 
insulation of Palestinian Jordanians from public politics and later on, led to the 
creation of the country of origin as an independent factor, which increases this 
insulation. 
Annexing the West Bank to Transjordan lacked an Arab or international 
recognition of the annexing decision. This lack of political support accompanied 
by the struggle with Israel discomfited the Jordanian regime plans to dissolve 
the Palestinian identity into a Jordanian one. The rise of the Palestinian identity 
cracked the unity of the Jordanian society and rocked the capacity of the 
Jordanian regime. To consolidate its capacity, the regime had to increase its 
support to Transjordanians and increase the insulation of Palestinian Jordanians 
from public politics. Indeed, the political struggle was a driving force behind the 
discrimination against Palestinian Jordanians. Yet, more importantly, the 
political struggle took a militant form in the early 1970s which resulted in 
deactivating, to a large extent, the political opposition of Palestinian Jordanians. 
The state’s policy which decreased the integration of Palestinian Jordanians 
in public offices resulted in increasing the presence of Palestinian Jordanians in 
the private sector. This economic division created two labor zones characterized 
not only by the private and public dichotomy but also by the Palestinian 
Jordanian and Transjordanian one. 
The political and economic divisions between Transjordanians and 
Palestinian Jordanians and the reasons behind them established a level of 
uncertainty about the degree of Jordanianism of Palestinian Jordanians. This 
uncertainty led some Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians to perceive 
Palestinian Jordanians as guests rather than citizens. Hence, these 
Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians did not only accept the insulation of 
Palestinian Jordanians from public politics but also considered it crucial to 
preserve Jordan for ‘true’ Jordanians. Indeed, as Rustow (1970) argued 
democracy is impossible when is not clear who ‘the people’ of the nation are. 
In the next section the study elucidates how the insulation of Palestinian 
Jordanians from public politics is related to the students’ socioeconomic 
background and their opinions about democratic concepts, institutions and 
practices. 
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7.4 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND STUDENTS’ ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS DEMOCRACY 
 
The analysis in this section focuses on the relation between the country of origin 
factor and the students’ attitudes towards democracy. As in the previous two 
chapters, the analysis focuses on questions about the factor itself and on the 
questions which are related to the factor and tested by Chi-Square. The students 
were asked to define their ethnicity or country of origin. The possible answers 
were; Jordanian, Palestinian, Syrian, Circassian, Chechen and other (define). In 
this section the analysis focuses only on Transjordanian students (62.5 percent) 
and Palestinian Jordanian students (32.7 percent). The analysis neglects other 
Jordanians (4.8 percent of the students) because the data is not sufficient and 
considering it would disturb the analysis. After the analysis, the study examines 
common trends among students’ attitudes which are related to the country of 
origin factor. Before starting the analysis, the study examines the relations 
between the country of origin and other factors. 
 
7.4.1 Country of origin and the students’ socioeconomic backgrounds 
Unlike religiosity and gender factors, the country of origin factor has important 
relations to other factors; namely the standard of living, father’s work and 
father’s education. This, as the study demonstrates soon, assures many 
arguments in the previous section about the sociopolitical and economic 
positions of Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians. 
The percentage of Transjordanian students at universities is 62% compared to 
32.7% of Palestinian Jordanians. The percentage of Transjordanian students in 
public universities (80.6%) is much higher than the percentage of Palestinian 
Jordanians (19.4%). In private universities the percentage of Palestinian 
Jordanian students (73%) is much higher than the percentage of Transjordanians 
(27%). One possible explanation of these substantial differences could be the 
location of private and public universities. The major public universities where 
the questionnaire was distributed are located in the cities of Karak and M‘an, 
both of which have more Transjordanians than Palestinian Jordanians. Yet there 
is no data that assesses the percentage of the two groups in these cities, hence it 
is not possible to evaluate the accuracy of this argument. However, it is likely 
that the difference between the representations of both groups in public 
universities is also caused by existing policies which favor Transjordanian 
students in public universities (Abu-Odeh, 1999, 215; Massad, 2001, 219). The 
high percentage of Palestinian Jordanians in private universities indicates that 
they have less access to public universities and/or they have better economic 
status. In this context, it is important to note that public universities in Jordan 
have a better reputation than private universities and that they are much 
cheaper. The results here indicate that the negative influence of privatization on 
Transjordanians is compensated indirectly by providing them with cheaper 
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services such as access to public universities (Abu-Odeh, 1999, 195-196; Nevo, 
2003, 201; Massad, 2011, 265, 272; Al-Rantawi, 1996; Lynch, 2001, 350). 
In relation to the standard of living, the data shows that the percentage of 
Palestinian Jordanian students who think that they enjoy a greater than average 
standard of living is significantly more than the percentage of Transjordanian 
students (see Table 34).  
 
 
 Students standard of living 
Total 
Less than 
average Average 
More than 
average 
The Country 
of Origin 
Transjordanian 37 181 65 283 
13.1% 64.0% 23.0% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanian 
13 82 54 149 
8.7% 55.0% 36.2% 100.0% 
Total 50 263 119 432 
11.6% 60.9% 27.5% 100.0% 
 = 9.115; d.f. = 2; p = .01 
 
 
The relationship between the country of origin and the work sectors of the father 
is in line with previous results. The fathers of Transjordanian students tend to 
work in the public sector rather than private sector more than the fathers of 
Palestinian Jordanian students. Moreover, the percentage of retired fathers is 
much higher among Transjordanians than among Palestinian Jordanians (see 
Table 35). These results confirm Reiter’s (2004) and the Center of Strategic 
Studies (1996) studies – as mentioned earlier in this chapter- which demonstrate 
the overwhelming presence of Palestinian Jordanians in the private sector and 
their large contribution to the country’s capital. 
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 In which sector the father Works? 
Total 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Private 
business 
owner Unemployed  Retired 
Country 
of 
Origin 
Transjordanian 49 32 36 29 122 268 
18.3% 11.9% 13.4% 10.8% 45.5% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanian 
12 41 64 9 20 146 
8.2% 28.1% 43.8% 6.2% 13.7% 100.0% 
Total 61 73 100 38 142 414 
14.7% 17.6% 24.2% 9.2% 34.3% 100.0% 
 = 86.769; d.f. = 4; p = .000 
 
 
The results also support the arguments about discrimination against recruiting 
Palestinian Jordanians in public positions. This discrimination is confirmed and 
maximized by recognizing that the education level of Transjordanian fathers is 
clearly less than the corresponding data for Palestinian Jordanian fathers (See 
Table 36). 
 
 
 The education level of the student’s 
father 
Total 
No or low 
Education High school 
College or 
university 
The Country of 
Origin 
Transjordanian 71 120 93 284 
25.0% 42.3% 32.7% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanian 
14 34 101 149 
9.4% 22.8% 67.8% 100.0% 
Total 85 154 194 433 
19.6% 35.6% 44.8% 100.0% 
 = 49.28; d.f. = 2; p = .000 
 
 
Regardless of whether the state was intentionally discriminating against 
Palestinian Jordanians or not, the recruiting policies through which the state 
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Regardless of whether the state was intentionally discriminating against 
Palestinian Jordanians or not, the recruiting policies through which the state 
 162   
 
 
hires Jordanians in the public sector resulted in increasing the insulation of 
Palestinian Jordanians from public politics as the data demonstrates. Yet, 
eventually the state’s economic policies resulted in increasing the economic 
status of Palestinian Jordanians, who went to the private sector and decreasing 
the economic status of Transjordanians. 
 
7.4.2 Democratic concepts 
 
Importance of national issues 
The country of origin factor does not have any significant relation to a set of 
issues that political parties should consider in their platform. These issues are: 
Islamic issues, Arab national issues, economic issues, social issues. The only 
exception was national issues; Palestinian Jordanians tend to rank the 
importance of national issues more than Transjordanians (see Table 37). The 
results here are very important. The issue of Palestinian Jordanian loyalty to 
Jordan is questioned directly by Transjordanian exclusivists and indirectly by 
the state’s discriminative policies. However, the results show the opposite. One 
of the reasons behind this could be that Palestinian Jordanian students need to 
prove or to express their nationalism more than Transjordanians since it is under 
question. Another reason could be that Palestinian Jordanians might feel 
gratitude towards the country that received them and offered them benefits that 
they would not have in other Arab countries. Nevertheless, the percentage of 
Palestinian Jordanians who ranked national issues as the least important is much 
higher than that of Transjordanians. This indicates that a relatively small group 
among Palestinian Jordanians is more concerned about Islamic issues, Arab 
issues, economic issues or social development than national issues. The results 
are in line with Abu-Odeh’s (1999, 216) argument which suggests that there is a 
sense among Palestinian Jordanians that their situation in Jordan was temporary 
rather than permanent. However, the results support more a sense among 
Palestinian Jordanians that they are Jordanians. 
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 Political parties consideration of national issues 
Total Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5 
Country of 
Origin 
Transjordanian 27 59 91 71 29 277 
9.7% 21.3% 32.9% 25.6% 10.5% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanian  
20 41 32 22 31 146 
13.7% 28.1% 21.9% 15.1% 21.2% 100.0% 
Total 47 100 123 93 60 423 
11.1% 23.6% 29.1% 22.0% 14.2% 100.0% 
 = 19.796; d.f. = 4; p = .001 
 
 
Freedom of expression 
Palestinian Jordanians tend to agree more than Transjordanians that freedom of 
expression should include “freedom to hold opinions without interference and 
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers” (see Table 38). Yet there is no difference in attitudes of 
both groups in their answers about freedom to criticize the government or to 
mock the government. Hereby, Palestinian Jordanian students tend to expand 
the area of freedom of expression more than Transjordanians. However, this 
tendency does not expand or include an area in which they would have a 
confrontation with the regime. 
 
 
  Freedom to Hold Opinions (UDHR) 
Total 
  
Absolutely 
To a Large 
Extent Somewhat 
To a Small 
Extent 
not at 
all 
Country 
of 
Origin 
Transjordanian 52 24 64 45 96 281 
18.5% 8.5% 22.8% 16.0% 34.2% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanian  
34 16 50 23 23 146 
23.3% 11.0% 34.2% 15.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
Total 86 40 114 68 119 427 
20.1% 9.4% 26.7% 15.9% 27.9% 100.0% 
 = 18.115; d.f. = 4; p = .001 
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hires Jordanians in the public sector resulted in increasing the insulation of 
Palestinian Jordanians from public politics as the data demonstrates. Yet, 
eventually the state’s economic policies resulted in increasing the economic 
status of Palestinian Jordanians, who went to the private sector and decreasing 
the economic status of Transjordanians. 
 
7.4.2 Democratic concepts 
 
Importance of national issues 
The country of origin factor does not have any significant relation to a set of 
issues that political parties should consider in their platform. These issues are: 
Islamic issues, Arab national issues, economic issues, social issues. The only 
exception was national issues; Palestinian Jordanians tend to rank the 
importance of national issues more than Transjordanians (see Table 37). The 
results here are very important. The issue of Palestinian Jordanian loyalty to 
Jordan is questioned directly by Transjordanian exclusivists and indirectly by 
the state’s discriminative policies. However, the results show the opposite. One 
of the reasons behind this could be that Palestinian Jordanian students need to 
prove or to express their nationalism more than Transjordanians since it is under 
question. Another reason could be that Palestinian Jordanians might feel 
gratitude towards the country that received them and offered them benefits that 
they would not have in other Arab countries. Nevertheless, the percentage of 
Palestinian Jordanians who ranked national issues as the least important is much 
higher than that of Transjordanians. This indicates that a relatively small group 
among Palestinian Jordanians is more concerned about Islamic issues, Arab 
issues, economic issues or social development than national issues. The results 
are in line with Abu-Odeh’s (1999, 216) argument which suggests that there is a 
sense among Palestinian Jordanians that their situation in Jordan was temporary 
rather than permanent. However, the results support more a sense among 
Palestinian Jordanians that they are Jordanians. 
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Equality 
An important question about the country of origin is the degree to which 
students agree that the interest of Transjordanian citizens should come ahead 
the interest of other Jordanian citizens. Almost one quarter of the students agree 
absolutely, the majority of the students 65.3% agree in different degrees and 
34.7% of the students do not agree at all (see Table 39). 
 
 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Absolutely 105 24.5 
To a Large Extent 57 13.3 
Somewhat 74 17.2 
To a Small Extent 44 10.3 
not at all 149 34.7 
Total 429 100.0 
Missing System 35  
Total 464  
 
 
The answers here demonstrate how the majority of students do not consider the 
Jordanian citizenship of non-Transjordanians as equal to that of Transjordanians. 
In relation to the country of origin factor, Transjordanian students appear to 
have much stronger discriminative attitudes than Palestinian Jordanians as 
Table 40 shows. Though the majority of Palestinian Jordanian students (51.8%) 
do not agree at all, the rest of Palestinian Jordanian students agree to varying 
degrees. The results here are very important as they affirm that discrimination 
against Palestinian Jordanians has, to a large degree, turned into an acceptable 
cultural practice (Ryan, 2002, 127-128; Massad, 2001, 266). Moreover, they 
demonstrate how this culture is accepted among many Palestinian Jordanians 
who are subject to the discrimination. Such a culture undermines 
democratization significantly since it makes the insulation of a large group of 
citizens from public politics not only possible or actual but also acceptable. In 
addition, the results show that Transjoranians and Palestinian Jordanians’ 
conceptualization of citizenship is different. 
A very important point about the analyses here is that the social class factor 
does not seem to have any relation to students’ attitudes. In fact, according to 
the data, the social class factor does not have any relation to any question related 
to the country of origin factor. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
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economic relations between the state, Transjordanians and Palestinian 
Jordanians did not sustain discriminative attitudes. A more comfortable 
understanding would be that the combination of economic, politics and social 
factors created a culture of discrimination among all social classes. In other 
words, the social chasm which is based on the country of origin factor is strong 
to the point that it seems to cross all social classes. 
 
 
 The interest of Transjordanian citizens should come 
ahead the interest of other Jordanian citizens 
Total Absolutely 
To a Large 
Extent Somewhat 
To a Small 
Extent 
not at 
all 
Country 
of 
Origin 
Transjordanian 90 37 46 25 65 263 
34.2% 14.1% 17.5% 9.5% 24.7% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanian  
12 18 23 15 73 141 
8.5% 12.8% 16.3% 10.6% 51.8% 100.0% 
Total 102 55 69 40 138 404 
25.2% 13.6% 17.1% 9.9% 34.2% 100.0% 
 = 44.013; d.f. = 4; p = .000 
 
 
7.4.3 Democratic institutions 
 
Political parties 
The analyses show that four factors which prevent students from joining a 
political party are related to the country of origin. Palestinian Jordanian students 
tend to agree more than Transjordanian students that they will not join a 
political party which is controlled by tribes. The results here show that tribes 
have a more important political role among Transjordanian students than 
among Palestinian Jordanians (see table 41). As argued in this and the next 
chapter, the state’s policies led to increase the political role of Transjordanian 
tribes. Yet, these policies did not increase the same role for Palestinian tribes. 
The importance of this result is that it assures the argument in the next chapter 
that the state policies rather than the nature of tribes play the most significant 
incentive in increasing or decreasing the political role of tribes. 
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 Not joining a political party which is controlled by 
tribes 
Total Absolutely 
To a Large 
Extent Somewhat 
To a Small 
Extent 
not at 
all 
Country 
of 
Origin 
Transjordanian 33 45 62 53 72 265 
12.5% 17.0% 23.4% 20.0% 27.2% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanians 
35 26 22 26 36 145 
24.1% 17.9% 15.2% 17.9% 24.8% 100.0% 
Total 68 71 84 79 108 410 
16.6% 17.3% 20.5% 19.3% 26.3% 100.0% 
 = 11.262; d.f. = 4; p = .024 
 
 
Palestinian Jordanian students tend to agree less than Transjordanian students 
that they will not join a weak political party (see Table 42), a party which is 
controlled by Islamists, or a party which opposes the government (see Table 43). 
The weak channels of political representation for Palestinian Jordanians seem to 
increase their support for weak political parties. By contrast, Transjordanians 
who are dominating public institutions and the political sphere to a large extent 
would be less likely to accept representation via weak channels. As for 
supporting Islamists’ parties, chapter four examined the relation between 
Palestinian Jordanians and Islamists and argued that Transjordanians are 
usually members of Jordanian tribes. These tribes participate in public politics 
through a tribal framework. Palestinian Jordanians, on the other hand, are more 
marginalized politically and the Islamic Action Front party as the major 
opposition party in Jordan is the chief place in which Palestinian Jordanians can 
express their political demands. These results are compatible with Abu Rumman 
(2003) analysis of the role of Jordanian tribes in parliamentary elections. The 
third trend among Palestinian Jordanians here - being more eager to join a 
political party which opposes the government - can indicate that Palestinian 
Jordanians tend to support opposing the government more than Transjordanians. 
However, the analysis of the relationship between the state and Palestinian 
Jordanians in the previous section clarified that the state’s policies pacified the 
Palestinian Jordanian political opposition. In addition, the analysis of all other 
questions shows that Transjordanian tribal students tend to oppose the 
government more than other students. These notes indicate that the trend here is 
not related to opposition as much as it is related to political party opposition. 
The political opposition of Transjordanians is not based on political parties but 
rather on tribes. Moreover, Transjordanian tribes were utilized by the regime to 
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encounter political parties which oppose it79. As for many Palestinian Jordanians, 
political opposition is related largely to political parties or movements (Abu 
Rumman, 2003). Hence, Palestinian Jordanians tend to be less reluctant to join a 
political party which opposes the government. 
 
 
 
 Not joining a weak political party 
Total Absolutely 
To a 
Large 
Extent Somewhat 
To a 
Small 
Extent 
not at 
all 
Country of 
Origin 
Transjordanian 94 70 62 29 21 276 
34.1% 25.4% 22.5% 10.5% 7.6% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanian  
28 42 35 22 17 144 
19.4% 29.2% 24.3% 15.3% 11.8% 100.0% 
Total 122 112 97 51 38 420 
29.0% 26.7% 23.1% 12.1% 9.0% 100.0% 
 = 11.225; d.f. = 4; p = .024 
 
 
 The political party opposes the government 
policies 
Total Absolutely 
To a Large 
Extent Somewhat 
To a Small 
Extent 
not at 
all 
Country 
of 
Origin 
Transjordanian 67 51 73 40 32 263 
25.5% 19.4% 27.8% 15.2% 12.2% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanians 
27 20 44 21 32 144 
18.8% 13.9% 30.6% 14.6% 22.2% 100.0% 
Total 94 71 117 61 64 407 
23.1% 17.4% 28.7% 15.0% 15.7% 100.0% 
 = 9.698; d.f. = 4; p = .046 
 
 
                                                     
79 More about tribes’ role in encountering political opposition is presented in the next chapter. 
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7.4.4 Democratic practice in Jordan 
 
Bases for voting 
The relation between democratic practices and the country of origin factor 
appears in eight questions. Some of these questions reaffirm previous findings 
related to the country of origin, tribes and attitudes towards criticizing the 
government. For instance, Transjordanian students tend to consider electing a 
candidate based on his tribe or based on his country of origin more than 
Palestinian Jordanian students (See Tables 44 and 45). These results affirm that 
in the political sphere tribes are more important among Transjordanian students 
than among Palestinian Jordanian students Abu Rumman (2003). Moreover, the 
results affirm that the consideration of the country of origin in the political 
sphere is more present among Transjordanian students than among Palestinian 
Jordanian students. 
 
 
 
 Choosing a candidate based on his tribe 
Total 
Very 
important Important Average Weak 
No 
role 
The Country of 
Origin 
Transjordanian 103 75 55 19 21 273 
37.7% 27.5% 20.1% 7.0% 7.7% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanian 
18 28 42 27 30 145 
12.4% 19.3% 29.0% 18.6% 20.7% 100.0% 
Total 121 103 97 46 51 418 
28.9% 24.6% 23.2% 11.0% 12.2% 100.0% 
 = 51.513; d.f. = 4; p = .000 
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 Choosing a candidate based on his country 
of origin 
Total 
Very 
important Important Average Weak 
No 
role 
The Country of 
Origin 
Transjordanian 114 37 41 27 52 271 
42.1% 13.7% 15.1% 10.0% 19.2% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanian 
18 20 30 24 52 144 
12.5% 13.9% 20.8% 16.7% 36.1% 100.0% 
Total 132 57 71 51 104 415 
31.8% 13.7% 17.1% 12.3% 25.1% 100.0% 
 = 41.821; d.f. = 4; p = .000 
 
 
The government, opposition and democratic practices 
Palestinian Jordanian students tend to agree less that the democratic practice in 
Jordan is good (see Table 46). In addition, they more strongly support allowing 
demonstrations by merely notifying the government. Transjordanians on the 
other hand give more support to allowing demonstrations that the government 
permits (see table 47). However, these attitudes towards democratic practices in 
Jordan do not increase the political opposition of Palestinian Jordanian students 
towards the government. For instance, when students were asked if they would 
participate in a demonstration against the government, the analysis did not 
show any relationship between the answer and the country of origin. Moreover, 
Palestinian Jordanians tend to agree more than Transjordanians that officials are 
serious about democratic reform (see table 48). 
 
 Democratic practice in Jordan 
Total Excellent Very good Good Bad Very bad 
Country 
of Origin 
Transjordanian 25 86 111 27 19 268 
9.3% 32.1% 41.4% 10.1% 7.1% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanians 
14 36 59 31 5 145 
9.7% 24.8% 40.7% 21.4% 3.4% 100.0% 
Total 39 122 170 58 24 413 
9.4% 29.5% 41.2% 14.0% 5.8% 100.0% 
 = 12.412; d.f. = 4; p = .015 
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 When talking about peaceful demonstrations, it is an 
obligation 
Total 
Prevent all 
peaceful 
demonstrations 
Allow all 
peaceful 
demonstrations 
merely by 
notifying the 
government 
without any 
restrictions 
Allow only 
peaceful 
demonstrations 
that are 
permitted by 
the 
government 
Something 
else 
The 
Country 
of 
Origin 
Transjordanian 17 123 111 22 273 
6.2% 45.1% 40.7% 8.1% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanian 
6 94 40 8 148 
4.1% 63.5% 27.0% 5.4% 100.0% 
Total 23 217 151 30 421 
5.5% 51.5% 35.9% 7.1% 100.0% 
 = 13.094; d.f. = 3; p = .004 
 
 
 Officials are serious about democratic reform  
Total 
not at 
all 
To a 
Small 
Extent Somewhat 
To a 
Large 
Extent Absolutely 
The Country 
of Origin 
Transjordanian 12 19 62 79 106 278 
4.3% 6.8% 22.3% 28.4% 38.1% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanian 
10 20 28 53 37 148 
6.8% 13.5% 18.9% 35.8% 25.0% 100.0% 
Total 22 39 90 132 143 426 
5.2% 9.2% 21.1% 31.0% 33.6% 100.0% 
 = 13.007; d.f. = 4; p = .011 
 
 
The results suggests that Palestinian Jordanian students support political 
opposition and they are not satisfied with democratic practices in Jordan. 
However, they tend to avoid political confrontation with officials. These results 
 
  171 
 
are in line with Aljohari (2004), Abu-Odeh (1999), Massad (2001) arguments 
about the political position of Palestinian Jordanians. The insulation of 
Palestinian Jordanians from public politics and the discriminative policies 
towards them result in lower satisfaction with the political practice. However, 
the historical confrontation between the regime and Palestinian guerrillas 
impedes Palestinian Jordanians from being open about their political opposition. 
 
Elections 
The weak political practice of Palestinian Jordanians appears as expected in 
elections. Palestinian Jordanians tend to participate in parliamentary elections 
and in Students’ Unions elections less than Transjordanians (see table 49). This 
affirms Aljohari (2004) analysis of the demographic influence on parliamentary 
elections in Jordan. 
 
  Participation in Students’ 
Unions elections* 
Participation in 
parliamentary elections** 
Yes No Yes No 
Country of 
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 When talking about peaceful demonstrations, it is an 
obligation 
Total 
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The results suggests that Palestinian Jordanian students support political 
opposition and they are not satisfied with democratic practices in Jordan. 
However, they tend to avoid political confrontation with officials. These results 
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7.5.1 Pro-democratic attitudes 
Palestinian Jordanian students tend to have more pro-democratic attitudes 
towards democratic concepts, institutions and practices than Transjordanian 
students. For instance, they support more some aspects of freedom of expression, 
support more forms of equality between citizens, support more democratic 
political opposition parties and support more democratic practices. These pro-
democratic attitudes can be understood through the state policies, which have 
been increasing the insulation of Palestinian Jordanians from public politics 
directly; through political appointments and laws (for example, electoral law) 
and indirectly; through increasing the role of Transjordanian tribes in state 
institutions. These policies have been indirectly pushing Palestinian Jordanians 
to adopt pro-democratic attitudes that can be used to decrease their insulation 
from public politics. 
The state policies led to the creation of two economic segments related not to 
the social class but to the country of origin. The domination of Palestinian 
Jordanians over the private sector and the domination of Transjordanians over 
the public sector accompanied with the state privatization policies and the 
decline of state welfare increased the division of the two segments. Eventually, 
because of the state policies, the size of the low class among Transjordanians 
increased more than among Palestinian Jordanians. This situation might have 
sustained the spread of less democratic attitudes related to citizenship and 
equality among Transjordanians. 
 
7.5.2 Stronger political opposition 
There is stronger political opposition trend among Palestinian Jordanian 
students than among Transjordanian students in an abstract level or in the 
practical level. The political opposition among Palestinian Jordanians appears in 
their stronger support for Islamists or political parties that oppose the 
government. Yet, it does not appear in a direct confrontation between 
Palestinian Jordanians and the government. The insulation of Palestinian 
Jordanians from public politics seems to increase the support of political 
opposition among Palestinian Jordanian students. Transjordanians are not only 
more integrated in public politics but are also in many cases, through 
Transjordanian tribes, used by the state to oppress political opposition - for 
example, Palestinian guerrillas, socialist and Arab nationalists’ parties. This 
assists in understating the lower support for political opposition in 
Transjordanian students’ attitudes. However, as the study clarifies next, this is 
reversed among Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians when the political 
opposition is directly confronting the government. 
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7.5.3 Low profile in the public political sphere 
This trend appears among Palestinian Jordanian students in their weak 
participation in parliamentary elections and in Student Union elections. 
Palestinian Jordanians also tend to agree that officials are serious about applying 
democratic reform. This trend supports the previous discussion about the 
insulation of Palestinian Jordanians from public politics. This result here is 
interesting, especially when we read it in relation to previously identified trends. 
It affirms that increasing the support of democratic values and increasing the 
political dissatisfaction does not necessarily result in more democratic 
participation or in higher levels of criticizing the government. The unfair 
electoral law, the rise of the Palestinian identity, the exclusion from public 
institutions and the displaced and refugee status did not only insulate 
Palestinian Jordanians from public politics but also led Palestinian Jordanian 
students to act in conformity with this insulation. 
Transjordanian students are less supportive of political opposition groups. 
However, they participate more in the political sphere through elections and 
they tend to be less supportive of the government when no other group is 
involved. The next chapter demonstrates through discussing the relationship 
between state and autonomous power groups, namely tribes, how the insulation 
of Palestinian Jordanians from public politics sustained the decreasing 
autonomy of Jordanian tribes to act outside public politics.
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8 State, Tribes and 
University Students’ 
Attitudes 
This chapter analyzes the relationship between state and autonomous power 
groups in Jordan, namely tribes, and how this affects democratization. This 
entails examining the extent to which the state has been managing or willing to 
insulate tribes from operating autonomously in public politics. Based on Tilly’s 
(2007) theory, the more the state insulates power groups from operating 
autonomously in public politics, the more the country moves towards 
democracy and vice versa. This chapter argues that the state managed to 
decrease the autonomy of tribes to operate outside public politics at the national 
level. However, this process along with other national, regional and 
international factors increased the autonomy of tribes to operate outside public 
politics within state institutions through cajoling or mediation practices. 
Additioally, this chapter argues that tribes in Jordan should not be seen as one 
group and they should not be considered as merely supporters of the state. 
Different tribes through different periods have had complex and 
multidimensional relations with the state. Further, the state’s policies 
reconstructed many tribal values and polarized opinions, not only between 
tribes but also within them. In these processes, democracy has been increasing 
and decreasing, yet, in different dimensions. 
In another dimension, this chapter argues that the state’s relations with tribes 
affected the integration of other power groups into public politics and limited 
their role as political actors. In some cases this resulted in increasing 
democratization and in others it resulted in increasing de-democratization. 
In the frame of the relationship between the Jordanian state and tribes, this 
chapter analyzes students’ attitudes towards democratic concepts, institutions 
and practices and examines how that relationship affects their attitudes. In this 
chapter, attitudes are examined through questions related to tribes and the 
questions related to the tribal factor. The ‘tribal factor’, means the extent to 
which students support tribes to operate autonomously in public politics. 
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8.1 TRIBES IN JORDAN 
 
The relationship between the state and tribes molds in different shapes and 
varies from one time to another and from one country to another. Yet, before 
examining the position of tribes as an autonomous power group in Jordan, it is 
important to note that scholars do not agree on a single definition of ‘tribe’. As 
ideal types, tribes “represent large kin groups organized and regulated 
according to ties of blood and family lineage” (Khoury and Kostiner, 1990, 4). 
Albert Hourani (1990, 304) suggests that the relations within these groups are 
sometimes based on a “myth of common ancestors, sometimes expressed in the 
tribal name” rather than an actual kinship - and even this myth may not exist in 
some tribes. In the Jordanian context, tribes owe their solidarity to more complex 
loyalties than actual or mythical kinship. The loyalties, as this chapter 
demonstrates, are based on economic interests and power relations besides 
actual or mythical kinship. Another important note about the ideal typology of 
tribes is that it fails to “consider that tribes could exist in different ecological 
systems, that some could be nomadic and others sedentarized” (Khoury and 
Kostiner 1990, 5). In the Jordanian context, tribes transformed largely through 
the nation-building process and various international and Arab projects from 
being nomadic to sedentarized (Bocco, 2006, 304-305). Bearing these notes in 
mind, this study adopts Alon’s (2009, 8) definition of tribes in the Middle East as 
“a group of people distinguished from other groups by notions of shared 
descent, whether real or imagined”. 
 
8.1.1 Tribes and the Jordanian State 
Among Arab states, Jordan serves as a unique example of relations between the 
state and tribes. This uniqueness is characterized by integrating tribes within 
state institutions and granting them an advantage over other power groups, yet 
without allowing any of them to have an upper-hand over other tribes or being 
able to bridle their power in state institutions. Thus the common state-tribes 
dichotomy is not an actual one; Jordanian tribes are integrated within state 
institutions and they form a large part of the state, rather than functioning 
completely outside its borders. In this regard, Yoav Alon (2009, 9) borrows from 
Sami Zubaida the concept ‘political field’ and argues that the Jordanian state 
should not be “treated as a political actor, but rather as a framework within 
which a political struggle for influence and resources take place”. This view does 
not recognize the Jordanian state as a powerful actor that dominates and 
manipulates the political struggle which is taking place within it. Rather, this 
view considers the Jordanian state as a neutral framework within which the 
political struggle follows certain rules. This understanding of the state could be 
suitable for highly developed democratic countries where political struggle 
takes place without being manipulated to support one party over the other. The 
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understanding might also be suitable for weak countries where the central 
government does not exist or the law is not effective. However, this 
understanding is not suitable for undemocratic countries or even semi-
democratic ones where the regime is still the major political actor in the political 
struggle. In the Jordanian case, Alon (2009) suggests, does not pay enough 
attention to the role of the Royal Court and the secret agency (almukhabarat) in 
supporting or manufacturing some tribe leaders, weakening political parties, 
manipulating religious groups and heavily designing public policies. 
Opposite to Alon’s (2009) understanding of the Jordanian state, Joseph 
Massad (2001) argues that British colonial power and state institutions, namely 
military and law, created the Jordanian identity by adopting, refining and 
redefining the Bedouin culture. According to Massad (2001), coercive means 
were used to a large extent by the British colonial power and the Jordanian 
regime to create the Jordanian identity. Bedouins were recruited in the army; 
however, they were not conferred the same civil rights as other male citizens 
until the early 1970s (Massad, 2001, 60).  In the process of creating the Jordanian 
identity, the government produced and/or braced tribe leaders who supported 
the state (Massad, 2001, 60; Susser, 2000, 93). Massad’s (2001) arguments are 
quite convincing. However, he adds too much weight to the Jordanian state’s 
power and downplays the expansion of the Jordanian tribes’ role in public 
institutions which challenges the state’s law. Many scholars note that the 
relation between British colonial power and the Jordanian regime on one side 
and tribes on the other was not coercive for its most; negotiations and 
corporation with tribes were vital tools in the relation between both parties 
(Bocco, 2006, 313-318; Susser, 2000, 92; Tal, 1997, 103). In such cases the 
consideration of tribes’ desires is invisible. In addition, the Jordanian tribes have 
different interests and traditions -where some tribes object a state policy others 
might favor and defend it. 
Charles Tilly (2007) suggests more useful and less problematic frame to 
understand the relation between state and power groups. In his frame, the state 
is 
 
“an organization that controls the major concentrations of coercive means within a 
substantial territory, exercises priority in some regards over all other 
organizations operating within the same territory, and receives acknowledgment 
of that priority from other organizations, including states, outside the territory” 
(Tilly 2007, 11).  
 
Consequently, the relationship between the state and power groups depends on 
the state’s capacity to exercise priority over power groups; the lower the state’s 
capacity, the more power groups interfere autonomously with public politics. In 
effect, the Jordanian state controls tribes or shares power with them according to 
its capacity. This capacity fluctuates over time due to economic conditions, 
 
  177 
 
domestic conflicts, regional crises and interference from international powers. 
An extreme understanding of Alon (2009) would suggest that the Jordanian 
state’s capacity is extremely weak or that Jordan has an advanced level of 
democracy. This entails that the Jordanian state is extremely weak, barely exists 
or that it has a high capacity. Apparently, the Jordanian state is none of these 
options and Alon (2009) himself does not claim this. An extreme understanding 
of Massad (2001) would suggest that the Jordanian state capacity is extremely 
high. However, the relatively weak economy, domestic conflicts and regional 
crises demonstrate that the Jordanian state’s capacity is not high and Massad 
himself agrees on this. The relationship between the Jordanian state and tribes 
should be perceived as dynamic rather than static and as mutual interest relation 
rather than an intrinsic loyalty of any party towards the other. 
In the following sections, the study examines briefly three historical periods 
to depict the state-tribes power relations; mainly to what extent the state 
managed to insulate tribes’ power from operating autonomously outside public 
politics. These periods are: the establishment period, which ranges from the 
establishment of Transjordan until early 1970s; the transformation period, ranging 
from early 1970s until the democratic reform in 1989; and the parliamentary period 
which started in 1989 and continues to the present. 
 
8.1.2 The establishment period 
During the arrival of King Abdullah I to Transjordan in the early 1920s, 
Transjordanians were divided to three social groups: settled, semi-nomads and 
nomads80. According to the British authorities, the population of Transjordan in 
1929 was 300,000 (Shwadran, 1959, 162) 81  among which 120,000 were semi-
nomads, 50,000 were nomads and 130,000 were settled (Shwadran, 1959, 162; 
Bocco 2006, 313). This large number of unsettled population had been a 
challenge to the King and to the British colonial power which aimed at creating a 
central state and establishing control over the land and population. Many tribes 
refused to recognize the King or to be subject to a central government. For 
instance, in the 1920s some Transjordanian tribe leaders such as Kulaib Shuraidi 
Sultan, in Ajlun district, and Al-‘Udwan, in Balqa district, led revolts against the 
King. Al-Liyathna tribesmen in Wadi Musa rejected the extension of 
governmental control over their area (Glubb, 1948, 60-61). Other Jordanians in 
Karak and Kura protested against the King and refused to pay taxes (Shwadran, 
1959, 147-148). These armed challenges were met and terminated by using force 
of the Arab Legion (Al-Jaysh Al-‘Arabi), the Transjordan Frontier Force and the 
                                                     
80 According to Shwadran (1959, 162), the settled population lived in simple houses, the semi-
nomads lived in tents and cultivated their own land, and the nomads depended on herds for their 
living and bothered very little with cultivation. 
81 The mandatory report one year before that estimated that the population probably fell short of 
250,000 (Shwadran 1959, 162). 
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80 According to Shwadran (1959, 162), the settled population lived in simple houses, the semi-
nomads lived in tents and cultivated their own land, and the nomads depended on herds for their 
living and bothered very little with cultivation. 
81 The mandatory report one year before that estimated that the population probably fell short of 
250,000 (Shwadran 1959, 162). 
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British Royal Air Force (Glubb, 1948, 60-61; Shwadran, 1959, 147-148).Besides the 
riots and armed protests against the state, intertribal raids caused political 
instability and disturbed the security of the emerging state, especially between 
1926 and 1933 (Bocco 2006, 314; Layne 1994, 10; Anderson, 2005, 40).  
The use of force against Transjordanians successfully countered the armed 
riots. However, it was not the chief method to subdue the majority of tribes to 
the state power and to stop the raids. Massad (2001, 59) says that  
 
“the criminalization of the Bedouin lifestyle and the juridically sanctioned 
penalties imposed on Bedouins who resist state-sponsored sedentarization 
policies led to the prevention of Bedouin raiding, and international crossing, and 
to the confiscation of the cattle and herds of resistors—which in conjunction with 
droughts in the late 1920s and early 1930s decimated Bedouin herds—with the 
state providing the Bedouins with alternative economic activity through the 
military mainly, but also through agricultural settlement and wage labor.” 
 
Yet, Massad (2001) fails to recognize that the criminalization of the Bedouin 
raiding lifestyle, the penalties and the confiscation of herds were mostly done 
through negotiation and mutual agreements between the state and the tribes. 
According to Brigadier John Bagot Glubb (1948, 113) who established the Desert 
Patrol Force whose mission was to stop raids and to subjugate tribes to the state 
“in Trans-Jordan raiding, which had been practiced for centuries, was abolished 
in a few months without inflicting a single casualty on the tribes and without 
putting a single tribesman in prison”. Many Transjordanians such as Bani 
Shakhr were supportive for the King (Harris, 1958, 16). Others joined the Arab 
Legion and fought for the emerging state (Layne, 1994, 10; Fieldhouse, 2006, 227). 
According to Glubb (1948, 103)  
 
“although recruiting for the desert patrol had started slowly […] it took us only a 
few weeks to recruit our ninety men. Very soon we had a long waiting list, and the 
sons of many of the leading shaikhs were struggling for admission.” 
 
Recruiting tribesmen in military and public services braced increasing the sense 
of nationalism among tribes, increasing their dependency on the state and 
decreasing their autonomy to operate outside the state’s public policies. 
However, the influence of this economic dependency on subjugating tribes to 
state power should not be overemphasized. The size of the Arab legion, the 
biggest institution to recruit Transjordanians from 1926 until 1939, was around 
1,500 to 1,600 men (Fieldhouse, 2006, 227; Shwadran, 1959, 201). Governmental 
personnel in 1936 stood at 683; of which 422 were native Transjordanians 
(Shwadran, 1959, 186). On many occasions, Transjordanians during the mandate 
were protesting against their low level of representation in public offices. Arabs 
from Palestine, Egypt, Syria and Iraq who had better qualifications than 
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Transjordanians occupied all high administrative positions (Shwadran, 1959, 
186-187; Anderson, 2005, 43, 51, 54). Among eight men who headed eighteen 
cabinets between 1921 and 1946, no one was a Transjordanian (Anderson, 2005, 
53). These tiny numbers of Transjordanians who served in the military and in 
public offices and represented less than one percent of Transjordanians could 
not establish a strong bond between tribesmen and the state. On the contrary, 
they created tension between both parties since the percentage was too small 
and non-Transjordanians were given priority. The Second World War might 
have helped in alleviating this tension: by the end of the war the military section 
of the Arab Legion rose to eight thousand men and the civil police section rose 
to two thousand (Shwadran, 1959, 209).  
The major factors which enabled the state to gain support from 
Transjordanians and establish stability were not the use of force or employment. 
For the most part, the state gained support and established stability by 
providing security, lavishing titles on tribe leaders, offering privileges and tax 
exemptions, and above all providing education, health, transportation and social 
services (Brand, 1998a, 101; Fischbach, 2000, 5; Anderson, 2005, 54). Put simply, 
the regime succeeded because it was useful for Transjordanians. The bond 
between tribes and the state increased and “because of their symbiotic 
relationship with the state, the tribes have declined as autonomous power 
structures” (Bengio and Ben-Dor, 1999, 100). 
In 1926 there were 8,842 students studying in public and private schools; this 
rose to 10,782 in 1933/34 and to 15,211 in 1941/42 (Shwadran, 1959, 181-199). 
Betty Anderson (2005) discusses the role of schools in Jordan in establishing 
national identity among Transjordanians. According to Anderson (2005, 66-67)  
 
“The Hashemite state gradually began to generate a feeling of 
“Transjordanianness” among the students [… who] became part of an “imagined 
community” of Transjordanian travelers […] They traveled from their villages and 
met companions from around the country, from different tribal groupings, and 
from all occupational sectors. The reality of the Hashemite-Jordanian state 
influenced these educational pilgrimages as the students became aware of the 
boundaries of their political lives and the connections among them and their new 
colleagues.” 
 
Creating a collective national identity could bolster creating bridges between 
tribes, and increasing the state’s legitimacy and hence increase democratization. 
Another - and maybe more important - process increased the sense of 
national identity among Transjordanians. Between 1927 and 1952 the state 
initiated a land program which introduced the European concept of 
landownership. Prior to the program, the land was owned collectively by the 
tribe or the village. The program drew village borders, recognized individual 
ownership to land, distributed collectively owned land, improved the state 
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capacity to collect taxes, and established the conceptualization of state owned 
land (Fischbach 2000, 2). Consequently, the state’s capacity to control land and 
people and to collect taxes increased. Michael Fischbach (2000) analyses the 
impact of the land program on increasing the bonds between the state and 
Transjordanians and crystallizing the Jordanian identity. He argues that 
  
“in the first place, these state programs linked the state with society's need to 
secure private individual property rights at the expense of collective village rights 
at a crucial period of time. The state came to occupy a role, alongside the village, 
the family, and the shaykh, as a main arbiter of a peasant's access to land rights” 
(Fischbach, 2000, 3). 
 
By drawing maps and putting borders for land and villages the state was 
reconstructing concepts of space, mobility and belonging, which fit with the 
concept of modern nation state. Equally as important, officially issued, certified 
and/or registered maps, land contracts and tax statements held the name of the 
new state and reinforced the power and the role of the state in reconstructing 
and protecting Transjordanian lives (Fischbach, 2000, 198). 
The land program and the state economic policy supported the merchant 
class, which consisted mainly of Syrians and Palestinians. By introducing land 
individual ownership and regulating the procedures of land registration, 
distribution and ownership, merchants were encouraged to buy land and invest 
in ruler areas (Anderson 2005, 59). By giving usury loans 82 , merchants, 
moneylenders and investors foreclosed and seized lands when peasants failed to 
pay. The state encountered this problem by issuing laws which prevented such 
practice (Fischbach, 2000, 160-165). However, this increased the gap between 
social classes were the poor became poorer and the rich became richer. In this 
context, democracy was increasing through establishing stability, decreasing the 
autonomy of tribes to operate outside the state policies and enforcing law. 
However, democracy was decreasing by extending the gap between social 
classes. Glubb (1959, 173-174) noted: 
 
“There was less inequality in wealth and social position in the old insecure chaotic 
times than there was under the new theoretical “democracy.” The establishment 
of law and order resulted in the rich becoming richer and the poor growing 
poorer… The establishment of public security deprived the farmer of the power to 
threaten the usurer with violence. The town merchant now not only possessed 
money but education and the ear of the authorities.” 
 
Part of the land program aimed at increasing sedentarization among semi-
nomadic and nomadic tribes and transferring them to cultivators. The Land 
                                                     
82 In some cases, interest rates reached thirty to fifty percent (Fischbach, 2000, 160). 
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Code and the Land Settlement Law of 1933 granted no rights to tribes over their 
pastureland. However, the tribes were conceded rights were they cultivated 
lands or had summer camping (Bocco, 2006, 315; Layne, 1994, 52). According to 
the report to the League of Nations (cited by Shwadran, 1959, 180), by the year 
1931 Bani Hasan tribe resided in newly allocated lands and more than 5000 land 
deeds were issued. In the 1950s sedentarization was adopted as official policy by 
Arab countries and was supported by many international organizations such as 
the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization and the International Labour Organization. 
Sedentarization, as international organizations claimed (cited by Bocco, 2006, 
311-312, was going to bring more stable economic conditions to Bedouins by 
integrating their economy in the national trading network. It was going also to 
weaken tribalism and hence increase democracy. Yet, these claimed benefits, as 
Bocco (2006) argues, were not achieved. On the contrary, the economic 
conditions of Bedouins deteriorated and their ability to sustain their livelihood 
decreased. In socio-political terms tribalism was not weakened but rather 
transformed to a political identity (Bocco, 2006, 324). Nonetheless, these results 
do not refute that sedentarization could weaken tribal identities among 
Bedouins. In the case of Jordan, other policies related to Bedouin representation 
in parliament, distribution of land within tribes and Bedouin control laws fed 
the socio-political identity of tribal territories. Moreover, as Layne (1994, 103) 
and Massad (2001, 59) argue the Jordanian state adopted the Bedouin identity as 
an important element of its national identity. Though the Bedouin identity was 
refined and redefined in this process, its value and importance was preserved by 
state institutions and policies. Moreover, the state did not have an absolute 
upper-hand over tribes’ identities and customs, but rather it managed to amend 
some customs and create new ones and forms of loyalty. This appears, for 
example, in the state recognition of tribal law, which had been in force beside 
civil law until the former was abolished by the Jordanian government in 1976. 
The deterioration of Bedouins and peasants economy caused large migration 
to cities. The population of Amman the capital trebled from 20,000 in 1938 to 
60,000 in 1945, and reached 330,000 by 1966. “The annual rate of growth was 
about 9.6 percent between 1952 and 1961” and had been about 6 percent 
between 1962 and 1966 (Jones, 1969, 209). The Nakbah catastrophe in 1948 in 
Palestine contributed partially, but not completely, to this increase. The large 
migration increased unemployment levels in cities. Part of the state’s policies to 
encounter this problem was maintaining relatively large army and expanding its 
bureaucracy (Anderson, 2005, 121). The number of employees in public services 
jumped from six hundred eighty three in 1936 to twenty thousand in 1956 
(Anderson, 2005, 189). Consequently, public institutions became packed with 
tribesmen who brought to these institutions patronage and wasta (mediation) 
values. These values, as some scholars argue, were important to encounter the 
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adversity of the new life style of cities. They were utilized to find jobs, houses 
and spouses (Anderson, 2005, 126). 
During the 1950s, the Jordanian regime had to deal with Arab nationalist and 
leftist opposition which was threatening its stability. The regime depended on 
the army to crush the opposition and consolidate itself. The army had 17,000 to 
20,000 men in 1953 and almost 25,000 in 1956, most of which were Bedouins 
(Massad, 2001, 177). There were also thirty thousand men, mainly from West 
Bank villages, enlisted in the latterly assembled National Guard (Massad, 2001, 
177). In 1957, when units from the National Guard attempted a coup in Zarqa, 
Bedouin soldiers stood beside King Husain and scotched the coup (Rousseau, 
2005, 188; Kostiner, 2000, 94; Massad, 2001, 194). The King utilized this incident 
to expand his power by banning political parties and disbanding the parliament 
(Ryan, 2002, 8).  As for Bedouins, their chances to inter the political sphere 
increased with the amendments of the electoral law in 1960. Before these 
amendments, Bedouins did not elect their representatives; “instead, a Bedouin 
committee appointed by the King would elect two deputies who represented the 
nomadic part of the population” (Dieterich, 2001, 144). 
The loyalty of Bedouin tribes came from the preferences they had in the army 
and from the largesse they had received from the regime. This loyalty was most 
important and highly rewarded during and after the regime conflict with 
Palestinian guerrillas in 1970 and the summer of 1971 during the civil war 
(Massad, 2001, 66). 
Thus far, the study argues that the state and the colonial power managed to 
eliminate the tribe’s power as an independent power from the state. In addition, 
they established Jordan as an independent state and created a Jordanian national 
identity. These processes were increasing democratization. Apparently, without 
a state and with domestic conflicts democracy would be in an extremely weak 
position. Nonetheless, these accomplishments were accompanied with other 
processes that impeded democratization. State institutions became packed with 
employees who deliver services through patronage relations; neglecting the 
state’s public policies. Hereby, democratization was increasing at a national level 
and it was at the same time decreasing at an institutional level. Moreover, the 
colonial power - which had been playing a vital role in increasing the state’s 
capacity and in consolidating its regime - had been impeding the development 
of democratic institutions and practices and decreased political participation. 
Though it is possible to argue that the political opposition in Jordan consisted 
mainly of Arab Nationalists and leftists who did not believe in democracy as an 
ideology but as a tool to gain power, the colonial power and the regime did not 
try to develop democratic culture in the emerging country. The Anglo-
Transjordanian Agreement and the Organic Law, which was acting as the first 
constitution in 1928 granted the colonial power and the King an absolute power 
(Shwadran, 1959, 167-175). Consequently, increasing the state’s capacity and 
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decreasing the inclusion of political opposition in public politics created another 
sturdy obstacle for the future of democratization. 
 
8.1.3 The transformation period 
The social and political role of Bedouin tribes started to grow more during the 
militant conflict between the Jordanian state and Palestinian guerrillas in 1970-
1971. The conflict, which resulted in terminating the existence of Palestinian 
guerrillas in Jordan, increased the state dependency on tribesmen and hence 
increased their autonomous power to operate outside public politics. This was a 
result of different policies and actions that the state applied during the conflict. 
For instance, on January 2nd, 1970 the state issued an ordinance calling for the 
organization of a popular army. The army implicitly consisted of 
Transjordanians who were mostly from rural areas replacing the popular 
resistance, which consisted of Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians. The 
number of forces reached 45,000 and its duty was to keep order in towns during 
the conflict (Musa, 1996, 353). Yazid Sayigh (cited by Massad, 2001, 240-241) 
estimates that Palestinian soldiers constituted 45 percent of the Jordanian army 
in mid-sixties and this declined notably after the conflict in early seventies. By 
mid-1980s, according to Sayigh (cited by Massad, 2001, 241) the percentage of 
Palestinian Jordanians was fewer than 25 percent83. Contrary to this view, Satloff 
(1986a, 63) claims that from 1971 to 1986 the numbers of Palestinian Jordanians 
had grown significantly in the army. However, Satloff does not support his 
claim with any solid evidence84. 
The political and social position of tribes was also expanded through holding 
many tribal conventions during the conflict. According to Musa (1996, 368) the 
purpose of these conventions was to support the King and his government and 
to make it clear that tribes have a role to play in the political and public sphere. 
Indeed, these conferences played an extensive role in mobilizing and unifying 
the public opinion of tribes85. They also pressured the state and/or were utilized 
by the state to increase the presence of Transjordanians in public offices. For 
instance, at the Abu Rummaneh (a village in north Amman) convention where 
two hundred tribes chiefs and notables met, the participants asked the King “to 
strike with an iron fist” those who defy security and order (Musa, 1996, 369; 
Massad, 2001, 243). According to Massad (2001, 243), the king responded to the 
convention on February 23 by “announcing the promotion of fifty secret agency 
(Mukhabarat) officers, of mostly Bedouin backgrounds”. 
                                                     
83 There are other estimations for the numbers of Palestinian soldiers in the Jordanian army; Massad 
(2001) suggests that the percentages here are the most accurate. 
84 Both opinions about the numbers of Palestinian Jordanians in the army do not rely on any official 
statistics. However, it is hard to accept Satloff’s (1986a) claim especially when it is put in the frame of 
the early 1970s conflict. 
85 It is important to note that some tribesmen and some military officers joined Palestinian guerrillas 
against the state.  
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decreasing the inclusion of political opposition in public politics created another 
sturdy obstacle for the future of democratization. 
 
8.1.3 The transformation period 
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83 There are other estimations for the numbers of Palestinian soldiers in the Jordanian army; Massad 
(2001) suggests that the percentages here are the most accurate. 
84 Both opinions about the numbers of Palestinian Jordanians in the army do not rely on any official 
statistics. However, it is hard to accept Satloff’s (1986a) claim especially when it is put in the frame of 
the early 1970s conflict. 
85 It is important to note that some tribesmen and some military officers joined Palestinian guerrillas 
against the state.  
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In this context it is important to note that tribesmen who were recruited by 
the state were not completely obedient to the state. In some occasions during the 
conflict tribesmen ignored and defied the orders of the king himself (Musa, 1996, 
329, 331, 353). The high tension between the army and Palestinian guerillas 
accompanied with the provocative actions from the guerillas, the increase 
dependency on tribes and Bedouins and the amplification of their role led to 
such results. However, those objections were limited and did not challenge in 
anyway the legitimacy of the regime. 
On September 7th, 1971, the king announced the establishment of a political 
organization called ‘National Union’ which aimed to include all Jordanians. In 
his article about the union, Hani Horani (1972, 54-55) notes that the National 
Union fabric held in its structure the features of the conflict which divided the 
society into two regional banks Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians and 
protruded a new “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” inside state and army. This new 
bourgeoisie class, which consisted of Transjordanians and the military-tribal 
alliance that the regime had rested on during the crisis, replaced or minimized 
the former merchant bourgeoisie which consisted mainly of Syrians and 
Palestinians (Horani, 1972, 54-55). In July 1971, the Council of Tribal Leaders was 
established by royal decree. The official purpose of the council was to implement 
agricultural, health, educational and development projects among Bedouins, 
improve their livelihood, encourage their settlement and increase their 
contribution to development of the country (Massad, 2001, 61).  
According to Massad (2001, 61) the state wanted to unify Transjordanians 
“under one national identity after the challenge that the 1970 Civil War 
constituted to the country”. This was clear in the statute that was issued by the 
council in 1973, wherein all tribes in the country would be governed by the same 
law and all their traditions would be nationally unified (Al‘abbadi, 1988, 61-64). 
These policies were important to limit the growing power of tribes and to keep 
them under the state’s authority. 
The outcome of the civil war – the victory of the state - increased the state’s 
capacity but also increased its dependency on tribes, increased the integration of 
tribes into public politics and increased their employment in public institutions. 
At the same time, it decreased the integration of Palestinian Jordanians in public 
politics and increased fragmentation in Jordanian society. The Jordanian labor 
immigration to Gulf countries in the 1970s and 1980s contributed to decreasing 
tensions between Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians. Palestinian 
Jordanians who were better educated formed the majority of immigrants. Hence, 
the state’s policies did not result in a socio-economic clash people (Sayiegh, 1997, 
34). Yet, the immigration of Palestinian Jordanians sustained and increased even 
more the employment of Transjordanians in public positions. 
In 1976, the government abolished all tribal laws including the Tribal Court 
Laws and the Law for Supervising the Bedouins (Massad, 2001, 63; Layne, 1994, 
17; Satloff, 1986a, 67). These laws were applied to solve problems between 
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Bedouins. By abolishing tribal laws, Bedouins became subject to civil law and 
hence the abolishment increased the state’s legal capacity and decreased the 
legal and social power of tribe leaders. In this regard, the state’s policy could 
have been heading towards democracy by increasing its capacity and by 
decreasing the autonomy of tribes to operate outside public politics. In addition, 
abolishing tribal laws helped in unifying Jordanians and decreasing the gap 
between Bedouins and Hadari Transjordanians and between Jordanian tribes and 
Palestinian Jordanians. However, in practice the tribal law is still functional. This, 
as the thesis discusses later, is considered by some writers in Jordanian 
newspapers an impediment to democracy. 
The decision to abolish tribal laws was followed by protests of tribe leaders. 
This was not the first conflict between tribesmen and the state after the civil war; 
in 1974, a small military mutiny caused by economic pressures occurred in 
Zarqa among Bedouin members (Massad, 2001, 66). In both cases the King 
intervened to calm down the protestors. Yet, the protests of 1976 continued to 
simmer until they exploded in 1979 with demonstrations by tribal leaders and 
former Bedouin army officers against the economic policies of Prime Minister 
Mudar Badran’s government. The tribal dissatisfaction escalated in July 1983 
into direct confrontation between the Badran government and the Bani Hasan 
tribe in the north of the country. Members of the tribe clashed with security 
agents preventing them from fencing in some tribal land. Dozens of the Bani 
Hasan Tribesmen were arrested and later imprisoned (Satloff, 1986a, 66). These 
conflicts between the government and the tribes were not as much common 
before the civil war. Hence, they reflect the growing opposition role of tribes in 
the public sphere. Nonetheless, the troubles were for most caused by economic 
dissatisfaction rather than political or ideological disagreements. Moreover, the 
opposition was targeting the government but not the monarchy or the regime. 
The relationship between the state and tribes in Jordan became a heated 
subject in national newspapers during the 1984 by-elections. Many writers from 
different back grounds such as Zayd Al-Rifa‘i (a former prime minster and 
senator), Marwan Mu‘ashsher (a former minister and senator) criticized the 
position of tribes in state institutions. In general the criticism revolved on the 
following points: criticizing tribalism as an irrational operative criterion to elect 
candidates; criticizing the impact of tribalism on state administration and the 
role of wasta instead of individual merits; criticizing the continuity of applying 
the tribal law though it was abolished legally; criticizing the tribal identity as 
opposite to the national identity; and criticizing cultural tribal practices which 
are incompatible with the modern state concept (Layne, 1994, 97-101; Massad, 
2001, 68-70; Satloff, 1986a, 67-68). A segment of the Jordanian intelligentsia was 
concerned that candidates were using their tribal background rather than their 
individual meritocracy in their electoral campaigns (Metz, 1991, 85; Layne, 1994, 
99). In her study of the electoral behavior of the tribes’ people of the Jordan 
Valley during the 1984 by-elections, Layne (1994) argues that tribes-peoples’ 
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votes were not based on blind identification with the tribe or the sheikh. A 
multidimensional and individual motivations not necessarily pertaining to 
tribalism were behind voter decisions. In addition, Layne (1994, 101) criticizes 
the view of tribal tradition “as a repository of an ancient and unchanged way of 
life”. The problem with Layne’s (1994) criticism is that she agrees implicitly that 
voting should not be based on irrational choices and if so it is not democratic. 
This view fails to recognize that people’s preferences are for the most part not 
rational. They are based on different ideologies, forms of loyalties, morals, 
interests, etc. (Harik, 2001, 16-17, 32-33). Democracy aims at regulating these 
preferences regardless of their origin rather than transforming them to rational 
or disregarding the irrational ones. In simple words, democracy is the power of 
people not the power of reason. 
Massad (2001, 68) and Layne (1994, 108-109) criticize the arguments which 
suggest that tribal and national identities cannot coexist together. In these 
arguments, the tribal identity should develop to a national one in an 
evolutionary path. Massad (2001, 68) argues that “nationalism and tribalism 
coexisted synchronically in modern Jordan”. However, Massad (2001) and 
Layne (1994) fail to recognize the internal contradiction in their arguments. This 
is to say that they both argue that the Bedouin or the tribal identity in Jordan 
was redefined by state policies and that it is continually changing. Yet they fail 
to recognize that it is because of the change that occurred in the tribal identity 
that Jordan as a modern state came into being. By addressing this contradiction, 
in Massad (2001) and Layne’s (1994) arguments the study does not claim that 
societies should go into a clear path of development in order to become modern 
but rather they should disregard different dimensions of their previous 
identities and adopt new ones. 
In the Jordanian context, the impact of tribalism on state institutions through 
different traditions, such as wasta, stands as an impediment to establishing an 
advanced democratic state. However, this differs from abolishing the tribal law 
legally and/or in practice. In the sphere of debating the relation between tribes 
and the state in Jordan the Upper House of Parliament86 debated and voted87 in 
January 1985 to abolish all remnants of tribal legal practices that had continued 
despite the abolition of tribal laws in 1976 (Layne, 1994, 104; Massad, 2001, 68-
69). Zayd Al-Rifa‘i , Marwan Mu‘ashsher and others saw the tribal law as 
opposite to development and incompatible with the modern state. In 
Mu‘ashsher’s view, “Jordanians cannot be governed by dual, often contradictory 
laws” (cited by Massad 2001, 69-70). From this thesis’ view of democracy and 
democratization, abolishing the tribal law decreases the integration of trust 
networks into the state’s public policies and decreases categorical equality in 
                                                     
86 The Upper House of Parliament is appointed by the King and not elected. 
87 All members of the Upper House of Parliament voted for the abolishment of the tribal law from 
practice, except Hayel Srur. 
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public policies; hence, it decreases democratization. This is to say that instead of 
regulating the tribal law, the state abolished it. Instead of increasing the 
integration of the groups who have the tribal law as their preference into the 
state’s public policies, the state decreased the integration of these groups and 
abolished their preferences. Moreover, instead of granting Bedouin and non-
Bedouin citizens equal rights to be ruled according to their preferences, the state 
imposed the preferences of one group over the other. The state’s policies and the 
calls of abolishing the tribal law from practice as from theory decreased 
democratic equality in public politics. 
Shortly after the debate in the Upper House of Parliament, King Husain 
declared in a letter to the Prime Minister which was published in Jordanian 
newspapers his ultimate support to tribes. He wrote that “whatever harms tribes 
is considered harmful to us. Law will remain closely connected to norms, 
customs, and traditions… Our traditions should be made to preserve the fabric 
of society. Disintegration of tribes is very painful, negative and subversive” 
(cited by Metz 1991, 86). The letter ended the tension favoring tribes and 
criticizing their opponents. In response to the King’s letter, Minister of 
Information Layla Sharaf resigned in protest (Metz, 1991, 86; Massad, 2001, 70; 
Layne, 1994, 104-105; Satloff, 1986a, 68). The resignation gives a clear sign about 
the strong stance of different parties regarding the tribes’ role in the public 
sphere. Nonetheless, the King’s position gave an indirect and mostly unintended 
royal blessing to patronage and wasta practices within state institutions. In 
addition, the King increased the regime’s capacity by promoting himself as the 
defender of tribes and consolidated the state’s patronage relations with tribes. 
Moreover, the King protected the practice of the tribal law without giving it an 
official legal status. This increased the tribes’ power and sheikhs in personal and 
local matters and decreased their power to confront the state at the national level. 
By now, it is possible to recognize that the state in the transformation period 
was supporting tribal identity and promoting it as the Jordanian national 
identity, yet at the same time redefining this identity by establishing laws which 
unified tribes or cancelled laws which pertain to them. In this process, the state 
was increasing the sense of tribalism which resulted in an increase in patronage 
relations within state institutions. At the same time, the state was decreasing 
tribes’ power and independency to operate on a larger – i.e. national - scale. The 
state-tribes patronage relationship in the establishment period was based mostly 
on economic support for the state’s part and political or militant support for the 
tribes’ part. In the transformation period the patronage relationship added to the 
economic support greater independence for tribes in the local and state 
institutional spheres. This independence is utilized to gain not only economic 
benefits but also social and political ones. As for the state, the relationship 
expanded its power to control the national sphere and to limit a branched power 
of tribes or opposition. 
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In 1989, revolts started in Ma‘an (a city in the southern part of Jordan) and 
spread to Tafiyleh and Karak. The revolts were mainly driven by serious 
economic crisis and fueled by the way the government handled the crisis. The 
revolts combined with the crisis shuddered the state’s capacity and pushed it to 
apply political reforms. In the same year, the government resigned and the new 
government called for parliamentary elections, thereby establishing a new phase 
in the modern history of Jordan. 
 
8.1.4 The parliamentary period 
This period started with the parliamentary elections which were held in 1989. 
Tribalism was not strongly present in these compared to following elections. 
Islamists who gained thirty-two seats out of eighty had greater presence than 
any other parliamentary bloc. Leftists and nationalists gained thirteen seats. 
Candidates of traditional current (tayyar) gained thirty-five seats. The traditional 
current included former ministers and officials, retired military officers, 
businessmen, professionals and tribal and local leaders. Mudar Badran (a former 
prime minister and the Chief of the Royal Court during the elections) suggests 
that the reason behind the victory of Islamists is that voters lost their trust in 
people who work in public offices and they had to choose between 
righteousness (Islamists) and corruption (officials) (cited by Mahafzah, 2001, 
126). 
The second elections took place in 1993. The state’s stance during the first 
Gulf war - before the elections - resulted in political isolation and in cutting the 
financial aid that was coming from Arab countries and the United States. This 
situation amplified the economic crisis in Jordan and the state’s capacity 
declined. In order to come over these challenges, the state started a peace 
process with Israel. Such an action, according to some observers, was going to 
face domestic protests and refusal (Mahafzah, 2001, 283). Thus, the government 
proposed a new electoral law based on ‘Single Non-Transferable Vote’ system. 
The new law was designed to decrease the representation of political opposition 
to the government and increase the presence of traditional supports of the 
regime in the parliament (Mahafzah, 2001, 283; Alda‘jeh, 2005, 151). The law was 
approved with the absence of the parliament which was dissolved by King 
Husain on August 14th 1993 - two weeks before the announcement of the law 
(Mahafzah, 2001, 284). 
 
Tribes and the electoral system in Jordan 
The electoral system in Jordan was designed in a way which increases the 
presence of tribal candidates through Single Non-Transferable Vote system and 
through the distribution of seats for each constituency. At the same time, the 
system increases tensions and competition between candidates who belong to 
the same political group. 
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Voters in the Single Non-Transferable Vote system can cast only one vote 
regardless of the number of seats in their constituency. This practice has many 
consequences, which affects the electoral practice and its results significantly. 
First, the system gives rise to many wasted votes. This is to say that all the votes 
which were given to candidates who lost will be wasted, unlike, for example, 
List Proportional Representation systems where the vote will be transferred to 
other members in the list. Second, there will be no representatives for the voters 
who voted for a losing candidate unlike, for example, Two Round systems 
where the voters can vote again in a second round of elections. Third, it is more 
likely that voters give their votes to the candidate who shares with them the 
strongest personal relation instead of voting for many candidates based on many 
preferences as in Single Transferable Vote system. In the case of Jordan, the 
strongest preference would be a kinship relation. Fourth, candidates of the same 
political party or tribe who belong to the same constituency compete with each 
other to gain the vote of their group. This weakens political parties and creates 
tensions within any tribe who nominates more than one candidate in the same 
constituency or fails to have a full consent on a single nominated candidate88. 
In another dimension, the distribution of seats in each constituency favors 
tribes largely. The number of seats in each constituency was based on the region 
rather than on the number of people or voters who live in the constituency. In 
the previous chapter covering the relationship between state and Palestinian 
Jordanians, the study demonstrated how constituencies with high percentages of 
Transjordanians have more seats in relation to their population than other 
constituencies. The deficits in the distribution of seats increased with the mass 
return of Jordanians (most of them were Palestinian Jordanians) from Gulf States 
after the Gulf War. The population of some constituencies increased 
dramatically but not in others. However, this was not followed by a 
redistribution of the seats to match the changes. For instance, in “Amman's 
second district and the Irbid governorate, the former still elected three persons 
(with a population of 391,849) while Irbid (with a population of 390,685) had 
nine seats in parliament” (Amawi, 1994). In 2003, Alzarqa district had ten seats 
and the number of voting cards holders was 316,328. Karak and Balqa districts 
which have an overwhelming majority Transjordanians had also ten seats each 
and the number of voting cards holders was 102,610 and 170,730 respectively 
(Abu Rumman, 2003). 
The nature of the electoral system in Jordan has a strong impact on the 
political and social position of tribes. The elections in 1993 resulted in a decline 
in the representation of opposition (Islamists, leftists and nationalists) in the new 
parliament and in an increase in the representation of tribesmen and 
traditionalists (Dieterich, 2001, 143; Amawi, 1994). Moreover, the Islamic Action 
Front party (IAF) and other political parties nominated candidates based on 
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In 1989, revolts started in Ma‘an (a city in the southern part of Jordan) and 
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their tribal weight (Amawi, 1994; Alzywd, 2010, 95). Some candidates avoided 
running as party members and chose to ran as tribe candidates (Lust-Okar, 2006 
463). Hereby, the voting system increased the importance of tribalism in the 
political sphere on the expenses of political and ideological platforms. In this 
regard, it is important to note that casting votes on the basis of tribal 
identification do not contradict with democracy. However, decreasing the role of 
other identifications by utilizing policies which favor certain identification over 
the others contradicts with democracy.  
In another dimension, the Single Non-Transferable system, as expected, 
created tensions and conflicts within the same tribe members who were 
competing against each other or supporting one candidate from the tribe over 
another (Amawi, 1994). This became increasingly possible with the continuing 
state policies which altered the social and political culture of tribes and 
decreased the role of sheikhs within the tribes since the British occupation. 
Hereby, the electoral system weakened the political weight of the tribe by 
dividing its members and at the same time increased the importance of less 
collective and more individual tribalism. By so doing, the state was increasing its 
capacity to manipulate the political sphere and decreasing the integration of 
political opposition and tribes as political units in public politics. However, 
increasing the tribal identification of individual candidates and voters increased 
the role of tribalism in providing personal services through cajoling and wasta 
practices. Moreover, by becoming ‘service’ representatives (Barwig, 2012) the 
aptitude of tribal members of parliament to present a united front - which 
demands more democratic political reforms - decreased. In addition, Lust-Okar 
(2006) notes the distribution of discretionary funds to parliamentarians is at the 
government discretion, which pressures them to avoid upsetting the regime 
(Lust-Okar, 2006, 459). Further, many electorates expect from their 
representatives to ‘play by the regime’s rules’ in order to keep access to the state 
(Lust-Okar, 2006, 461).  Hence, what is often thought to be a democratization 
period in Jordan (Alda‘jeh, 2005) was in fact a de-democratization one. Indeed, 
elections in Jordan became a pool of competition over access to state resources. 
Parliamentarians take advantage of the resources within parliament and 
redistribute some of it, as they see, to their constituents (Lust-Okar, 2006, 459). 
When a parliamentarian fails in providing his or her constituent with the 
services they expect he or she risks losing the chance to be reelected (Lust-Okar, 
2006, 460-461). During the 1990’s fewer than 20% of parliamentarians have kept 
their seats (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009, 410).  
In a third dimension, increasing the power of tribes besides increasing the 
tensions between and within tribes through the Single Non-Transferable Vote 
system also intensified the social violence which was based on tribalism and 
decreased the presence and respect of law (Abu Rumman, 2003).  In this context, 
violent conflicts between university students in Jordan started to take place in 
the mid-1990s. These conflicts have tribal grounds such as protecting the honor 
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rather than ideological or political ones (Ahmad, 2012; Al-Badayneh, 2012, 83). 
In some cases, the violent conflicts resulted in casualties among students. In the 
last decade, these conflicts became common at Jordanian universities (Ahmad, 
2012). 
The Single Non-Transferable Vote system led many political parties, 
including the IAF, to boycott the 1997 election. Other political parties nominated 
their candidates as independent candidates in order to gain the support of their 
tribes. This situation further increased the importance of tribalism in the political 
and social spheres. In a representative study of the candidates in 1997 elections, 
Alzywd (2010) argues that tribes adopted democratic methods to choose their 
candidates. Foremost tribes followed the opinion of the majority (without 
elections) or held preliminary elections. Nonetheless, Alzywd (2010) notes that 
the percentage of those who nominated themselves after the consensus of the 
tribes was relatively low. Moreover, many tribes had more than one candidate 
and consequently, the tribal structure started to disintegrate (Alzywd, 2010, 176).  
In 1998, protests took place in number of cities against the United States 
attack on Iraq. In Ma‘an, a city, which is known of strong tribal identities, 
protests turned violent and the state had to deploy the army and to put the city 
under curfew (Massad, 2001, 274). Another clash between the state and Ma‘ani 
people occurred in 2002. The International Crisis Group (an independent 
international organization) suggested that the crisis were driven by the 
deterioration of economic, social and political conditions of the city (ICG, 2003). 
According to Abu Rumman (2003), the incident indicated the increased 
dissatisfaction in the relationship between tribes and the Jordanian state and 
raised questions about new dimensions in the relation between tribes and the 
state and new bases of legitimacy for the regime, especially after increasing the 
role of the private sector by adopting new economic policies which would 
mostly benefit Palestinian Jordanians. 
The next elections took place in 2003, nineteen months after the 
constitutionally-scheduled date (House of Representatives, 2011). Islamists won 
seventeen seats out of 110 (Abu Rumman, 2007, 21) while most of the seats went 
to tribal candidates. According to Abu Rumman’s (2003) observation, Islamists 
nominated candidates based on political choices in constituencies of Palestinian 
Jordanian majority and considered the tribal weight while nominating a 
candidate in constituencies of Jordanian tribal majority; the same strategy that 
emerged in the 1993 elections. 
The 2007 elections brought a noticeable change in the structure of the 
Jordanian parliament by bringing another political bloc to the scene. The 
elections brought many unknown faces of businessmen to the parliament 
through what has been called almal alsiyasi (political money); i.e. buying votes 
(Al-Hayat Center for Civil Society Development, 2007; Al-Rantawi, 2008, 83). Al-
Rantawi (2008, 83) states that buying votes, transferring hundreds or thousands 
of votes from one constituency to another and the governmental support of 
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certain candidates were major reasons behind seeing these new faces. However, 
at the same time, the elections emphasized the tribal identity and the 
polarization and tensions between and within tribes’ members. Following the 
elections, twenty-five members of the parliament supported the government in 
its policy to sell public places (for example, the building of the General 
Command of the Armed Forces) to foreign investors (Almansi, 2008). This was 
part of the excessive privatization policies that the regime adopted. The majority 
of tribal and traditional members opposed the government strongly (Almansi, 
2008). The discussion transformed to a battle in the public sphere between 
neoliberals represented by the chief of the Royal Court Bassem ‘Awad and 
traditionalists represented by the head the secret agency Muhammad Alzahabi 
(Alnajjar). The battle ended by the resignation of ‘Awad (Almansi, 2008). The 
struggle between the government and the Royal Court on one side and the secret 
agency and tribes on the other illustrates partly the political power of tribes in 
Jordan. This power was unified when the regime failed to recognize through its 
policies the economic benefits that tribes should enjoy. 
  
 
8.2 TRIBES AND DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
This chapter examined the relationship between the state and tribes in Jordan in 
the context of increasing or decreasing tribal autonomy to operate in public 
politics. In an early stage of this relationship, the state managed to subjugate 
tribes to the power of a central government and hence the autonomy of tribes to 
operate outside public politics decreased. This democratization process 
increased the state’s capacity and enabled it to counter domestic conflicts. This 
resulted in decreasing the integration of many trust networks in public politics 
such as leftists, socialists and Islamists; i.e. resulted in de-democratization. 
Domestic conflicts reached their peak during the civil war in the early 1970s. 
Depending on tribes to counter Palestinian guerrillas resulted in increasing the 
capacity of the state and decreasing the insulation of tribes and Bedouins from 
public politics. In this process, the state survived and increased democratization. 
However, the autonomous power of tribes to operate outside public politics was 
increasing through patronage relations within state institutions; i.e. de-
democratization. Moreover, the integration of tribes in state institutions resulted 
in increasing the insulation of Palestinian Jordanians from public politics. 
In parliamentary elections, the state decreased the autonomous power of 
tribes to operate outside public politics at the national level by creating 
individual tribal service representatives through the voting system. However, it 
decreased the integration of other trust networks in public politics. Moreover, it 
increased tribal polarization within and between tribes which resulted in an 
increase in social violence, a decrease in the rule of law, a decrease in the state’s 
capacity and an increase in the autonomy of tribes to operate outside public 
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politics at local or institutional levels. Apparently, decreasing the autonomous 
power of tribes to operate outside public politics was accompanied in most cases 
with other de-democratization processes. In the following section, this chapter 
examines the impact of state-tribes relations on students’ attitudes towards 
democracy. 
 
 
8.3 TRIBALISM AND STUDENTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
DEMOCRACY  
 
This section presents and discusses the questions from which the data appears to 
relate to the tribal factor. Tribalism has many dimensions: social, cultural and 
political. Yet, this research is interested mainly in examining tribalism as an 
autonomous source of power which operates outside public politics. Hereby, in 
this study, tribal students are those who tend to accept tribes to solve conflicts 
between citizens instead of the state courts and laws. In order to examine this 
tendency, students were asked the following question: Do you agree on solving 
conflicts between citizens through tribes instead of law and courts? The answer to this 
question indicates how many students support tribes to operate, in one way, as 
an autonomous power outside public politics. Analyzing the relationship 
between the students’ answers to this question and other questions gives an 
indication about the relationship between tribalism and students’ attitudes 
towards democracy. In this regard, tribalism appears to have the highest 
number of relations to the students’ attitudes towards democracy. The answers 
to the question show that 51.7 percent of university students do not agree on 
solving conflicts between citizens through tribes instead of law and courts, 24 
percent agree somewhat and 24.2 percent agree. 
 
8.3.1 Tribalism and other factors 
Crosstabulation analysis shows that there are relations between tribalism and 
three factors: the country of origin (p = .000); attending religious lessons (p = .007); 
and the work of the father (p = .007). There are also relations to the education 
level of the parents and going to the mosque factors. However, further analysis 
shows that these relations are affected by the country of origin factor and hence 
they are not significant. Tribalism appears to be stronger among Transjordanian 
students than among Palestinian Jordanian students (see Table 50). The result 
suggests that tribalism is related to the processes which integrate or insulate 
tribes from public politics. Tribalism is supported more among Transjordanians 
because state policies supported not only the tribal identity as a Jordanian 
identity, but also the social and political power of Jordanian tribes. In the case of 
Palestinian Jordanian tribes, the tribal identity is preserved through the tribal 
identity discourse without a support for their political power to operate outside 
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the state law. These results are in line with Abu Rumman (2003) arguments 
about the role of tribalism in Jordanian elections. 
 
 
 Tribes solving conflicts instead of 
courts and law 
Total Agree 
Somewhat 
agree Disagree 
Country of Origin Transjordanian 84 80 119 283 
29.7% 28.3% 42.0% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanian 
24 25 99 148 
16.2% 16.9% 66.9% 100.0% 
Total 108 105 218 431 
25.1% 24.4% 50.6% 100.0% 
 = 24.052; d.f. = 2; p = .000 
 
 
Students who attend religious lessons once or more a week tend to be more 
tribal than other students. However, adding the country of origin factor to the 
analyses shows that the relation appears only among Transjordanian students 
and not among Palestinian Jordanian students (see Table 51). There are three 
possible explanations for this result. First, religious students - as the study 
demonstrated previously - are more critical towards the state than other 
students hence they need to balance their power against the state by recalling 
and utilizing their tribal capital. Second, both tribalism and religiosity tend to be 
conservative and they share many values. For instance, in the previous chapter 
about Islamists, the study discussed how Islamists and tribesmen foiled the 
government suggested law for so-called honor killing crimes. Third, Islamists 
nominated candidates based on the tribal weight in constituencies of Jordanian 
tribal majority (Abu Rumman, 2003; Amawi, 1994; Haniyeh, 2008). This could 
increase tribalism among Transjordanian Islamists.  
Students whose fathers are either unemployed or work in the public sector 
are more tribal than other students (see Table 52). This result has two important 
implications: first, it indicates how public institutions nurture tribalism. Second, 
it indicates that tribalism plays a role in supporting people who do not have 
financial income (Barakat, 2008, 174-177). Testing the relationship between 
tribalism and the standard of living factor shows that students who have lower 
than average living standards are more tribal than other students. However, the 
Chi-square test shows that the differences are not significant statistically. 
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Transjordanian students 
Clans solving conflicts instead of courts 
and law 
Total Agree 
Somewhat 
agree Disagree 
Attending 
Religious 
Lessons 
Once or more a 
week 
  18 
38.3% 
19 
40.4% 
10 
21.3% 
47 
100.0% 
Once a month 11 
22.4% 
19 
38.8% 
19 
38.8% 
49 
100.0% 
Barely or do 
not go 
51 
28.8% 
42 
23.7% 
84 
47.5% 
177 
100.0% 
Total 80 
29.3% 
80 
29.3% 
113 
41.4% 
273 
100.0% 
 = 13.708; d.f. = 4; p = .008 
 
 
 
 The work of the father 
Total 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Private 
business 
owner Unemployed  Retired 
Tribes solving 
conflicts 
instead of 
courts and 
law 
Agree 22 13 19 15 34 103 
21.4% 12.6% 18.4% 14.6% 33.0% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
11 18 23 7 46 105 
10.5% 17.1% 21.9% 6.7% 43.8% 100.0% 
Disagree 29 43 71 16 69 228 
12.7% 18.9% 31.1% 7.0% 30.3% 100.0% 
Total 62 74 113 38 149 436 
14.2% 17.0% 25.9% 8.7% 34.2% 100.0% 
 = 21.202; d.f. = 8; p = .007 
 
 
8.3.2 Tribalism and democratic concepts 
 
The Collective Identity 
Tribal students tend to say that political parties should consider social 
development in their platforms slightly more than other students (see Table 53). 
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the state law. These results are in line with Abu Rumman (2003) arguments 
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Supporting social development has 260.8 points for tribal students, 255 points 
for somewhat tribal students and 253.3 points among nontribal students. The 
differences appear significant statistically (p = .018).  This result is compatible 
with the impact of the Single Non-Transferable Vote system on the tribal voters’ 
expectations and behavior. The tribal practice in this system is largely based on 
the services that a candidate provides or promises to provide to his or her 
supporters or community through patronage relations (Barwig, 2012). 
 
 
 Importance of social development in political 
parties platforms (1 is the highest and 5 is the 
lowest) 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Tribes solving 
conflicts 
instead of law 
and courts 
Agree 16 13 20 29 29 107 
15.0% 12.1% 18.7% 27.1% 27.1% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
6 29 17 24 33 109 
5.5% 26.6% 15.6% 22.0% 30.3% 100.0% 
Disagree 19 34 54 66 56 229 
8.3% 14.8% 23.6% 28.8% 24.5% 100.0% 
Total 41 76 91 119 118 445 
9.2% 17.1% 20.4% 26.7% 26.5% 100.0% 
 = 18.407; d.f. = 8; p = .018 
 
 
Freedom of expression 
The more tribal students are, the more they tend to agree that freedom of 
expression should include flouting the government publicly (see Table 54). This 
entails that the more the students support tribes to operate autonomously in 
public politics, the more they tend to publicly show disrespect for the 
government. Yet it is important to note that the percentage of all students who 
agree on flouting the government publicly is low: respectively, 11%, 16% and 
73% agree, somewhat agree and disagree. Another important note is that 
tribalism did not have a significant relation to the question regarding public 
criticism of government policies. Hereby, the trend does not reflect higher 
democratic values among tribal students but rather it indicates less respect for 
public order. This finding is in line with the social violence in Jordan which is 
based on tribalism (Abu Rumman, 2003, Ahmad, 2012; Al-Badayneh, 2012, 83). 
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 Freedom of expression should include 
flouting the government publicly 
Total Agree 
Somewhat 
agree Disagree 
Clans solving conflicts 
instead of courts and 
law 
Agree 21 21 68 110 
19.1% 19.1% 61.8% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
11 22 77 110 
10.0% 20.0% 70.0% 100.0% 
Disagree 18 30 188 236 
7.6% 12.7% 79.7% 100.0% 
Total 50 73 333 456 
11.0% 16.0% 73.0% 100.0% 
 = 15.918; d.f. = 4; p = .003 
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Toleration 
The more tribal students are, the more they tend to accept using force to prevent 
someone under their authority from consuming alcohol and the more they tend 
to force somebody under their authority to follow religious rules such as 
wearing the veil89 (see Tables 55 and 56). The results indicate that tribal students 
tend to be more conservative in their religious and social views than other 
students. They also indicate that tribal students have higher chances to use force 
rather than other methods to pursue their opinions. While the first indication 
does not necessarily contradict with the democratic ideal, the latter one does. 
 
 
 If someone under your authority tries to 
consume alcohol in front of you 
Total 
Try to prevent 
him by all 
means even if 
you are obliged 
to use force 
Try to give 
him an advice 
and leave it 
for him to 
decide 
Consider it a 
personal 
matter and 
you will not 
interfere 
Clans solving 
conflicts 
instead of 
courts and 
law 
Agree 43 52 7 102 
42.2% 51.0% 6.9% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
36 58 9 103 
35.0% 56.3% 8.7% 100.0% 
Disagree 54 133 26 213 
25.4% 62.4% 12.2% 100.0% 
Total 133 243 42 418 
31.8% 58.1% 10.0% 100.0% 
 = 10.373; d.f. = 4; p = .035 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
89 Adding gender and religiosity factors as an extra layer to the crosstabulation analysis does not 
appear to have any influence on the tribal factor. 
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 Force someone under your authority to follow 
a religious rule 
Total Yes No Do not know 
Clans solving 
conflicts 
instead of 
courts and 
law 
Agree 68 26 10 104 
65.4% 25.0% 9.6% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
51 32 22 105 
48.6% 30.5% 21.0% 100.0% 
Disagree 97 90 28 215 
45.1% 41.9% 13.0% 100.0% 
Total 216 148 60 424 
50.9% 34.9% 14.2% 100.0% 
 = 17.437; d.f. = 4; p = .002 
 
 
The Rule of the Majority 
The more tribal students are, the more they tend to agree that in a democratic 
system the winning majority should have the right to impose its opinions on 
minorities or individuals in any issue that achieves their interests or supports 
their ideologies without any restrictions (See Table 57). The result shows a 
greater misunderstanding of democracy among tribal students than other 
students. This result is compatible with the Schumpeterian (1942, 269) view 
which reduces democracy to periodical elections. It is also in line with 
Rousseau’s (2010, 8, I.vii) view where anyone who refuses to obey the will of the 
majority (the general will) is to be forced to do so by the rest. In the Jordanian 
context, democracy was summarized to electoral procedures that support such 
views especially among tribal people. The trend among tribal students here is 
quite interesting. In his analysis of tribes in Jordan as civil society, Richard 
Antoun (2000, 450) argues that in conflict resolution the tribal mode provides “a 
mechanism for reconciliation and a basis for resuming the normal flow of social 
relations at both the family and the community level”. Thus tribal students’ 
attitudes seem to contradict with the tribal mode of conflict resolution. This hints 
that the tribal culture is transforming from being more to less democratic. The 
Single Non-Transferable Vote system is not solely responsible of this change; the 
state’s policies, the social, political and economic changes, the exposure to 
modernity and the way democracy is promoted at the national and international 
levels plays a role in transforming the tribal culture to a less democratic one. 
Nonetheless, the voting system in Jordan - which has been implemented for 
almost two decades - accelerates the transformation. 
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that the tribal culture is transforming from being more to less democratic. The 
Single Non-Transferable Vote system is not solely responsible of this change; the 
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 Majority have the right to impose its 
opinions on minorities in any issue that 
achieves its interests or supports its 
ideologies 
Total Agree 
Somewhat 
agree Disagree 
Clans solving 
conflicts 
instead of 
courts and 
law 
Agree 44 28 32 104 
42.3% 26.9% 30.8% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
37 30 36 103 
35.9% 29.1% 35.0% 100.0% 
Disagree 60 53 105 218 
27.5% 24.3% 48.2% 100.0% 
Total 141 111 173 425 
33.2% 26.1% 40.7% 100.0% 
 = 11.943; d.f. = 4; p = .018 
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8.3.3 Tribalism and democratic institutions 
Tribal students tend to agree more than other students that active democratic 
institutions in Jordan such as political parties, labor and profession unions are 
weak (see Table 58). Yet, half of the students who disagree on solving conflicts 
through clans say that democratic institutions in Jordan are weak and the 
majority of all students agree. The weak performance of these institutions in the 
social and political domains and the presence of tribal identifications as an 
alternative could partly explain the tendency among tribal students here (Abu 
Rumman, 2003). Yet, the weak performance of those institutions is partly caused 
by the presence of tribalism in the political sphere. This situation creates a circle 
in which the weakness of democratic institutions strengthens tribalism and the 
strength of tribalism weakens democratic institutions. The processes through 
which the state policies insulated democratic institutions from public politics 
and decreased the autonomy of tribes to operate outside public politics in a 
national level created this circle. These policies increased the state capacity in a 
national level and preserved and consolidated its regime. 
 
 
 Active democratic institutions in 
Jordan are weak 
Total Agree 
Somewhat 
agree Disagree 
Clans solving conflicts 
instead of courts and 
law 
Agree 64 32 12 108 
59.3% 29.6% 11.1% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
51 42 14 107 
47.7% 39.3% 13.1% 100.0% 
Disagree 117 67 50 234 
50.0% 28.6% 21.4% 100.0% 
Total 232 141 76 449 
51.7% 31.4% 16.9% 100.0% 
 = 10.26; d.f. = 4; p = .036 
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Tribal students tend to be more satisfied and more unsatisfied with the 
Jordanian parliament performance than other students. The polarization in tribal 
students’ opinions is in line with the polarization among tribes in elections 
(Amawi, 1994; Alzywd, 2010). Moreover, the majority of tribal students tend to 
be unsatisfied with the Jordanian parliament (see table 59). This hints that the 
tribal nature of the parliament does not grant it an intrinsic support from tribal 
people. The support of tribal candidates from tribal people is based to a large 
extent on the services that the candidate will provide to his or her group. These 
local and personal services can hardly reach the majority of tribal people. This 
situation seems to be reflected in the opinions of tribal students. 
 
 
 Are you satisfied with the performance of the 
Jordanian parliament? 
Total Absolutely 
To a 
Large 
Extent Somewhat 
To a 
Small 
Extent 
not at 
all 
Tribes solving 
conflicts instead 
of courts and law 
Agree 14 10 33 16 36 109 
12.8% 9.2% 30.3% 14.7% 33.0% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
7 6 50 24 22 109 
6.4% 5.5% 45.9% 22.0% 20.2% 100.0% 
Disagree 19 20 88 56 47 230 
8.3% 8.7% 38.3% 24.3% 20.4% 100.0% 
Total 40 36 171 96 105 448 
8.9% 8.0% 38.2% 21.4% 23.4% 100.0% 
 = 16.301; d.f. = 8; p = .038 
 
 
Political parties 
Obstacles behind joining a political party 
Tribal students tend to agree more that they will not join a weak political party. 
Further analyses show that this tendency appears among Transjordanian 
students and not among Palestinian Jordanian students. However, p-value for 
Transjordanians is more than .05 (see Table 60). Tribal students have stronger 
bonds with tribes than non-tribal ones. These tribes have stronger status in the 
political sphere than political parties. Hereby, there is less necessity for tribal 
students to join weak political parties than non-tribal ones. The argument here 
becomes more valid by recognizing two points. First, Palestinian tribes do not 
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have the same political status of Transjordanian tribes. Thus, Palestinian 
Jordanian tribal students do not have the same tendency as Transjordanian tribal 
students. Second, tribal students tend to agree more than other students that 
they will not join a political party because legislations and laws that support 
political parties in Jordan are weak (see Table 61). 
 
 
The Country of Origin 
Not joining a weak political 
Party 
Total Agree 
Somewhat 
agree Disagree 
Transjordanian Tribes Solving 
Conflicts 
between 
citizens Instead 
of Law and 
Courts 
Agree 57 10 14 81 
70.4% 12.3% 17.3% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
40 23 15 78 
51.3% 29.5% 19.2% 100.0% 
Disagree 64 28 21 113 
56.6% 24.8% 18.6% 100.0% 
Total 161 61 50 272 
59.2% 22.4% 18.4% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanian 
Tribes Solving 
Conflicts 
between 
citizens Instead 
of Law and 
Courts 
Agree 11 4 8 23 
47.8% 17.4% 34.8% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
12 7 4 23 
52.2% 30.4% 17.4% 100.0% 
Disagree 46 23 27 96 
47.9% 24.0% 28.1% 100.0% 
Total 69 34 39 142 
48.6% 23.9% 27.5% 100.0% 
*  = 8.428; d.f. = 4; p = .077 
**  = 2.203; d.f. = 4; p = .698 
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have the same political status of Transjordanian tribes. Thus, Palestinian 
Jordanian tribal students do not have the same tendency as Transjordanian tribal 
students. Second, tribal students tend to agree more than other students that 
they will not join a political party because legislations and laws that support 
political parties in Jordan are weak (see Table 61). 
 
 
The Country of Origin 
Not joining a weak political 
Party 
Total Agree 
Somewhat 
agree Disagree 
Transjordanian Tribes Solving 
Conflicts 
between 
citizens Instead 
of Law and 
Courts 
Agree 57 10 14 81 
70.4% 12.3% 17.3% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
40 23 15 78 
51.3% 29.5% 19.2% 100.0% 
Disagree 64 28 21 113 
56.6% 24.8% 18.6% 100.0% 
Total 161 61 50 272 
59.2% 22.4% 18.4% 100.0% 
Palestinian 
Jordanian 
Tribes Solving 
Conflicts 
between 
citizens Instead 
of Law and 
Courts 
Agree 11 4 8 23 
47.8% 17.4% 34.8% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
12 7 4 23 
52.2% 30.4% 17.4% 100.0% 
Disagree 46 23 27 96 
47.9% 24.0% 28.1% 100.0% 
Total 69 34 39 142 
48.6% 23.9% 27.5% 100.0% 
*  = 8.428; d.f. = 4; p = .077 
**  = 2.203; d.f. = 4; p = .698 
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 Not joining a political party because 
legislations that support political parties 
are weak 
Total Agree Somewhat agree Disagree 
Clans solving 
conflicts instead 
of courts and law 
Agree 61 19 23 103 
59.2% 18.4% 22.3% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
42 37 24 103 
40.8% 35.9% 23.3% 100.0% 
Disagree 109 69 43 221 
49.3% 31.2% 19.5% 100.0% 
Total 212 125 90 427 
49.6% 29.3% 21.1% 100.0% 
 = 10.1; d.f. = 4; p = .039 
 
 
A small majority of students (26.4%) do not have any concern about joining a 
political party which is controlled by tribes (see Table 62). The tribal factor does 
not relate to the students’ answers; yet, the country of origin factor does. 
Palestinian Jordanian students tend to refrain from joining a political party 
which is controlled by tribes more than Transjordanian students. This shows 
that Transjordanian students tend to accept a political role of tribes more than 
Palestinian Jordanian students. This result is in line with the fact that tribalism 
plays a more significant political role among Transjordanians than among 
Palestinian Jordanians. 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Absolutely 76 17.5 
To a Large Extent 74 17.0 
Somewhat 88 20.2 
To a Small Extent 82 18.9 
not at all 115 26.4 
Total 435 100.0 
Missing System 29  
Total 464  
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Results of diverse political parties 
Negative Results 
Tribal students tend to agree more than other students that the presence of 
diverse political parties will lead to the fragmentation of Jordanian society. In 
addition, tribal students tend to agree more than other students that the 
existence of many political parties in Jordan will lead to the foundation of 
groups which fight over power. Yet, further analysis shows that in both 
questions this tendency appears only among Transjordanian tribal students and 
does not among Palestinian Jordanian tribal ones (see Tables 63 and 64). The 
differences between the opinions of Transjordanian tribal students and 
Palestinian Jordanian tribal ones show that the negative attitudes towards 
political parties among the former are not based on inherited tribal culture but 
rather on the relationship between certain tribes and political parties. This has 
been confrontational for many decades in the modern history of Jordan (Musa, 
1996; Massad, 2001). This was not the case between Palestinian Jordanian tribes 
and political parties. 
 
 
 
Transjordanian students 
Political parties will lead to the 
fragmentation of the Jordanian society 
Total Agree 
Somewhat 
agree Disagree 
 Tribes solving 
conflicts 
instead of 
courts and law 
Agree 41 21 20 82 
50.0% 25.6% 24.4% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
22 17 41 80 
27.5% 21.3% 51.3% 100.0% 
Disagree 44 18 52 114 
38.6% 15.8% 45.6% 100.0% 
Total 107 56 113 276 
38.8% 20.3% 40.9% 100.0% 
 = 15.778; d.f. = 4; p = .003 
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Transjordanian students 
Political parties will lead to the 
foundation of groups, which fight over 
power 
Total Agree 
Somewhat 
agree Disagree 
 Tribes solving 
conflicts 
instead of 
courts and law 
Agree 53 16 13 82 
64.6% 19.5% 15.9% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
34 24 22 80 
42.5% 30.0% 27.5% 100.0% 
Disagree 50 29 35 114 
43.9% 25.4% 30.7% 100.0% 
Total 137 69 70 276 
49.6% 25.0% 25.4% 100.0% 
 = 11.448; d.f. = 4; p = .022 
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8.3.4 Tribalism and democratic practice 
 
The state and democracy in Jordan 
Students who do not agree at all on solving conflicts through tribes instead of 
courts and law tend to agree less than other students that the democratic 
practice in Jordan is good. These different attitudes between tribal and non-tribal 
students are understandable since democracy in Jordan favors the former group 
more than the latter. However, students who support tribalism absolutely tend 
also to say more than other students that democracy in Jordan is bad. This 
strongly negative attitude appears among Transjordanian but not among 
Palestinian ones (see table 65). Thus the opinions of students with strong tribal 
identification tend to be strongly polarized regarding democracy in Jordan. 
 
 
Transjordanian students 
Democratic practice in Jordan 
Total Good Average bad 
Tribes solving 
conflicts instead of 
courts and law 
Absolutely 
 
16 11 18 45 
35.6% 24.4% 40.0% 100.0% 
To a Large 
Extent 
 
15 14 2 31 
48.4% 45.2% 6.5% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
 
32 33 12 77 
41.6% 42.9% 15.6% 100.0% 
To a Small 
Extent 
 
22 16 1 39 
56.4% 41.0% 2.6% 100.0% 
not at all 23 36 13 72 
31.9% 50.0% 18.1% 100.0% 
Total 108 110 46 264 
40.9% 41.7% 17.4% 100.0% 
 = 29.39; d.f. = 8; p = .000 
 
 
Tribal students tend to agree more than other students that the government 
adopts the democratic choice as an attempt to silence, calm or contain the 
opposition on the Jordanian street (see table 66). In addition, tribal students tend 
to agree more than other students that officials are not serious about adopting 
the democratic choice. Yet, the latter tendency appears only among 
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opposition on the Jordanian street (see table 66). In addition, tribal students tend 
to agree more than other students that officials are not serious about adopting 
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Transjordanian tribal students and does not appear among Palestinian Jordanian 
ones (see table 67). These tendencies show that tribal students have more critical 
opinions towards the government. Moreover, these opinions seem to be more 
consistent among Transjordanian tribal students. It is possible to argue that the 
political weight of tribes gives tribal students more confidence to have critical 
opinions towards the government. Moreover, the debate between the 
government and opposition regarding privatization policies after the elections in 
2007 was a debate between the government and Transjordanian tribes (Almansi, 
2008). Palestinian tribes were not present in that debate, yet they could still give 
some confidence to their members. Nonetheless, this confidence does not 
transfer to direct criticism to officials. In line with the results here, tribal students 
tend to agree more than other students that the state adopts the democratic 
choice in order to appease Western countries that seek to spread democracy. Yet, 
the latter tendency appears only among Transjordanian tribal students and not 
among Palestinian Jordanians. 
 
 
 
 = 9.889; d.f. = 4; p = .042 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Jordanian government adopts the 
democratic choice to silence, calm or contain 
opposition 
Total Agree Somewhat agree Disagree 
Clans solving 
conflicts 
instead of 
courts and law 
Agree 67 18 22 107 
62.6% 16.8% 20.6% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
44 33 27 104 
42.3% 31.7% 26.0% 100.0% 
Disagree 124 55 48 227 
54.6% 24.2% 21.1% 100.0% 
Total 235 106 97 438 
53.7% 24.2% 22.1% 100.0% 
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Transjordanian students 
Officials are not serious about adopting the 
democratic choice 
Total Agree Somewhat agree Disagree 
Tribes solving 
conflicts instead 
of courts and 
law 
Agree 
 
65 7 7 79 
82.3% 8.9% 8.9% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
46 20 12 78 
59.0% 25.6% 15.4% 100.0% 
Disagree 71 34 12 117 
60.7% 29.1% 10.3% 100.0% 
Total 182 61 31 274 
66.4% 22.3% 11.3% 100.0% 
 = 15.101; d.f. = 4; p = .004 
 
 
In relation to the state and Islamists, the more nontribal students are, the more 
they tend to disagree that in relation to democracy in Jordan the government 
fears that Islamists will control the government. Again the relationship does not 
appear among Palestinian tribal students (see Table 68). However, Palestinian 
Jordanian students in general agree more than Transjordanian students that the 
government fears that Islamists will rule as the previous chapter discussed. The 
result here shows that Transjordanian tribal students tend to see more tension 
between the state and Islamists than nontribal ones. Islamists objection of the 
electoral system and the government utilization of the system to decrease the 
power of Islamists by increasing tribal identifications (Mahafzah, 2001; Alda‘jeh, 
2005) are in line with the result here. 
In the last three questions, the percentage of tribal students who have critical 
views towards the government relation to democracy was more than 62 percent. 
This finding might appear to contrary to the supportive position of tribes to the 
regime, and the regime’s support for tribes. In order to understand this assumed 
contradiction, one needs to recognize that the regime is represented mainly by 
the monarchy - not by the government. The tribal opposition - as the previous 
section elaborated - is driven by economic conditions rather than ideological 
stances. In addition, it is usually motivated by personal or group interests within 
the tribes and rarely driven, if at all, by the whole tribe. Consequently, the tribal 
opposition, especially the public one, for the most part targets the government 
which is responsible of implementing the economic policies and providing 
services but not the monarchy or the political system which constructs monitors 
and regulates the government and its policies at the national level. 
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Transjordanian students 
The government fear that Islamists will 
control the government 
Total Agree Somewhat agree Disagree 
Tribes solving 
conflicts 
instead of 
courts and 
law 
Agree 54 14 12 80 
67.5% 17.5% 15.0% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
39 20 21 80 
48.8% 25.0% 26.3% 100.0% 
Disagree 70 14 33 117 
59.8% 12.0% 28.2% 100.0% 
Total 163 48 66 277 
58.8% 17.3% 23.8% 100.0% 
 = 10.838; d.f. = 4; p = .028 
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Demonstrations 
Tribal students tend to say more than other students that they would participate 
in a peaceful demonstration against some of the government policies such as the 
removal of subsidies on fuel. Yet, this tendency appears only among 
Transjordanian tribal students (see Table 69). The results here assure the 
importance of the government economic services for tribes (Satloff, 1986a; 
Massad, 2001). They also assure the readiness of tribes to protect these services. 
 
 
Transjordanian students 
Would participate in a peaceful demonstration 
against some of the government policies 
Total Yes Somewhat No 
Tribes solving 
conflicts 
instead of 
courts and 
law 
Agree 61 4 10 75 
81.3% 5.3% 13.3% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
43 12 13 68 
63.2% 17.6% 19.1% 100.0% 
Disagree 64 17 22 103 
62.1% 16.5% 21.4% 100.0% 
Total 168 33 45 246 
68.3% 13.4% 18.3% 100.0% 
 = 9.55; d.f. = 4; p = .049 
 
 
Elections 
The more tribal students are, the more they tend to participate in parliamentary 
elections. Half of all tribal students participated in parliamentary elections 
compared to 45% of somewhat tribal students and 38% of nontribal students. 
However, these differences are insignificant statistically. 
The more tribal students are, the more they tend to disagree on choosing a 
candidate based on his electoral platform (see Table 70). This tendency is 
relatively low: 70.6% of tribal students would still choose a candidate based on 
his or her electoral platform. However, this does not mean that the tribe does not 
play a strong role in candidate choice. A high majority of tribal students tend to 
choose a candidate based on his or her tribe (see Table 71). The result of the two 
questions suggests that the tribe is not the only factor which affects tribal 
students’ electoral behavior. The tribal candidate is still expected to deliver 
certain promises and services (Alzyud, 2010). 
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 Choosing a candidate based on his or 
her electoral platform 
Total Agree Somewhat agree Disagree 
Clans solving 
conflicts instead 
of courts and 
law 
Agree 77 9 23 109 
70.6% 8.3% 21.1% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
69 25 14 108 
63.9% 23.1% 13.0% 100.0% 
Disagree 176 34 20 230 
76.5% 14.8% 8.7% 100.0% 
Total 322 68 57 447 
72.0% 15.2% 12.8% 100.0% 
 = 18.562; d.f. = 4; p = .001 
 
 
 Choosing a candidate based on his or her 
tribe 
Total Agree Somewhat Agree Disagree 
Tribes solving 
conflicts 
instead of 
courts and law 
Agree 75 16 16 107 
70.1% 15.0% 15.0% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
62 32 14 108 
57.4% 29.6% 13.0% 100.0% 
Disagree 92 55 79 226 
40.7% 24.3% 35.0% 100.0% 
Total 229 103 109 441 
51.9% 23.4% 24.7% 100.0% 
 = 37.8; d.f. = 4; p = .000 
 
 
The more tribal the students are, the more they tend to agree on choosing a 
candidate based on his or her religion (see table 72). However, there is no 
relationship between the tribal factor and choosing an Islamist candidate. This 
shows that religion plays a stronger role among tribal students, yet this role does 
not take the form of political Islam. As the study argued in chapter four, the state 
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adopts Islam in its national discourse and promotes certain Islamic practices. At 
the same time, the state adopts a tribal identity as its national identity. This 
composition and the conservative tribal culture increase the importance of 
religion among tribes. However, the state at the same time utilizes tribal 
identifications to counter Islamists. Hence, religion does not take the form of 
political Islam among tribes. 
 
 
 Choosing a candidate based on his or 
her religion 
Total Agree Somewhat agree Disagree 
Clans solving 
conflicts 
instead of 
courts and law 
Agree 80 17 13 110 
72.7% 15.5% 11.8% 100.0% 
Somewhat 
agree 
68 17 24 109 
62.4% 15.6% 22.0% 100.0% 
Disagree 124 47 60 231 
53.7% 20.3% 26.0% 100.0% 
Total 272 81 97 450 
60.4% 18.0% 21.6% 100.0% 
 = 12.956; d.f. = 4; p = .011 
 
 
By examining the students' answers in relation to the tribal factor, it is possible 
to recognize three trends where the tribal factor prevails. These trends are: strong 
political opposition, tribal political participation and undemocratic tendencies. What is 
the relation between these trends and decreasing and/or increasing autonomous 
tribes’ power to operate outside public politics is discussed in the next section. 
 
 
8.4 TRIBALISM TRENDS AND DEMOCRACY AMONG 
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN JORDAN 
 
8.4.1 Strong political opposition 
Tribal students tend to be more critical towards government in its relation to 
democracy than other students. This trend appears in questions related to 
demonstrations, the relationship between the government and democracy and 
freedom of expression. The trend here is quite interesting; a simple expectation 
from the results would be that tribes are more supportive of the government 
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adopts Islam in its national discourse and promotes certain Islamic practices. At 
the same time, the state adopts a tribal identity as its national identity. This 
composition and the conservative tribal culture increase the importance of 
religion among tribes. However, the state at the same time utilizes tribal 
identifications to counter Islamists. Hence, religion does not take the form of 
political Islam among tribes. 
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Total Agree Somewhat agree Disagree 
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By examining the students' answers in relation to the tribal factor, it is possible 
to recognize three trends where the tribal factor prevails. These trends are: strong 
political opposition, tribal political participation and undemocratic tendencies. What is 
the relation between these trends and decreasing and/or increasing autonomous 
tribes’ power to operate outside public politics is discussed in the next section. 
 
 
8.4 TRIBALISM TRENDS AND DEMOCRACY AMONG 
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN JORDAN 
 
8.4.1 Strong political opposition 
Tribal students tend to be more critical towards government in its relation to 
democracy than other students. This trend appears in questions related to 
demonstrations, the relationship between the government and democracy and 
freedom of expression. The trend here is quite interesting; a simple expectation 
from the results would be that tribes are more supportive of the government 
 214   
 
 
because of the voting system which favors tribes and the policies which favor 
the presence of tribes in public institutions. However, the diachronic analysis of 
the relationship between tribes and the state would suggest a different 
understanding. First, the processes through which the state has been building 
the Jordanian national identity increased the importance of tribal identity by 
transforming it to a national one. These processes increased the tribes’ power 
and granted tribal people more confidence to criticize the government.  Second, 
the integration of tribes in public institutions has been increasing the negative 
impact of the government’s privatization policies since the mid-1990s on tribes 
and decreasing the state-tribes patronage relationship. As a result, the tension 
between tribes and the government has been increasing. Third, the Single Non-
Transferable Vote system privileges tribes and increases their engagement in 
public politics. This increases the tribes’ power to object to government policies. 
In relation to political parties, tribal students tend to have more negative 
attitudes towards them than other students. However, this negative attitude 
does not mean that tribal students are against the idea of political parties or that 
tribalism contradicts with the concept of political parties. Tribal students do not 
show any different attitudinal trends than other students towards the 
importance of political parties in a democratic system. The trend here can be 
understood through, firstly, the confrontational relation between Transjordanian 
tribes and political parties during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. In this 
confrontation the government promoted political parties as a source of disorder 
and utilized Jordanian tribes to oppress these parties. Second, tribal students 
have an alternative to political parties; i.e. tribes. This alternative is supported by 
the electoral system which marginalizes political parties. Therefore tribal 
students feel more comfortable to step away from political parties and choose a 
stronger alternative. 
The differences between the answers of Transjordanian and Palestinian 
Jordanian tribal students, which are related to this trend assures that the 
opposition tribal culture is constructed - rather than inherited - by social, 
political and economic relations. These relations are connected to the processes 
through which the state decreased the autonomy of tribes and other power 
groups to operate outside public politics and decreased the integration of 
political parties and other trust networks in public politics. 
 
8.4.2 Multilevel tribal political participation 
Tribalism has a strong relationship to the political participation of tribal students. 
Tribal students tend to strongly participate in elections based on their tribal 
identification. However, the electoral platform of the candidate is strongly 
important for tribal students. This suggests that traditional tribal identifications 
or kinship identifications construct different political groups among different 
tribes but not as much within the tribe. The political loyalties within the tribe are 
not merely based on the submission to the sheikh of tribe. Different political 
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actors with different political platforms compete to gain political support from 
their tribes’ members. The reconstruction of political power relations within the 
tribes is caused by the processes through which the state decreased the 
autonomy of tribes to operate outside public politics, for example, the land 
project, education, sedentarization, employment, etc. In addition, the 
reconstruction is caused by the processes through which the state decreased the 
integration of political opposition in public politics, for example, the electoral 
system. 
 
8.4.3 Undemocratic tendencies 
In democracy, conflict resolution and disagreements should be solved through 
negotiations and/or debates which led to a consensus paving the way for 
legislation. Social violence or having absolute winners or losers are 
undemocratic signs. Considering these points, tribal students tend to have 
undemocratic attitudes more than other students. For example, they tend to 
agree more with using force to prevent someone under their authority from 
consuming alcohol and on forcing somebody under their authority to follow 
religious rules such as wearing the veil. Patriarchal structures and traditions of 
bearing collective responsibility of tribe members (Kabatilo, 2013, 96-97) 
encourage this behavior. The state’s policies recognized, adopted and promoted 
these aspects of tribalism by recognizing the tribal law legally and in practice at 
the beginning and in practice later on. 
Tribal students tend also to agree more than other students that the winning 
majority have the right to impose their opinions on minorities or individuals in 
any issue that achieves their interests or supports their ideologies without any 
restrictions. As discussed earlier, the tendency here is new to the tribal culture 
and is driven by the Single Non-transferable Vote system, the state policies, the 
social, political and economic changes, and the way democracy is promoted in 
the national and international levels. 
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9 Conclusions and Final 
Remarks 
Thus far, the study has been analyzing democratization processes in Jordan and 
their impact on students’ attitudes towards democracy. Now, it is time to 
examine what the study adds to the understanding of democratization and what 
we have learned about the impact of democratization on the democratic culture 
and the future of democracy in Jordan. 
 
 
9.1 DEMOCRATIZATION AND DE-DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
Democracy, as this study has consistently argued, is an ideal that needs endless 
effort rather than an actual goal that can be accomplished. Thus, a study about 
democracy needs to examine continuous processes through which more people 
acquire power. This approach differs from two others. The first assumes that 
there are specific preconditions or conditions which result in democracy. The 
second assumes that there are no preconditions or conditions for democracy. 
The approach that this study adopts and promotes recognizes the importance of 
a democratic culture for democratization. This culture promotes values which 
are in line with the basic meaning of democracy, for example, collaboration, 
discussion, tolerance, trust, etc. Yet, the democratic culture and its values are not 
preconditions for democracy; they should not be achieved in a chronological 
fashion. Rather, they are part of the continuous processes of democratization. 
The work of Charles Tilly (2007) is a good starting point to examine democracy 
as a set of continuous processes. 
In Jordan, large processes produced democratization and de-democratization. 
These processes are colonialization, domestic conflicts, military occupation and 
economic organization. British colonialization utilized negotiations, financial aid, 
coercive and other means to support the creation of Jordan as a modern state. In 
this process, colonialization decreased the autonomy of tribes to operate outside 
public politics. By so doing, it increased democratization in Jordan. However, 
British colonialization decreased the integration of the opposition, reinforced the 
undemocratic regime and implemented undemocratic policies. By so doing, 
colonialization increased de-democratization in Jordan. 
 
  217 
 
In the 1950s, domestic sedition resulted in decreasing the integration of many 
trust networks into public politics and in increasing, at the same time, the 
integration of non-state Islamist trust networks into public politics. The sedition 
was largely caused by the rise of Arab nationalism after the occupation of 
Palestine in 1948 and the establishment of Israel as an independent state. As the 
sedition was subdued by the regime, increasing the integration of Bedouins and 
tribes into public politics ensued. In this context, domestic conflicts increased 
democratization and de-democratization. 
The regional conflict between Arabs and Israel and the Arabs’ support for the 
PLO accompanied with their refusal to recognize Jordan annexation of the West 
Bank exacerbated the national unity in Jordan and questioned the Jordanian 
identity. Those processes, their backwash and the Israeli occupation of the West 
Bank escalated domestic conflict between the regime and Palestinian guerillas. 
The denouements of the conflict in early 1971 were: increasing the insulation 
Palestinian Jordanians from public politics; increasing the autonomy of tribes to 
operate outside public politics; dividing the economic activities of both parties; 
creating chasm between both groups and consolidating the state. The survival of 
the state increased democratization, yet, the prices for this survival was an 
increase in de-democratization. 
The continuing occupation of the West Bank by Israel increased the 
insulation of Palestinian Jordanians from public politics, especially those who 
were residing in the occupied territories. Decreasing democratization here was 
halted by the undemocratic decision to disengage politically from the West Bank. 
Economic arrangements in Jordan have been producing controversial 
impacts on democratization. At large the Jordanian state has depended on the 
financial aid of Arab and foreign countries. This dependency decreases the state 
capacity to operate in conformity with the expressed demands of its citizens. 
Nonetheless, the financial aid enabled the state to create patronage relations to 
tribes and Bedouins and to decrease the autonomy of tribes to operate outside 
public politics. In addition, the financial aid endowed the state with the means to 
create, sustain and expand public services such as education, health and 
transportation. These services increased the presence of state in the everyday life 
of its citizens and increased the conformity between the state policies and the 
expressed demands of the citizens. 
The land program which aimed at organizing taxation increased the state 
capacity and bolstered the modern conceptualization of ‘country’ and 
‘boundaries’ among Transjordanians. Moreover, by establishing individual 
rights over the land, the program introduced the state as a mediator in disputes 
over the land and decreased the capacity of tribes’ leaders to operate outside 
public politics. 
Expanding the size of public institutions by employing more Transjordanians 
alleviated the effects of the malfunction of the economy and increased the 
integration of Transjordanians into public politics. However, this policy 
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transferred patronage relations to public institutions and decreased mutually 
binding consultation in state-citizens relations. Moreover the policy, after the 
domestic conflict in the early 1970s, divided the economic activities of 
Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians. The former dominated the private 
sector and the latter dominated the public one. Nonetheless, the policy and the 
weak performance of the economy in the 1970s increased labor migration to Gulf 
countries especially among Palestinian Jordanians. This mitigated the tension 
between Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians. Further, the dependency 
on the financial aid of Gulf countries compelled the Jordanian regime to 
acknowledge the Arab summit decision to recognize the PLO as the sole 
legitimate representative of Palestinian people. This recognition justified more 
the insulation of Palestinian Jordanians from public politics. 
Labor migration to Gulf countries and the positive performance of the 
economy in the 1970s and 1980s ameliorated the stature of women in the labor 
market and decreased the insulation of women from public politics. However, 
the amelioration tottered after the economic crisis in the late 1980s. 
The economic crisis in the late 1980s increased the integration of trust 
networks into public politics. However, the persistence and the aggravation of 
the crisis, especially after the first Gulf War, dragged the regime to seek the 
support of foreign countries. The consequences were a decrease in integrating 
trust networks into public politics, an increase in the tensions between 
Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians and an increase in patronage 
relation within state institutions. Effectively, the economic crisis at a certain level 
increased democratization. Yet, the exacerbation of the crisis increased de-
democratization. 
The analysis of the relationship between the economic arrangements and 
processes of democratization elucidate the impact of the former on increasing 
democratization and de-democratization. 
Thus far, the study concluded how larger processes in Jordan, namely, 
colonialization, domestic conflicts, military occupation and economic 
organization affected democratization. The effect of these processes on 
democratization is discussed in Tilly’s (2007) thesis. In addition, Tilly (2007) 
understands clearly the importance of considering the three processes of 
democratization rather than one or two of them. However, Tilly’s (2007) thesis 
does not give enough heed to the interrelation between democratization 
processes and their possible effect on each other and consequently on 
democratization. The analysis in this thesis demonstrates a strong impact of 
democratization processes on each other. Moreover, the analysis provides 
evidences on how democratization and de-democratization processes shape the 
political culture and in return how the political culture affects those processes. 
By so doing, the study contributes to the general debate on democratization 
processes and the political culture. In addition, it develops and sharpens Tilly’s 
thesis by rendering deeper insights on the dynamics of democratization 
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processes and their impact not on democracy and more important on the 
democratic political culture. These contributions, as the study aspires, provide 
solid bases for further researches on democratization processes and the political 
culture in Arab and other countries.  
In relation to trust networks in Jordan, increasing the integration of Islamist 
trust networks into public politics assisted the apolitical role of women and 
reinforced translating everyday gender differences and conservative gender 
views to public politics. In addition, it mitigated the tension between Palestinian 
Jordanians and Transjordanians and increased slightly the integration of the 
former group into public politics. On the other hand, decreasing the integration 
of socialist leftist, communist and Arab nationalist groups into public politics 
decreased domestic strife and increased the integration of Bedouins and tribes 
into public politics. 
In relation to gender inequality, decreasing the ubiety of women in social and 
political spheres increased slightly, yet perceptibly, the political and social 
spaces of women’s endeavors among Islamists and tribes. From another angle, 
translating everyday gender differences and conservative gender views to public 
politics increased the integration of Islamists’ trust networks and tribes into 
public politics and increased the insulation of women from public politics. 
Insulating Palestinian Jordanians from public politics increased the 
integration of tribes into public politics. However, over insulation and 
integration of both parties increased the autonomy of tribes to operate outside 
public politics within and outside state institutions; within state institutions 
through patronage relations and outside state institutions through the 
application of tribal law and domestic tensions. 
In relation to tribes, the excessive increase in their integration into public 
politics resulted in increasing the insulation of gender equality from public 
politics, decreasing the integration of Islamists trust networks into public politics, 
increasing further the insulation of Palestinian Jordanians from public politics 
and confusing the meaning of being Jordanian. 
 
9.1.1 Democratization and the democratic culture 
This study adopted a stance where cultures metamorphose continuously. The 
metamorphoses materialize through social, political, economic and natural 
processes. In relation to democratic culture, the analysis of this study elucidates 
a sturdy relation between democratic culture and those factors which pertain to 
democratization processes. In this relationship, democratization processes seem 
to be at stake in constructing the democratic culture. 
 In the case of Jordanian university students, increasing and decreasing 
the integration of Islamist and non-Islamist trust networks into public politics, 
increasing and decreasing the insulation of women and Palestinian Jordanians 
from public politics and increasing and decreasing the autonomy of tribes to 
operate in public politics have clear impact on students’ attitudes towards 
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different aspects of democracy. The impact of democratization processes is more 
significant than the impact of other factors such as standard of living, parents’ 
education, field of study, age, etc. This finding confirms one of the study’s 
arguments that the democratic culture is not a precondition to democracy or 
democratization. On the contrary, democratization processes largely construct 
the democratic culture. Hereby, it is more likely that a regime which claims the 
need to establish a democratic culture before introducing democratization 
would be establishing an undemocratic culture rather than a democratic one in 
many respects. 
 
 
9.2 AFTERWORD 
 
9.2.1 The future of democracy in Jordan 
Studying history and society is a difficult task. Trying to predict the future is a 
sort of divination. However, predicting the future based on examined patterns is 
part of what science does. On April 11th, 2011, after the Arab Spring broke out, I 
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de-democratization processes in Jordan to a considerable extent produced an 
undemocratic culture, at least among university students. Yet, the findings could 
be extended with confidence to Jordanian society as a whole. In this culture, the 
understanding of crucial democratic concepts such as freedom of expression, 
equality and citizenship seems problematic, likewise accepting democratic 
institutions such as political parties.  
By addressing the above points, this study does not intend to discourage 
democracy advocates in Jordan or diminish the value of their work for 
democracy. Rather, understanding what is at stake to establish democracy in 
Jordan could incite and inspire us to focus on what matters. 
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Appendices 
APPENDICE 1. 
 
Questionnaire about Students Attitudes towards Democracy90 
 
Dear students, 
The discourse about democracy and democratic transition occupies an important 
space in international and national discourses. This study aims at examining 
attitudes towards democracy among University students in Jordan. 
Your answers have very important scientific and statistical values. Thus, I hope 
you will answer carefully and you will give your personal opinion freely and 
honestly. To assure that your personal identity will be hidden, you are not 
obliged to write your name on the questionnaire. 
If you are not sure of the answers of some questions, please clarify that and do 
not leave the rest of questions unanswered. Any answer will help us in 
understanding and analyzing the subject of the study. 
The researcher is willing to accept any comment or suggestion and to answer 
any questions related to the questionnaire. 
 
First: General information: 
1. Age: _____  
 
2. Sex: a) Male        b) Female 
 
3. Nationality:       a) Jordanian        b) Other clarify _____________    
 
4. Country of origin or ethnicity: 
a) Jordanian     b) Palestinian     c) Syrian     d) Circassian     e) Chechen     f) 
Other___________    
 
5. Religion: a) Muslim           b) Christian           c) other ____________ 
 
Educational level: 
6. In which education level are you? 
a) bachelor specify the year ____ 
                                                     
90 Questions marked with * are not analyzed in the study 
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b) Diploma             c) Master           D) PhD        e) Other specify __________     
 
7. The name of the university ________________________________________  
 
8. Which faculty _____________________ 
 
Living conditions and parents 
9. According to your personal estimation, your living level is 
a) Poor   b) Less than average   c) Average    d) More than average     e) Wealthy 
 
10. What is the education level of your father? 
a) Illiterate  b) Elementary  c) High school  d) Diploma  e) Bachelor    f) Masters    
g) PhD 
 
11. What is the work or profession of your father? _________________________ 
 
12. The father works in 
a) Public sector    b) Private sector     c) Private business owner     d) Unemployed     
e) Retired    
 
13. What is the education level of your mother? 
a) Illiterate    b) Elementary  c) High school  d) Diploma   e) Bachelor    f) Masters    
g) PhD 
 
14. What is the work or profession of your mother? _________________________ 
 
15. The mother works in 
a) Public sector    b) Private sector     c) Private business owner     d) Unemployed     
e) Retired    
 
First: democracy 
16. Do you think that democratic regime is 
a) Excellent        b) Very good        c) Good        d) Bad        e) Very bad 
 
* 17. What is the most democratic practice in your personal opinion? 
__________________________________ 
* 18. What is the most undemocratic practice in your personal opinion? 
__________________________________ 
 
19. To what extent do you agree with the following punishments and 
legislations? 
* a) Stoning adulterer is fair 
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a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat   d) To a small extent             
e) Not at all      
 
*b) Cutting the thief’s hand is not suitable 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent           
e) Not at all      
 
c) Reducing the punishment of the murderer who kills his female relative to 
preserve the family honor is justice 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent           
e) Not at all      
  
20. To what extent do you agree that freedom of expression should include 
a) Criticizing the government publicly 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent           
e) Not at all 
 
b) Flouting the government policy publicly 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
c) Flouting publicly any ideology including religious beliefs 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) Criticizing publicly any ideology including religious beliefs 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
e) Freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all      
 
21. Regarding the relation between state and applying religious rules in 
society such as wearing the veil, praying, prohibiting alcohol and sexually 
suggestive or explicit music videos 
a) The state must impose religious rules and punish those who breach them 
b) These are personal issues and the state should not interfere 
c) It is up to the government to decide what is suitable and people should obey 
d) The state has the right to interfere with some religious rules and does not 
have the right to interfere with others 
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22. If your answer of the last question is (d), what do you think about these 
issues? 
1- Praying 
a) Has the right b) Does not have the right 
 
2- Wearing the veil 
a) Has the right b) Does not have the right 
 
3- Drinking alcohol 
a) Has the right       b) Does not have the right 
 
4- Sexually suggestive or explicit music videos 
a) Has the right b) Does not have the right 
 
23. When talking about democratic reform and security 
a) Security should be introduced and democratic reform should be reduced 
b) The democratic reform should come ahead of security 
c) There is no relationship between security issues and democratic reformation 
d) Democratic reform will lead to strengthening security in society 
 
24. Regarding the relation between reform in Jordanian and Islamic Shari‘a, 
a) The Islamic Shari‘a will lead to political, economic and social reformation 
b) It is important to consider the Islamic Shari‘a as much as possible but to give 
priority to reform 
c) It is better to put the Islamic Shari‘a aside when it comes to the reform 
d) Shari‘a should not be considered at all when it comes to reform 
e) Other explain ________________________________________________  
 
25. If there is a contradiction between Islamic Shari‘a, and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
a) Islamic Shari‘a should come ahead of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 
b) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights should come ahead of Islamic 
Shari‘a 
c) Solutions should be found from Islamic Shari‘a to make it compatible with the 
UDHR even if these solutions contradict with common opinions of Muslim 
scholars. 
d) Something else, please clarify__________________________________________ 
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e) Not at all      
 
*b) Cutting the thief’s hand is not suitable 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent           
e) Not at all      
 
c) Reducing the punishment of the murderer who kills his female relative to 
preserve the family honor is justice 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent           
e) Not at all      
  
20. To what extent do you agree that freedom of expression should include 
a) Criticizing the government publicly 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent           
e) Not at all 
 
b) Flouting the government policy publicly 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
c) Flouting publicly any ideology including religious beliefs 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) Criticizing publicly any ideology including religious beliefs 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
e) Freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers 
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22. If your answer of the last question is (d), what do you think about these 
issues? 
1- Praying 
a) Has the right b) Does not have the right 
 
2- Wearing the veil 
a) Has the right b) Does not have the right 
 
3- Drinking alcohol 
a) Has the right       b) Does not have the right 
 
4- Sexually suggestive or explicit music videos 
a) Has the right b) Does not have the right 
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a) Security should be introduced and democratic reform should be reduced 
b) The democratic reform should come ahead of security 
c) There is no relationship between security issues and democratic reformation 
d) Democratic reform will lead to strengthening security in society 
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a) The Islamic Shari‘a will lead to political, economic and social reformation 
b) It is important to consider the Islamic Shari‘a as much as possible but to give 
priority to reform 
c) It is better to put the Islamic Shari‘a aside when it comes to the reform 
d) Shari‘a should not be considered at all when it comes to reform 
e) Other explain ________________________________________________  
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a) Islamic Shari‘a should come ahead of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 
b) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights should come ahead of Islamic 
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c) Solutions should be found from Islamic Shari‘a to make it compatible with the 
UDHR even if these solutions contradict with common opinions of Muslim 
scholars. 
d) Something else, please clarify__________________________________________ 
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26. To what degree do you agree that the Jordanian government seeks to adopt 
the democratic choice because it 
a) Believes that democracy is the optimal way to govern and develop Jordan 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
b) Attempts to silence, calm or contain opposition within the Jordanian street 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
c) Seeks to appease Western countries 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) Tries to find legitimacy for its policies 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
27. How much do you agree with the following reasons regarding democratic 
situation in Jordan? 
a) Officials are not serious about adopting the democratic choice 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
b) The government fear that Islamists will rule 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
c) Effective democratic institutions in Jordan such as political parties, labor and 
profession unions are weak 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) Democratic culture and awareness in the Jordanian society are weak 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
* e) Political problems in the international and Arab arena have a negative effect 
on democracy such as the Palestinian case and Iraq 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
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* f) Western countries are eager to oppose having real democracy in Jordan at 
this stage because it contradicts with their interests 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
g) Some articles in the Jordanian Constitution or law limit the democratic reform 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
h) The Jordanian street opposes the democratic choice because it leads to social 
changes, which may include women’s status and freedom of expression in 
religious and intellectual issues 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
* i) Democracy does not fit with the clan nature of the Jordanian society 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
28. Do you consider that the democratic practice in Jordan in the current 
circumstances? 
a) Excellent          b) Very good          c) Average          d) Bad         e) Unacceptable 
 
Second: political parties 
29. The presence of different and diverse political parties in a democratic 
society is 
a) Necessary          b) Desirable          c) Ineffective          d) Undesirable       e) 
Wrong 
 
30. Have you ever participated in a political party? 
a) Yes          b) No 
 
31. Would you participate in a political party? 
a) Yes           b) No 
 
32. To what extent the following reasons prevent you from participating in a 
political party? 
a) The fear of security agencies chasing 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
b) The weakness of political parties in Jordan 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 240   
 
 
26. To what degree do you agree that the Jordanian government seeks to adopt 
the democratic choice because it 
a) Believes that democracy is the optimal way to govern and develop Jordan 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
b) Attempts to silence, calm or contain opposition within the Jordanian street 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
c) Seeks to appease Western countries 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) Tries to find legitimacy for its policies 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
27. How much do you agree with the following reasons regarding democratic 
situation in Jordan? 
a) Officials are not serious about adopting the democratic choice 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
b) The government fear that Islamists will rule 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
c) Effective democratic institutions in Jordan such as political parties, labor and 
profession unions are weak 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) Democratic culture and awareness in the Jordanian society are weak 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
* e) Political problems in the international and Arab arena have a negative effect 
on democracy such as the Palestinian case and Iraq 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
 
  241 
 
* f) Western countries are eager to oppose having real democracy in Jordan at 
this stage because it contradicts with their interests 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
g) Some articles in the Jordanian Constitution or law limit the democratic reform 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
h) The Jordanian street opposes the democratic choice because it leads to social 
changes, which may include women’s status and freedom of expression in 
religious and intellectual issues 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
* i) Democracy does not fit with the clan nature of the Jordanian society 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
28. Do you consider that the democratic practice in Jordan in the current 
circumstances? 
a) Excellent          b) Very good          c) Average          d) Bad         e) Unacceptable 
 
Second: political parties 
29. The presence of different and diverse political parties in a democratic 
society is 
a) Necessary          b) Desirable          c) Ineffective          d) Undesirable       e) 
Wrong 
 
30. Have you ever participated in a political party? 
a) Yes          b) No 
 
31. Would you participate in a political party? 
a) Yes           b) No 
 
32. To what extent the following reasons prevent you from participating in a 
political party? 
a) The fear of security agencies chasing 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
b) The weakness of political parties in Jordan 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 242   
 
 
c) Islamists dominate the political party 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) Tribes dominate the political party 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
e) The political party opposes the government policies 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
f) Legislations and laws, which support political parties are weak 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
g) Because you believe that the existence of diverse political parties is forbidden 
in Islam 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
33. To what degree do you agree that presence of political parties in Jordan 
will lead to 
a) Diversity of views the in Jordanian society and benefiting from different 
opinions 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
b) Fragmentation of the Jordanian society 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
c) Monitoring the performance of the government 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) Foundation of groups, which fight over power 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
e) Organize political opposition and make it more efficient 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
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34. Rank the following issues according to their importance in political 
parties’ platforms by writing numbers from 1 to 5 (number 1 is the most 
important and number 5 is the least important) 
____ Economic progress ____ Arab issues 
____ Islamic issues  ____ National issues 
____ Social Development, i.e. women's rights, child’ rights, health insurance, 
education, etc 
 
Third: The Civil Society 
* 35. Do you know what the civil society institutions are? 
a) Yes           b) No 
 
* 36. If your answer is yes, please give two examples about of these 
institutions 
First Example_________________   Second 
example________________ 
 
37. How many times do you go to attend Friday or Sunday prayer? 
a) Always     b) Three times in a month      c) Once or twice in a month      d) 
Barely or do not go 
 
38. How many times do you go to mosque or church apart from Friday or 
Sunday prayer? 
a) Almost daily    b) Once a week at least     c) Once or twice in a month    d) 
Barely or do not go 
 
39. How many times do you attend religious lessons apart from Friday or 
Sunday prayer? 
a) Once a week       b) Twice or more a week       c) Once a month       d) Barely or 
do not 
 
40. Did you participate in students' union elections at your university? 
a) Yes          b) No 
Why ________________________________________________________________ 
 
41. When talking about peaceful demonstrations, it is an obligation to 
a) Prevent all peaceful demonstrations 
b) Allow all peaceful demonstrations only by notifying the government about 
the demonstration without any restrictions 
c) Allow only peaceful demonstrations, which are organized by the government 
d) Other explain ________________________________________________  
 
 242   
 
 
c) Islamists dominate the political party 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) Tribes dominate the political party 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
e) The political party opposes the government policies 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
f) Legislations and laws, which support political parties are weak 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
g) Because you believe that the existence of diverse political parties is forbidden 
in Islam 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
33. To what degree do you agree that presence of political parties in Jordan 
will lead to 
a) Diversity of views the in Jordanian society and benefiting from different 
opinions 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
b) Fragmentation of the Jordanian society 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
c) Monitoring the performance of the government 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) Foundation of groups, which fight over power 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
e) Organize political opposition and make it more efficient 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
 
  243 
 
34. Rank the following issues according to their importance in political 
parties’ platforms by writing numbers from 1 to 5 (number 1 is the most 
important and number 5 is the least important) 
____ Economic progress ____ Arab issues 
____ Islamic issues  ____ National issues 
____ Social Development, i.e. women's rights, child’ rights, health insurance, 
education, etc 
 
Third: The Civil Society 
* 35. Do you know what the civil society institutions are? 
a) Yes           b) No 
 
* 36. If your answer is yes, please give two examples about of these 
institutions 
First Example_________________   Second 
example________________ 
 
37. How many times do you go to attend Friday or Sunday prayer? 
a) Always     b) Three times in a month      c) Once or twice in a month      d) 
Barely or do not go 
 
38. How many times do you go to mosque or church apart from Friday or 
Sunday prayer? 
a) Almost daily    b) Once a week at least     c) Once or twice in a month    d) 
Barely or do not go 
 
39. How many times do you attend religious lessons apart from Friday or 
Sunday prayer? 
a) Once a week       b) Twice or more a week       c) Once a month       d) Barely or 
do not 
 
40. Did you participate in students' union elections at your university? 
a) Yes          b) No 
Why ________________________________________________________________ 
 
41. When talking about peaceful demonstrations, it is an obligation to 
a) Prevent all peaceful demonstrations 
b) Allow all peaceful demonstrations only by notifying the government about 
the demonstration without any restrictions 
c) Allow only peaceful demonstrations, which are organized by the government 
d) Other explain ________________________________________________  
 
 244   
 
 
42. Could you participate in a peaceful demonstration against some of the 
government policies such as terminating the support of fuel prices? 
a) Absolutely       b) To a large extent      c) Somewhat       d) A little     e) Not at all 
f) Something else  Please 
explain__________________________________________ 
 
43. Do you agree on solving conflicts between citizens through clans instead 
of law and courts? 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
* 44. How important are the following sources for you to get information 
about the political and democratic situation in Jordan? 
a) Internet 
a) Extremely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
b) Satellite channels 
a) Extremely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
c) Daily newspapers 
a) Extremely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) Scientific magazines 
a) Extremely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
e) Discussing at university in your free time 
a) Extremely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
f) Sitting in a coffee shop 
a) Extremely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
g) Religious places 
a) Extremely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
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* 44. What is the most democratic institution in your personal opinion? 
__________________________________________________ 
* 45. What is the most undemocratic institution in your personal opinion? 
____________________________________________________ 
 
Fourth: legislative elections 
46. Have you ever participated in parliamentary elections? 
a) Yes           b) No 
Why _________________________________________________________ 
 
* 47. In a democratic system, do you think that a parliament member should 
be a 
a) Representative of people from all classes 
b) Representative of the group who elected him/her 
c) Commissioner with authority and not representative of voters genuinely 
 
48. To what extent you will support a candidate based on the following 
criteria 
a) The political platform 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
b) The tribe of the candidate 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
c) The candidate is an Islamist 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) The candidate origin, i.e. Jordanian, Palestinian, Syrian, Circassian, Chechens, 
Armenians, etc 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
e) The gender of the candidate 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
 
f) The religion of the candidate 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
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49. Regarding parliamentary elections in Jordan to what extent do you agree 
with the following statements? 
a) Elections are unfair 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
b) Candidates did not have electoral platforms 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
c) Elections results are futile 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) Elections are forbidden in Islam 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
e) The electoral system in Jordan is not convincing 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
50. If there are two equally qualified candidates, one is a man and the other is 
a woman, 
a) The man should be elected             b) The woman should be elected 
c) It is better to elect a man                d) It is better to elect a woman 
e) Something else _________________________________________    
Explain why ______________________________________________________ 
 
* 51. Do you agree with allotting number of seats (quota) in the Jordanian 
parliament to certain groups in society such as Chechens, Bedouin, women, 
Christians etc? 
A) Agree           b) Agree with some concerns          c) Do not agree with some 
concerns 
d) Do not agree 
- Explain why ___________________________________________________ 
 
52. Are you satisfied with the performance of the Jordanian parliament? 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
* Explain 
why_____________________________________________________________ 
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Sixth: citizenship 
53. The winning majority have the right to impose their opinions on minority 
or individuals in 
a) Any issue that achieves its interests or supports its ideologies without any 
restrictions 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
b) Any issue that does not breach human rights 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
c) Any issue that is compatible with the Islamic law and the general opinion of 
Muslim scholars 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) Any issue that is compatible with the customs and traditions of the majority 
culture 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
54. When talking about equality between citizens 
- Religious minorities should be allowed to apply the laws of their religion in 
issues, which are not directly related to public affairs such as marriage and 
inheritance 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
- The interest of Transjordanian citizens should come ahead the interest of other 
Jordanian citizens 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
55. When talking about equality between men and women 
a) Equality between men and women should not contradict with Islamic Shari‘a 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
b) Equality between men and women should not contradict with the customs 
and traditions of the society 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
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a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) Any issue that is compatible with the customs and traditions of the majority 
culture 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
54. When talking about equality between citizens 
- Religious minorities should be allowed to apply the laws of their religion in 
issues, which are not directly related to public affairs such as marriage and 
inheritance 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
- The interest of Transjordanian citizens should come ahead the interest of other 
Jordanian citizens 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
55. When talking about equality between men and women 
a) Equality between men and women should not contradict with Islamic Shari‘a 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
b) Equality between men and women should not contradict with the customs 
and traditions of the society 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
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c) Equality between men and women should be similar to gender equality in 
western countries 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
d) The responsibility of men should be different from the responsibility of 
women 
a) Absolutely     b) To a large extent     c) Somewhat     d) To a small extent     e) 
Not at all 
 
56. If someone under your authority tries to consume alcohol in front of you, 
will you 
a) Try to prevent the person by all means even if you have to use force 
b) Try to give him an advice and leave it for him to decide 
c) Consider it a personal matter and will not interfere  
 
57. Did you force someone, or will you ever force someone under your 
authority, for example, your sister, to obey what you consider a religious rule 
such as wearing the veil? 
a) Yes          b) No          c) Do not know 
 
If you like to get the results of the questionnaire, please write your e-mail 
address  
_______________________________ 
 
Thank you very much for your answers 
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Fadi Kabatilo
Democratization Processes 
and the Democratic Culture 
in Arab Countries:  
The Case of Jordan
This thesis argues that the Jordanian 
state policies towards Islamists, 
tribes, women and Palestinian 
Jordanians affect democratization 
and the democratic culture in Jordan 
as much as it affect the political and 
social identifications of those groups. 
Yet, those policies are altered by 
colonialization, domestic conflicts, 
military occupation and economic 
organization. The findings of this 
study provide bases for further 
researches on democratization and 
the democratic culture in Arab 
countries.
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